Coakley v. Coakley

• Decision Date: 22 October 1913
• Citation: 102 N.E. 930,216 Mass. 71
• Parties: COAKLEY v. COAKLEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

216 Mass. 71

102 N.E. 930

COAKLEY v. COAKLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

October 22, 1913

Oct 22, 1913.

COUNSEL

Marvin M. Taylor and Taylor & Taylor, all of Worcester, for appellant.

W Arthur Garrity, T. Hovey Gage, and Frank F. Dresser, all of Worcester, for respondent.

OPINION

RUGG, C.J.

This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The question at issue is the division of the payments due to the dependents of John C. Coakley, who received personal injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment and who died as a result. He left a widow, Nora, with whom as wife he was living at the time of his decease, two minor children who were children of Nora, a child of this marriage born since his death, and another child named Marion, by an earlier marriage. All the children are of tender years. The child Marion has no property of her own and was living with her father's family, entirely supported by him. The widow was appointed administratrix of the estate of John C. Coakley and she has come to an agreement with the insurer, which has been approved by the Industrial Accident Board, for the payment to be made by it on account of his death. A guardian has been appointed of the child Marion, who by law is charged with the custody and tuition of the ward, she having no father or mother living. R. L. c. 145, § 4; St. 1904, c. 163. The widow and administratrix claims that as matter of law under the act the guardian is entitled to nothing and she refuses to pay anything to her for the support of the ward.

The material provisions of the act are found in St. 1911, c. 751, part 2, § 7, in these words:

'The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employé:

'(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death.

'(b) * * *

'(c) A child or children under the age of eighteen years * * * upon the parent with whom he is or they are living at the time of the death of such parent, there being no surviving dependent parent. In case there is more than one child thus dependent, the death benefit shall be divided equally among them.

'In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the injury; and in such other cases if there is more than one person wholly dependent, the death benefit shall be divided equally among them, and persons partly dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof; if there is no one wholly dependent and more than one person partly dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of their dependency.'

It is plain from this provision that the widow is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent. It is equally plain that the child of the former marriage also is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent, because in her case there is no surviving dependent parent. This language as construed in the McNicol Case, 102 N.E. 697, means that the children of the deceased who are the children of the widow are not conclusively presumed to be dependent, because as to them there is a surviving parent. Analyzing the act with technical nicety, probably the last paragraph of section 7, above quoted, does not apply to the case at bar because it relates to 'all other cases,' and 'such other cases,' which must mean cases other than those specifically provided for in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the section. It is true that no express provision is made for a case like the present where there is more than one person beside orphaned...