Cnty. of Peoria v. Couture
| Decision Date | 21 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3-21-0091 |
| Citation | 2022 IL App (3d) 210091,193 N.E.3d 895,456 Ill.Dec. 655 |
| Parties | The COUNTY OF PEORIA, Illinois, and the City of Peoria, Illinois, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Joseph E. COUTURE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Joseph E. Couture, of Peoria, appellant pro se.
Jodi Hoos, State's Attorney, of Peoria (Dana Hughes, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for appellees.
¶ 1 Peoria County filed an ordinance-violation complaint against the defendant, Joseph E. Couture. The City of Peoria joined the action as a second plaintiff. In the ensuing bench trial, the circuit court of Peoria County found that Couture had violated three provisions of a Peoria ordinance forbidding the possession, within city limits, of a "nuisance animal." Peoria City Code § 4-22(a)(1), (2), (6) (amended Jan. 28, 2020). The court imposed a fine on Couture. He appeals, and in his appeal he makes four arguments.
¶ 2 First, Couture argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the ordinance-violation complaint, with prejudice, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2020)) and by granting the county's motion to amend the complaint. We conclude that the denial of the section 2-619 motion merged into the judgment, making the denial unreviewable. Also, because it is the policy of Illinois law to freely and liberally allow amendments to pleadings so that cases will be decided on their merits instead of on pleading technicalities, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to allow the amendment of the complaint.
¶ 3 Second, Couture contends that the circuit court erred by finding that he had violated the three subsections of the municipal code (Peoria City Code § 4-22(a)(1), (2), (6) (amended Jan. 28, 2020)). We partly agree with this contention. The finding against Couture on section 4-22(a)(6) is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We are unable to say the same, however, about the findings on section 4-22(a)(1) and (2), which we accordingly affirm.
¶ 4 Third, Couture maintains that the circuit court erred by granting a motion in limine by the plaintiffs. We hold that he has forfeited this issue by failing to follow up with an offer of proof in the bench trial.
¶ 5 Fourth, Couture argues that, if our decision requires further proceedings on remand, the matter should be assigned to a different judge. We see no need, however, for a remand.
¶ 6 Therefore, we reverse the finding against Couture on section 4-22(a)(6) of the municipal code (id. § 4-22(a)(6)), but we otherwise affirm the judgment.
¶ 8 Couture owned Unit 810 in the condominium building at 401 Southwest Water Street in Peoria, Illinois. Michael J. Salmon owned Unit 806. On the evening of May 6, 2020, in the eighth-floor elevator lobby of the building, Couture's dog bit Salmon's dog, killing it.
¶ 9 On May 7, 2020, a short-form ordinance-violation complaint, or ticket, was filed in the circuit court as Peoria County case No. 20-OV-227. According to the caption of the ticket, Peoria County was the plaintiff. (It was a form in which "County of Peoria" was preprinted as the plaintiff.) The ticket charged that on May 7, 2020, Couture violated section 5-9(a)(6) of the Peoria County Code (Peoria County Code § 5-9(a)(6) (amended Oct. 10, 2019)) by possessing an animal that created a nuisance.
¶ 10 On August 28, 2020, Couture moved for a summary judgment in his favor (see 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(b) (West 2020)). The motion gave four reasons for this requested relief. First, since Couture had an undivided percentage ownership interest in the eighth-floor elevator lobby, the county could not prove that the dog bite was inflicted, in the language of section 5-9(a)(6), "off the premises of the [biting dog's] owner." Second, Salmon was the signer of the ticket, even though he was neither "an attorney representing the plaintiff" nor "a peace officer or a code enforcement officer authorized by the plaintiff to sign the charging document." See Ill. S. Ct. R. 572(a) (eff. Dec. 7, 2011). Third, as proven by an affidavit signed by Couture, the alleged date of the offense was inaccurate (it should have been May 6, 2020, instead of May 7, 2020). Fourth, the ticket accused Couture of "city violations" while citing the Peoria County Code instead of the Peoria City Code.
¶ 11 On September 11, 2020, the circuit court declined to rule on the merits of Couture's motion for summary judgment, instead dismissing the ticket for noncompliance with the signature requirement of Rule 572(a).
¶ 12 On September 15, 2020, an officer of Peoria County Animal Protection Services (Animal Protection), Keith Mallow, signed a new ordinance-violation complaint, which was docketed as Peoria County case No. 20-OV-428. This complaint alleged that on May 7, 2020, at 401 Southwest Water Street in Peoria, Couture violated section 5-9(a)(1), (2), and (6) of the Peoria County Code (Peoria County Code § 5-9(a)(1), (2), (6) (amended Oct. 10, 2019)) by permitting his dog to become a nuisance.
¶ 13 On November 10, 2020, Couture filed a document titled "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for Rule 137 Sanctions." In this motion, he requested two forms of relief. First, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2020)), he argued that the case should be dismissed with prejudice because, under section 1-3 of the county code (Peoria County Code § 1-3 (adopted 1969)), the county code "appl[ied] only to all acts performed within the unincorporated areas of the county" (to quote from section 1-3). The motion argued, further, that the dismissal should be with prejudice "because the inapplicability of the [county code] mean[t] that there [were] no facts the County [could] prove that would entitle them to judgment." (Emphasis in original.)
¶ 14 Second, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), the motion sought sanctions against the county because (1) in this second version of the complaint, the county got the date of the offense wrong again; (2) the complaint cited the county code, which, it was clear from the face of the complaint, was inapplicable; and (3) in a vexatious effort to collect three times the lawful amount from Couture, the county asserted three violations of the county code.
¶ 15 On December 3, 2020, the county filed a response to Couture's motion for dismissal and for sanctions. The county pointed out that, in 2018, Peoria County and the City of Peoria entered into an intergovernmental cooperation agreement, as the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII) and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act ( 5 ILCS 220/1 et seq. (West 2018)) allowed them to do. In the agreement, which was attached to the county's response as exhibit A, the parties recited that the county operated Animal Protection and that the city was "in need of an animal control program." The county agreed to assume the duty of "respond[ing] to calls and issu[ing] ordinance violation tickets to owners for animals found to be in violation of the CITY's animal control ordinance." Not only would the county "retain all fines," but the city would pay the county certain amounts to cover the cost of providing animal control services in the city. In addition, the city agreed as follows:
¶ 16 The county further pointed out, in its response to Couture's motion for dismissal, that "the County Code section dealing with animal nuisance read[ ] almost verbatim to the City Code involving animal causing a nuisance." The county code provisions read as follows:
By comparison, the corresponding provisions of the Peoria City Code read as follows:
¶ 17 Thus, the county observed, "[b]oth the County and the City ordinances contain[ed] the same language, just in two different Codes and different labeling numbers." The county argued that, "[b]ecause authority has been given to [Animal Protection] by the City to enforce City and County codes in the City, [Couture's] argument [in his motion for dismissal] must fail."
¶ 18 As for Couture's request for the imposition of sanctions, the county argued it ought to be allowed to plead as many counts as the evidence warranted. The county explained that the date of the offense was merely a trivial clerical error, which the...
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