Coal & Coke Ry. Co v. Conley

CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
Citation67 S.E. 613,67 W.Va. 129
Decision Date08 March 1910
PartiesCOAL & COKE RY. CO. v. CONLEY et al.

67 S.E. 613
67 W.Va. 129

COAL & COKE RY. CO.
v.
CONLEY et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

March 8, 1910.


(Syllabus "by the Court.)

1. States (§ 191*)—Actions Against.

There is no difference between courts of law and courts of equity, in respect to their in ability to entertain a proceeding against the

state.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 182; Dec. Dig. § 191.*]

2. States (§ 191*)—Actions Against.

Interest on the part of the state, in the subject-matter of a suit to which it is not a formal party upon the record, must be immediate and direct, not merely incidental or consequential, to bring such suit within the inhibition of section 35 of article 6 of the Constitution, declaring, "the state of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity."

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 191.*]

3. States (§ 191*)—Action Against State-Direct Interest.

The interest of the state in the penalties, prescribed by a statute, limiting the charges of railroad companies for transportation of passengers, does not constitute an immediate and direct interest in a suit brought by a railroad company to have such statute declared unconstitutional and void. It is sequential and indirect.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 191.*]

4. States (§ 191*)—Action Against—Interest of State.

In such a suit, the real issue is whether the complainant is entitled to charge a higher rate than that prescribed, and amounts to a controversy between citizens over the validity of a law, analogous to that which arises on a writ of habeas corpus.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 191.*]

5. States (§ 191*) — Actions — Interest of State.

On an issue between a citizen and an officer, involving the constitutionality of a law, the state, considered an ideal, intangible person, as contradistinguished from the state government, its agent, stands neutral, impartial, and inactive, deeming the citizen and the government equally within the protection of the organic law, and not favoring either as against the other.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 191.*]

6. States (§ 66*)—Acts of Officers—Liability of State.

The officers of a state act in a representative capacity and bind it by their acts only in those instances in which they have authority, the law under which they act constituting their power of attorney; and when, for any reason, such law is void, the act done under it is likewise void, and amounts to no more than an individual wrong and trespass.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 68; Dec. Dig. § 66.*]

7. States (§ 191*)—Suits Against Officers-Interest of State.

A suit against an officer, acting, or threatening to act, under an unconstitutional statute, with the enforcement of which he is charged, is a suit against him in his individual capacity, as for a wrong done by him, and not a suit against the state, unless it directly involves a contract right or liability on the part of the state government or property belonging to it or in its custody.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 181; Dec. Dig. § 191.*]

8. Injunction (§ 85*)—Jurisdiction — Enforcement of Statute.

It is no objection to the remedy in such case that the statute, the application of which in the particular case is sought to be prevented,

[67 S.E. 614]

is not void on its face, but is complained of only because its operation in the particular instance works a violation of a constitutional right.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Dec. Dig. § 85.2-*]

9. Injunction (§ 85*)—Enforcement of Unconstitutional Act—Authority of Officer.

Nor is it material that the officer's color of authority for the enforcement of the act is found, not in it, but in the common law or some other statute. That he has some connection with the enforcement of the act is the important and material fact, whatever its source or origin may be.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Dec. Dig. § 85.*]

10. Injunction (§ 85*)—Jurisdiction—Enforcement of Void Act.

Unconstitutionality of the act is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction of such a suit or proceeding in equity. To this there must be added, for such purpose, some right or injury, respecting the person or property, not adequately remediable by any proceeding at law.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 150; Dec. Dig. § 85.*]

11. Injunction (§ 105*)—Jurisdiction—Enjoining Criminal Proceeding.

When the two grounds for relief, just mentioned, exist, the remedy in equity is not precluded, though it involves restraint, by injunction, of a criminal proceeding.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 179; Dec. Dig. § 105.*]

12. Injunction (§ 105*) — Enforcement of Unconstitutional Act — Restraint of Criminal Proceeding.

Under such circumstances, restraint of a criminal proceeding is merely incidental to adequate protection of a personal or property right, and is not founded upon the mere illegality of such proceeding. Its chief object being the maintenance and protection of such right, the bill is not one merely to enjoin such a proceeding.

(Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 179; Dec. Dig. § 105.*]

13. Injunction (§ 74*)—Acts of Officers— Unconstitutional Statute.

A wrong, attempted by an officer under color of a void statute, will be enjoined as readily as one attempted by a private person in violation of law and without color of office, if sufficient grounds for injunction, under the rules and principles governing the subject, are shown. Both acts are trespasses.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Dec. Dig. § 74.*]

14. Carriers (§ 18*)—Regulation—Enforcement—Injunction.

In ignoring an unconstitutional statute, limiting its charges for transportation of passengers, and appealing to a court of equity for protection against criminal proceedings to compel compliance therewith, a railroad company relies, in part, upon the legal principle, allowing an injured person, under some circumstances, to redress, by his own hands, the wrong done him.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Dec. Dig. § 18.*]

15. Injunction (§ 4*)—Enforcement of Unconstitutional Daw.

In form, a bill filed for such purpose is a pure bill of injunction, not ancillary to any other suit or other direct relief sought by it, but ancillary to a proceeding out of court. Nevertheless its real and substantial purpose is the determination of the validity of the "statute, indirect determination thereof arising ex necessitate from lack of any adequate form of direct adjudication upon the question.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Dec. Dig. § 4.*]

16. Injunction (§ 10*) —When Maintainable—Protection of Possession of Property.

There being no form of action at law appropriate to the protection of possession and enjoyment of property by the owner thereof, and damages and criminal penalties for trespasses, being inadequate, when recoverable and enforceable, injunction is the proper remedy therefor.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Dec. Dig. § 16.*]

17. Injunction (§ 13*)—When Maintainable—Grounds.

Neither physical destruction nor injury of property, nor total deprivation of the use and enjoyment thereof, is a sine qua non to judicial remedy, if wrongful. An unlawful and injurious restraint upon the use and enjoyment thereof in any form, being in law a deprivation of property pro tanto, suffices.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Dec. Dig. § 13.*]

18. Corporations (§ 391*)—Public Service Corporations—Limitation of Rights.

A statute, imposing a limit upon the rates to be charged by a public service corporation differs in nature from many others, in that it relates to the use of private property, and there is a constitutional limit on the powers of the Legislature, respecting the same, dependent upon a question of fact.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 391.*]

19. Corporations (§ 391*)—Public Service Corporations—Actions.

A proceeding for the relief of a public service corporation from illegal legislative restraint upon its charges may be prosecuted by such corporation in its own name.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 391.*]

20. Carriers (§ 12*)—Regulation—Passenger Rates.

Though the public has an interest in the use of private property, devoted to a public service, as in the case of a railroad, and the Legislature may, by statute, limit the charges for such service, it cannot reduce them below the point of fair and reasonable remuneration for the service rendered.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Dec. Dig. § 12.*]

21. Constitutional Law (§ 29S*)—Due Process of Law—Railroad Rates.

Legislative reduction of such charges so as to prevent the earning of such remuneration amounts to a taking of private property for public use, without compensation to the owner thereof, and a rate regulating statute, so operating, is void, in so far as it has such effect, being in conflict with section 10 of article 3 of the Constitution of this state and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, inhibiting deprivation of property without due process of law, and also with the equality clause of said amendment.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Dec. Dig. § 298.*]

22. Corporations (§ 391*)—Public Service Corporations—Rate Regulating Statute.

A public service corporation is entitled to a judicial inquiry as to whether, in point of fact, a rate regulating statute is confiscatory,

[67 S.E. 615]

and, if the Legislature has failed to prescribe or designate a mode of determining such question, the party aggrieved may invoke any appropriate remedy therefor in law or equity.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 391.3-*]

23. Statutes (§ 64*)—Partial Invalidity— Effect.

If penalties are prescribed in such a statute as a sanction for the due enforcement thereof, and...

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