Coalition for Economic Survival v. Deukmejian

• Citation: 217 Cal.Rptr. 621,171 Cal.App.3d 954
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 30 August 1985
• Parties: COALITION FOR ECONOMIC SURVIVAL, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. George DEUKMEJIAN, et al., Defendants and Appellants. B008453.

Page 621

217 Cal.Rptr. 621

171 Cal.App.3d 954

COALITION FOR ECONOMIC SURVIVAL, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. George DEUKMEJIAN, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

B008453.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Aug. 30, 1985.

Review Denied November 14, 1985.

Western Center on Law and Poverty, Inc., Los Angeles, Richard A. Rothschild, Carmen Estrada, San Francisco, and Melinda Bird, Los Angeles, San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., Lew Hollman, Pacoima, James Rutkowski, Keene, and James Carroll, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and respondents.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Warriner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anne S. Pressman and Henry Torres, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen. for defendants and appellants.

THOMPSON, Associate Justice.

In this case, the appellants challenge the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to the respondents' counsel for legal services provided the respondents. Three central issues are raised on appeal. First, do the budget act restrictions on the state's award of attorneys' fees apply to awards granted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988. Second, were the respondents "prevailing parties" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 1988. Finally, were the respondents entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. We find that the first two issues are dispositive that the respondents were properly awarded attorneys' fees in the case at bar, and that it is unnecessary to reach the third issue.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This case arose in the midst of a budget impasse that occurred in June and July of 1983. Because of this impasse, the State of California entered the 1983 fiscal year without having enacted a state budget. In the absence of a budget, there was no formal appropriation in effect for Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC) payments. ¹ The Department of Social Services informed all county welfare directors no funds would be released unless a Budget Act was enacted. In order for eligible recipients to receive their July 15th payment, the budget had to be enacted by July 13.

On July 11, 1983, the respondents filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. In requesting injunctive relief, the respondents sought to require the appellants to pay AFDC funds from the state's general revenue until the state budget was enacted.

On the same date, the trial court denied the respondents' motion for a temporary restraining order and the court scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing for July 14, 1983. As a result of the trial court's denial of their request for a temporary restraining order, the respondents filed a petition for writ of mandamus and temporary stay order with the California Supreme Court.

On July 14, 1983, the Supreme Court issued an interim stay. The court ordered the appellants to refrain from withholding any and all AFDC benefits which are due. The state payments to the counties went out immediately and the AFDC checks were issued.

On July 21, 1983, the Budget Act was signed into law. The AFDC appropriation was included. On August 10, 1983, the Supreme Court dismissed the respondents' mandate petition as moot.

On October 28, 1983, the respondents filed a motion for attorneys' fees based on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

The trial court heard the respondents' motion on December 8, 1983. The court ruled the respondents were entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of the award on a later date.

On or about June 29, 1984, the parties stipulated that the trial court proceedings may be dismissed as moot and the reasonable value of services rendered by respondents' counsel in this case from the beginning of the litigation through December 9, 1983, was $24,935. The appellants reserved the right to appeal the judgment awarding attorneys' fees to respondents' counsel but agreed not to challenge the reasonable value of these services.

On July 2, 1984, a judgment pursuant to stipulation was filed dismissing the case as moot and awarding the respondents' attorneys' fees in the amount previously stipulated to.

On July 13, 1984, the appellants filed a notice of appeal of the award of attorneys' fees.

II. THE BUDGET ACT RESTRICTIONS ON THE STATE'S PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS DOES NOT APPLY TO AWARDS PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1988 AND THUS THE RESPONDENTS CAN RECOVER THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE FEES STIPULATED TO

The appellants argue budgetary limitations on awards of attorneys' fees apply to awards of attorneys' fees under U.S.C. section 1988 and the award granted the respondents exceeds these limitations. A similar argument was recently addressed in Green v. Obledo (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 678, 207 Cal.Rptr. 830, and rejected by that court. We find the reasoning of this case persuasive.

In Obledo, the plaintiffs invalidated a state welfare regulation. The plaintiffs were awarded $34,439 in attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs, however, were denied enforcement of this award of attorneys' fees because the trial court held the payment was precluded by restrictions in the state Budget Act. The plaintiffs had sought enforcement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988.

In contending enforcement had been properly denied, the defendants relied, in part, on Item 9810-001-001 of the Budget Act of 1982. ² Item 9810-001-001 provides in relevant part:

"For payment of attorney fee claims, settlements, compromises, and judgments against the state, its officers, and officers and employees of state agencies, departments, boards, bureaus or commissions, supported from the General Fund, but only pursuant to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5, the 'private attorney general' doctrine, or the 'substantial benefit' doctrine.... 2. Expenditure from this item shall not exceed an hourly rate which equals the rate charged by the Attorney General of the State of California at the time the warrant is issued or at the time judgment is entered, whichever is earlier." (Italics added.)

The defendants analogized a 1983 action to one brought as a "private attorney general" thus bringing the action within one of the specified limitations.

The court rejected this argument. The court reasoned the limitations specified in Item 9810-001-001, by its own terms, apply to attorneys' fees awarded under one statutory basis (Code Civ.Proc., § 1021.5) and two common law bases ("private attorney general" and "substantial benefit"). If the Legislature had intended to include 42 U.S.C. section 1988, it would have specified it as it had specified section 1021.5. As the court stated: "If the term ' "private attorney general" doctrine' were to subsume analogous statutory authorizations for the payment of fees, there would be no need to separately specify Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, as the item does, for it is such. (Woodland Hills [Resident Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917], 933 [154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200].)" (Green v. Obledo, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 678, 685, 207 Cal.Rptr. 830.) The court also looked to another provision in the Budget Act which reinforced the court's interpretation. Section 4.50 of the Budget Act provided:

"No funds appropriated by this act may be used to pay court-awarded attorney's fees unless payment of such fees is either: (a) Specifically authorized and set forth in an item or section of this act; or (b) Expressly authorized by a statutory provision other than Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Italics added.)

Thus, pursuant to this provision, if an attorneys' fee award is authorized by a statutory provision other than Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, express authorization for the payment of such attorneys' The appellant in the case at bar argues Obledo was wrongly decided. In essence the appellant argues there has been no uncodified private attorney general fee awards under federal common law since Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society (1975) 421 U.S. 240, 269, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1627, 44 L.Ed.2d 141, and no California common law counterpart since the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Thus, the appellant argues, the Legislature's reference to "private attorney general doctrine" must refer to the codification of that doctrine. However, under this interpretation, there would have been no reason for the Legislature to specify section 1021.5--it would have been subsumed by the common law label. Moreover, the codification of the California private attorney general doctrine, section 1021.5, did not eliminate the judiciary's nonstatutory equitable authority to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine. (See Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 930, 154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200; People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 378, 386, 211 Cal.Rptr. 501; C.E.B., Attorney's Fees Award Practice, § 3.3, et seq.) ³

                fees in an appropriation item is not required.  42 U.S.C. section 1988 is such a statutory provision.  (Green v. Obledo, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at pp. 685-686, fn. 8, 207 Cal.Rptr. 830.)   By not requiring the payment of all court-awarded attorneys' fees to be specifically authorized and set forth in the Budget Act, the Legislature must have recognized some court-awarded attorney's fees would not be subject to the limitations of item 9810-001-001.  Section 4.50 thus strengthens the position that the Legislature was aware it was excluding statutory fee provisions other than Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 from the restrictions of item 9810-001-001 and did not intend for such statutory provisions, including 42 U.S.C. section 1988, to be brought within the confines of

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