Coalition Against Columbus Center v. New York City
| Decision Date | 05 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | 89 Civ. 5904 (SWK). |
| Citation | 750 F. Supp. 93 |
| Parties | COALITION AGAINST COLUMBUS CENTER, Selma Arnold, Ross Graham, Al Hehn, Columbus Center Travel, Ltd., and Coalition Against Lincoln West, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, The Board of Estimate of the City of New York, The Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York, The Metropolitan Transportation Agency, The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, The New York City Industrial Development Agency and Coliseum Associates, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Stults and Marshall, New York City by Jon Van Der Tuin, for plaintiffs.
Patterson, Belknap, Webb and Tyler, New York City by Robert LoBue, for All Public defendants, The City of New York, The Bd. of Estimate of the City of New York, The Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development of The City of New York, The Metropolitan Transp. Agency, The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, and The New York City Indus. Development Agency.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison, New York City by Steven Landers, for defendant, Coliseum Associates.
This case concerns the proposed building of "Columbus Center," a mixed-use redevelopment project involving retail, office, cinema and residential space in Manhattan. The seller of the site is the defendant Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority ("TBTA"), and the developer is Boston Properties, acting through defendant Coliseum Associates. The plaintiffs are a number of neighborhood organizations and individuals who challenge the project on six grounds, including two federal and four pendent state causes of action.1 Cross-motions for summary judgment are currently pending before the Court. However, defendants City of New York and its related agencies (the "public defendants") have moved this Court for dismissal of plaintiffs' Clean Air Act claim, and consequently the entire action, in light of a recent Supreme Court opinion.
The Clean Air Act requires that plaintiffs satisfy a statutory 60-day notice period before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b).2 Plaintiffs concede their failure to comply with this requirement, having noticed the relevant parties only six days before commencing suit. Recently, in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989), the Supreme Court dismissed a long-standing lawsuit because of plaintiffs' failure strictly to comply with an identical 60-day notice period.3 Accordingly, the public defendants have moved this Court to dismiss plaintiffs' Clean Air Act claims. This Court has considered the respective parties' briefs and arguments on this question at conference.
Hallstrom held that RCRA's 60-day notice period was a "mandatory, not optional, condition precedent for suit." ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 309. On that ground the Supreme Court dismissed, with leave to refile, a lawsuit that was seven years old and had been litigated to judgment in the District Court over the course of four years. ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 310.
This Court wishes to avoid subjecting its final judgment in this case to a similar attack after protracted proceedings, as occurred in Hallstrom. Such a result would be tremendously inefficient. Therefore, this Court will dismiss plaintiffs' Clean Air Act claim without prejudice. Because sixty days have now passed since plaintiffs gave notice to the relevant parties, plaintiffs may, and this Court is given to understand that they will, refile immediately.
The public defendants have further moved this Court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), to dismiss the entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They argue that Court's dismissal of the Clean Air Act claim, coupled with plaintiffs' abandonment of their only other federal cause of action, leaves the pendent state claims without a federal jurisdictional basis. The parties have conferenced this issue before the Court and have submitted additional briefs on the subject.
During the briefing of the pending summary judgment motions, plaintiffs conceded that they do not have standing to bring their only other federal claim, purportedly arising from the now-defunct Federal Housing Act of 1949. Consequently, the public defendants argue that there is no longer a basis for federal court jurisdiction, and that this Court must dismiss the entire action, including the four pendent state claims, albeit temporarily.
The public defendants, along with the plaintiffs, are eager for a final judgment which is not clouded by unresolved jurisdictional problems.4 Defendant Coliseum Associates, on the other hand, seeks to persuade the Court that it can and should retain jurisdiction over the four pendent state claims even though it temporarily dismisses the Clean Air Act claim. Their motivation for wishing the Court not to dismiss the entire action is somewhat collateral to the issues presently before the Court. Their contract with the City provides that the closing on the property would be postponed until after the final resolution of any litigation that might arise within four months of the signing of the contract. The present action was filed just two weeks before that four month period expired. Therefore, if the Court dismisses with leave to refile, the newly-refiled action will fall outside of this period and the City could potentially move towards closing the transaction without final disposition of this lawsuit. Coliseum Associates naturally wishes to avoid this situation, whereas the City would prefer to be free to go to closing.
Accordingly, Coliseum Associates argues that this Court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over the pendent state claims while plaintiffs refile their Clean Air Act claim, whereas the public defendants maintain either that this Court has no such discretion or that it should not exercise that discretion to keep the state claims.
This Court takes no position on the question of whether it has such discretion or not, because in either event it would dismiss the entire case with leave to refile. On one hand, if the federal claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the state law claims must be dismissed as well. Local Div. 732 v. M.A.R. T.A., 667 F.2d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir.1982). On the other hand, if the federal claims are dismissed for substantive reasons, for example on a summary judgment motion, this Court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over pendent state claims. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2278, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). However, in the interest of comity, such discretion is limited: the Second Circuit instructs that "absent exceptional circumstances," where federal claims can be disposed of on summary judgment grounds, courts should "abstain from exercising pendent jurisdiction." Time Life Films, supra, 784 F.2d at 53. This Court itself has stated that dismissal under these circumstances is "recommended." Kaplan v. Shapiro, 655 F.Supp. 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Factors to be considered include (1) the length of time the matter has been pending before the federal court; (2) the proximity of the trial date; and (3) the predominance of issues of federal, as opposed to local, concern. McLearn v. Cowen & Co., 660 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.1981) ().
It is not clear whether the Clean Air Act's...
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