Coaldale Borough v. Delaney
| Decision Date | 04 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 674 C.D. 2017,674 C.D. 2017 |
| Citation | 177 A.3d 1039 |
| Parties | COALDALE BOROUGH v. Timothy DELANEY, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Richardson T. Eagen, Harrisburg, for appellant.
Eric M. Brown, Chester Springs, for appellee.
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
Timothy Delaney (Delaney) appeals from the April 26, 2017 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court) which granted the petition of Coaldale Borough (Borough) to quash Delaney's request for arbitration.
The underlying facts in this matter are not in dispute and were summarized by the trial court as follows. Delaney was the Borough's Chief of Police. On or about August 13, 2013, Delaney injured his right hand while testing a taser. On June 25, 2015, Delaney requested a disability pension from the Police Pension Board (Board).1 He subsequently requested a hearing before the Board and one was conducted on March 29, 2016. By decision dated May 23, 2016, the Board denied Delaney's request and informed him of his right to appeal within 30 days. Rather than appeal, Delaney filed a grievance on June 7, 2016, alleging that the denial of his disability pension was in violation of his Employment Agreement with the Borough. Under this Employment Agreement, Delaney participated in the Borough's Police Pension Fund. Additionally, Article XIV of the Employment Agreement provides for a grievance and arbitration procedure to resolve all disputes arising between Delaney and the Borough. Counsel for Delaney later sent a letter to the Borough requesting that the parties bypass the grievance procedure and proceed directly to arbitration. (Trial court op. at 2.)
However, the Borough responded by filing a petition with the trial court to quash Delaney's arbitration request on December 30, 2016. In this petition, the Borough acknowledged the Employment Agreement as well as a local ordinance adopting the Borough's Police Pension Plan. Nevertheless, the Borough alleged that the Board was a local agency operating in accordance with its Police Pension Plan and the Local Agency Law,2 that the Board convened a hearing and issued a written decision, and that Delaney's sole remedy was to file an appeal with the appropriate court, i.e., the trial court, within 30 days of the Board's decision in accordance with the Local Agency Law. The Borough noted that it lacked the statutory or contractual power to overrule the Board's decision. (Trial court op. at 1; R.R. at 6a–12a.)
On January 3, 2017, the trial court issued a rule to show cause directing Delaney to file an answer to the Borough's petition within 20 days, advising that the matter would be decided under Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.7 (), requiring depositions to be completed within 60 days, and noting that either party could request oral argument pursuant to the local rules of civil procedure. Delaney filed a timely answer denying that his sole remedy was an appeal under the Local Agency Law, but acknowledging that he was advised of his right to appeal within 30 days of the date of the Board's decision.3 (R.R. at 54a–61a.)
On April 13, 2017, the Borough filed a praecipe for certification noting that fact-finding was complete and/or unnecessary, and requesting that its petition be transferred to a judge for disposition. Around the same time, the Borough filed a brief in support of its petition with the trial court. Delaney was not given an opportunity to file a responsive brief. (R.R. at 63a–79a.)
2 Pa.C.S. § 752. Additionally, the trial court cited section 5571(b) of the Judicial Code, which provides that "an appeal from a tribunal or other government unit to a court ... must be commenced within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken ...." 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(b). The trial court proceeded to state that the Board was a local agency and governed by the Local Agency Law, citing this Court's decision in City of Arnold v. Wage Policy Committee of Arnold Police Department , 138 A.3d 719 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), rev'd , ––– Pa. ––––, 171 A.3d 744 (2017). Citing City of Arnold and Groman v. Officers' & Employees' Pension Board , 69 Pa.Cmwlth. 447, 451 A.2d 789 (1982) (), the trial court concluded that Delaney's exclusive remedy for the denial of his disability pension was to appeal the Board's determination within 30 days pursuant to the Local Agency Law.
Delaney thereafter filed a notice of appeal with the trial court, alleging that the trial court erred in applying City of Arnold and Groman to this matter when the Employment Agreement with the Borough mandated that all disputes arising thereunder proceed to arbitration. Delaney also alleged that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to provide him with an opportunity to file a responsive brief in opposition to the Borough's petition and brief. The trial court issued an opinion in support of its order explaining that the facts were not in dispute and that only issues of law remained to be decided. The trial court stated that Delaney was entitled to a pension plan under the Employment Agreement and he was provided with the same. The trial court reiterated that, under City of Arnold and Groman , Delaney's exclusive remedy from the Board's adverse determination was an appeal under the Local Agency Law. The trial court noted that, under the circumstances, i.e., since Delaney did not raise any material issues of fact in his response to the Borough's petition to quash and the only issue before it concerned a matter of law, a remand to allow Delaney to file a brief was unnecessary.
On appeal,4 Delaney reiterates the issues raised before the trial court, relying extensively on our Supreme Court's recent reversal of this Court's decision in City of Arnold .5
In City of Arnold , Thomas Cimino died in April 2002, after serving as a City of Arnold police officer for 11.77 years. In May 2002, the City's Controller informed his widow, Pamela Cimino (Widow), that she was entitled to a death/survivor benefit of $1,949.11 per month, which was 50% of Thomas Cimino's annual compensation at the time of his death. This death benefit was reconfirmed in a July 2003 letter from the City's Controller to Widow and was consistent with provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into by the City of Arnold and the bargaining representative of the City's police officers. In 2014, the City's police pension board advised Widow that her benefit had been miscalculated; that she was only entitled to 50% of the monthly benefit, or $974.55 per month; that she received an overpayment of $138,386.10 as a result of the miscalculation; and that it would deduct $10.00 per month from her future benefit payments to recoup said overpayment.
The police officers' bargaining representative grieved the action on Widow's behalf pursuant to the CBA and the matter was submitted to an arbitrator. The arbitrator ultimately sustained the grievance. The City's police pension board filed a petition to vacate the arbitrator's award with the common pleas court, but said petition was denied. The City's police pension board then appealed to this Court. By decision and order dated May 20, 2016, we reversed the trial court's order, concluding that Widow's right to a survivor benefit was "not derivative of [her late husband's] rights under the CBA, but an independent right under the City's pension plan." Id. , 138 A.3d at 725. We held that, as the matter involved a decision of the City's police pension board, a local agency subject to the provisions of the Local Agency Law, the arbitrator lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and the common pleas court erred in failing to vacate the arbitration award.
However, our Supreme Court recently reversed this Court's decision, holding that the arbitrator had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between the police officers' bargaining representative and the City over a Widow's pension benefit. The Supreme Court noted that section 1 of the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act,6 commonly referred to as Act 111, states that "policemen or firemen ... have the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment, including ... retirement, pensions and other benefits ...." 43 P.S. § 217.1. The Supreme Court also referenced section 4(a) of Act 111, which provides, in part, that disputes may be resolved by arbitration "[i]f in any case of a dispute between a public employer and its policemen or firemen employes the collective bargaining process reaches an impasse and stalemate ...." 43 P.S. § 217.4(a). Additionally, the Supreme Court cited section 14303(f) of the Third Class City Code, 11 Pa.C.S. § 14303(f), which authorizes the payment of a pension benefit to a police officer who dies while not in the line of duty. Further, the Supreme Court noted local ordinances enacted by the City that provide for a reduced survivor benefit for a spouse or child of the retiree, which were incorporated into the CBA between the police...
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