Coal-Float v. City of Jeffersonville

• Decision Date: 30 September 1887
• Citation: 112 Ind. 15,13 N.E. 115
• Parties: A Coal-Float v. City of Jeffersonville.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

112 Ind. 15

13 N.E. 115

A Coal-Float

v.City of Jeffersonville.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

September 30, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Clark county.

John H. Stotsenburg and James K. Marsh, for appellant. George H. Voigt, for appellee.

Niblack, J.

The judgment appealed from in this case is based upon a proceeding in attachment, instituted by the city of Jeffersonville against a coal-float, the name of which was unknown, and John Plotz, its owner, to recover the sum of $50 alleged to be due for wharfage. The proceeding was commenced before the mayor of the city, where the plaintiff obtained judgment for the amount demanded, and the coal-float was ordered to be sold to pay the judgment. Upon an appeal to the circuit court, Plotz, on his own behalf, as well as that of the coal-float, moved to dismiss the action- First, because the ordinance requiring the payment of wharfage was an unreasonable, and hence an invalid, ordinance; second, because the coal-float was a part of the wharf, and not a boat or craft, within the meaning of the ordinance set out in the complaint; third, because the ordinance, by its terms, created only a personal liability, and therefore did not provide for a lien upon boats or crafts of any kind; fourth, because, upon the facts stated in the complaint, no lien attached to the coal-float; fifth, because a coal-float cannot contract an indebtedness; sixth, because there was no law authorizing the enforcement of a lien against a coal-float by attachment. The court declining to sustain this motion, Plotz then moved to dismiss the attachment proceedings against the coal-float, upon the ground that the ordinance relied on for the collection of wharfage was unlawful and void, as previously claimed; but this motion was, in like manner, not sustained. The court, after hearing the evidence, found that there was due the city, as a balance on wharfage against the coal-float, the sum of $13, and that the attachment proceedings ought to be sustained, and accordingly rendered a judgment for the sale of the coal-float, and its furniture and apparel, to pay the amount so found to be due, and certain specified costs, but declined to award a personal judgment against Plotz. Error is assigned upon the alleged insufficiency of the complaint, upon the overruling of the motion to dismiss the action and the attachment proceedings respectively, and upon the refusal of the court to order a new trial.

The complaint represented that the city of Jeffersonville, on the twenty-fifth day of October, 1881, adopted an ordinance providing, among other things, that “all steam-boats, barges, keel-boats, flat-boats, or other boats or rafts, coming to or landing at the wharves of said city,” shall pay to said city, for the use of said wharves, the following sums, to-wit: “For every coal-float used and owned by regular dealers in coal at said wharves, the sum of $200 per year, payable monthly, provided that no more space shall be occupied than the length of such float;” that John Plotz was, during the months of May, June, and July, 1885, the owner of a coal-float, the name of which was unknown, attached to a wharf on the Ohio river within the corporate limits of said city, and was, during all that time, a regular dealer in coal, using said coal-float in the prosecution of his business as such dealer; that on the third day of August, 1885, which was after the indebtedness for wharfage for said months of May, June, and July became due, and before the commencement of this action, Andrew J. Burlingame, wharf-master of said city, demanded of the said John Plotz the sum of $50, the amount due for such wharfage, and payment was refused by him, the said Plotz, all of which was verified by the affidavit of Burlingame. The objections to the complaint are that the ordinance set out in it, was, upon its face, an unreasonable, and consequently an invalid, ordinance, and that, upon the facts alleged, no cause of action is shown against the coal-float, as it is an inanimate thing, and therefore incapable of contracting an indebtedness, and as no lien was expressly provided for in such a case by the ordinance.

As this proceeding was commenced before a mayor of a city, and as the amount involved did not exceed $50, this court would have no jurisdiction of this appeal were it not that the avowed object in prosecuting it is to test the validity of the ordinance referred to in, and relied upon by, the complaint. Rev. St. 1881, § 632.

The power to adopt rules, regulations, by-laws, and ordinances, not inconsistent with its character, is inherent in every municipal corporation, and is...