Coale v. Metro-North R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 3:08–CV–01307 CSH.,3:08–CV–01307 CSH.
• Citation: 34 F.Supp.3d 206
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: William COALE, Plaintiff, v. METRO–NORTH RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

34 F.Supp.3d 206

William COALE, Plaintiff

v.METRO–NORTH RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 3:08–CV–01307 CSH.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed July 28, 2014.

George J. Cahill, Jr., Scott E. Perry, Cahill Goetsch & Perry, P.C., New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.

Beck S. Fineman, Charles A. Deluca, Robert O. Hickey, Ryan Ryan Deluca, LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff William Coale brought this action against Metro–North Railroad Company (“Metro–North”) pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (or “FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 –60, for injuries sustained while employed as an assistant conductor by Metro–North. Metro–North has in turn filed a third-party complaint against New Haven Parking Authority (“NHPA”) seeking indemnification from NHPA from Coale's claim of negligence.

Metro–North has moved for summary judgment dismissing Coale's negligence claim. [Doc. 38]. NHPA has moved for summary judgment dismissing Metro–North's third-party complaint and granting its counterclaim against Metro–North for breach of contract. [Doc–41]. Coale has moved for spoliation of evidence sanctions against Metro–North. [Doc–58]. This Ruling resolves all three motions.

II. BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to this litigation occurred near the start of Coale's shift at the Union Station in New Haven. All Train and Engine employees on March 18, 2008, at Metro–North, in whose ranks Coale was counted, were required at the beginning of the workday to view certain bulletins and operating instructions and record their attendance in a register book. The room designated for this purpose was commonly referred to as the “register room.” It was generally accessible only by way of a key pad located on its outside, the security code to which was known only to Metro–North or NHPA employees. [Doc. 44–1] at ¶ ¶ 7, 26.

Coale entered the register room at the start of his shift around 3:17 in the afternoon. [Doc. 41–1] at 31–32. After using the computer system, which was also located in the register room, Coale sat down at the register room table. Realizing that he had forgotten to record his attendance, Coale rose from his seat and walked toward the register book. He had taken only a few steps before he slipped on a shiny, slippery, and what remains to be unidentified substance. [Doc. 44–9] at 37, 41–43; [Doc. 44–1] at ¶ 29. The accident left Coale badly hurt.

Coale thereafter filed this action against Metro–North seeking damages for his injuries. The lawsuit prompted Metro–North's third-party complaint against NHPA seeking indemnification against any judgment rendered against Metro–North on grounds that NHPA is responsible for keeping the register room in a safe condition.

The space at Union Station where Metro–North maintains its offices, including the register room, was operated by NHPA and rented to Metro–North pursuant to the terms of a certain lease agreement (“Lease Agreement”). Section 8 of the Lease Agreement provides that Metro–North will indemnify NHPA for injuries occurring to persons on the premises under certain circumstances. Section 9 of the Lease Agreement provides that NHPA will provide certain utilities and janitorial services. [Doc. 41–13] Ex. I, at §§ 8–9. Pursuant to its obligation under the Lease Agreement to furnish janitorial services, NHPA had a practice of cleaning the register room once daily between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. and inspecting the register room the following morning before 6:30 a.m. [Doc. 41 –11] at 6, 8, 10–11.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standards for summary judgment are familiar. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F.R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The role of a district court in considering a motion for summary judgment is therefore “not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists.” In re Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129, 151 (2d Cir.2009). The moving parties, in this case Metro–North and NBPA, bear the burden of showing that they are entitled to summary judgment. Once a movant has satisfied this burden, in order to defeat the motion the party opposing summary judgment, in this case the Plaintiff, “must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a genuine issue of fact exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In making its determination on a summary judgment motion, a trial court will resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir.2009). It is “[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence” that summary judgment is proper. Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). When “a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence ... the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but rather must present significant probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of fact.” Marczeski v. Gavitt, 354 F.Supp.2d 190, 193 (D.Conn.2005) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ).

In order to present a “genuine issue of material fact” the nonmoving party must therefore present contradictory evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Consequently the nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. As the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment,” Id. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, if the nonmoving party submits evidence that is “merely colorable,” summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In sum, a “complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Metro–North's Motion for Summary Judgment

Metro–North claims that summary judgment must be granted because there is no evidence to support a finding that it had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of which Coale complains—the accumulation of the wet substance that gave rise to Coale's fall. In support of this claim Metro–North argues that NHPA, which had responsibilities under the Lease Agreement to provide janitorial services, was not its agent within the meaning of FELA, such that the negligence of NHPA would be imputable to Metro–North as its principal.

1. Federal Employers' Liability Act

The FELA is a broad remedial statute that must be construed liberally in order to effectuate its purposes. Marchica v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 F.3d 1197, 1202 (2d Cir.1994). It provides that:

Every common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier

45 U.S.C. § 51. The Second Circuit “construes the statute, in light of its broad remedial nature, as creating a relaxed standard for negligence as well as causation.” Corsale v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., Inc., No. 1:08cv572 (GLS)(RFT), 2010 WL 3907827 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (quoting Williams v. Long Island R.R. Co., 196 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir.1999) ). However, “FELA is not a strict liability statute, and the fact that an employee is injured is not proof of negligence.” Williams v. Long Island R.R. Co., 196 F.3d at 405 (citations omitted). “FELA does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur.” Corsale v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., Inc., 2010 WL 3907827 at *2 (quoting Capriotti v. Consol. Rail Corp., 878 F.Supp. 429, 431 (N.D.N.Y.1995) ). Although “the plaintiff's burden in making a showing of causation and negligence is lighter under FELA than it would be at common law,” nonetheless “in FELA actions, the plaintiff must prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability and causation.” Tufariello v. Long Island R.R., 458 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir.2006).

“FELA requires an employer ‘to provide its employees with a reasonably safe place to work and this includes the duty to maintain and inspect work areas.’ ” Corsale v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., Inc., 2010 WL 3907827 at *2 (quoting Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1993) ). “An employer breaches its duty to provide a safe workplace when it knows or should know of a potential hazard in the workplace, yet fails to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees.” Id. (quoting Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80, 84–85 (2d Cir.1989) ).

“[R]easonable foreseeability of harm is an essential ingredient of [FELA] negligence.” Id. (quoting Gallick v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 117, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963) ). “Under FELA, the reasonable foreseeability element ‘requires proof of actual or...