Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman
| Decision Date | 01 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 96-3037 (JHR). |
| Parties | COALITION OF NEW JERSEY SPORTSMEN, INC., BOB'S LITTLE SPORTSHOP, INC., SPRINGFIELD INC., ARMALITE, INC., ROBERT L. VIDEN, JR., STEPHEN D. McCLURE, JOHN DOES I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, GOVERNOR, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PETER VERNIERO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, HARRIS Y. COTTON, PROSECUTOR OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY, NEW JERSEY, PATRICIA KUNCHYNSKI, CHIEF OF GLASSBORO, NJ, POLICE DEPARTMENT, CARL A. WILLIAMS, COLONEL, DIVISION OF NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Gary Jay Needleman, Esquire, Needleman & Schocket, Montville, NJ, (Attorney for Plaintiffs).
Michael John Williams, Deputy Attorney General Office of New Jersey Attorney General Divison of Criminal Justice-Appellate Section Trenton, NJ, (Attorney for Defendants Whitman, Poritz, Williams).
Bruce C. Hasbrouck, Esquire, Dianne Herland Sloane, Esquire, Hasbrouck & Uliase, Woodbury, NJ, (Attorneys for Defendant Cotton).
Timothy Scaffidi, Esquire, Ragonese, Scaffidi & Albano, Woodbury, NJ, (Attorney for Defendant Kunchynski).
Plaintiffs, the Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc., Bob's Little Sportshop, Inc., Springfield, Inc., ArmaLite, Inc., Robert L. Viden, Jr., Stephen D. McClure, and nine other New Jersey residents identified simply as John Does I through IX (collectively "plaintiffs"), bring this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Governor of New Jersey, the state's Attorney General1, Colonel Carl A. Williams of the New Jersey State Police, the Prosecutor of Gloucester County as prosecutor, and the Chief of Police of the Glassboro Police Department in New Jersey ("collectively "Defendants")2. At issue is New Jersey's assault weapons law, passed and signed into law in 1991, and now codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1 et seq.
Plaintiffs raise the following federal constitutional challenges to this state law: (1) it is unconstitutionally vague, and thus void (Counts III, V, VIII, X, XI, and XIV); (2) it violates equal protection (Counts I, II, IV, VI, IX, XII, and XIII); (3) it violates their rights to free association (Count I); (4) it infringes on their right to free speech (Count IV); and (5) it constitutes a bill of attainder (Count VII). The complaint also seeks a declaratory judgment that certain firearms are not "assault firearms" within the meaning of the statute, and that plaintiffs who register their weapons and possess "large capacity ammunition magazines" are not required under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3j to actually participate in competitive shooting matches sanctioned by the Director of Civilian Marksmanship.
This matter is now before the court on motions for summary judgment filed by both plaintiffs and defendants. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendants' motion is granted.
On May 17, 1990, the New Jersey Legislature passed a bill restricting the possession, sale, and transport of "assault firearms" and "large capacity ammunition magazines." L. 1990, c. 32. Governor James Florio signed the bill into law on May 30, 1990, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1 et seq. (the "Act"), saying at the time, N.J. Lawmakers Approve Nation's Toughest Ban on Assault Weapons, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1990, at 4.
Beyond the obvious objective of removing assault weapons from New Jersey streets and from the hands of criminals, the rationale for this law can also be found in then Attorney General Robert Del Tufo's testimony concerning Senate Bill 166. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 12, 1990, the Attorney General explained that the intent of the law did not touch upon any firearms used for legitimate hunting or target shooting purposes. Rather, the law would only prohibit semi-automatic (ie. self-loading) shotguns with excessive magazine capacities, or with other prohibited characteristics such as a pistol grip designed for hand-held firing. According to this testimony, "[a]ny person who possesses a shotgun with a magazine capcity of more than 5 rounds intends to hunt something other than game." (Plaintiffs' Exh. 18, Del Tufo Testimony).3
New Jersey's gun control statute accomplishes its prohibition by defining the term "assault firearm" to include five separate categories of firearms: (1) certain firearms listed by make and model, series or type; (2) "[a]ny firearm manufactured under any designation which is substantially identical to any of the firearms listed above"; (3) a semi-automatic4 shotgun with either a magazine capacity exceeding six rounds, a pistol grip5, or a folding stock; (4) a semi-automatic rifle with a fixed magazine capacity exceeding 15 rounds; and (5) "a part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault firearm, or any combination of parts from which an assault firearm may be readily assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person." N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1w(1-5).
Under the statute, "any person who knowingly has in his possession" such a firearm is guilty of a third degree crime6, unless certain very narrow exceptions apply. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f). Possession of large capacity ammunition magazines7 is also prohibited, subject to some of the same exceptions. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3j. Exceptions to the general prohibition include if a weapon is among the types certified by the Attorney General as a `legitimate' target-shooting firearm and the owner has registered the weapon with the state and proven his or her membership in a valid rifle or pistol club, see N.J.S.A. 2C:58-12, or if the weapon has been rendered permanently inoperable, see N.J.S.A 2C:58-5, 13. There are also exemptions within the law for certain government employees, such as member of the Armed Forces and federal law enforcement officials. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6. A one-year grace period was provided for individuals who currently owned prohibited weapons to comply with the law or surrender the firearm. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-13. There was no grandfather clause for those individuals who legally possessed assault weapons at the time this law was enacted.
The law's prohibitions extend beyond merely possessing such weapons; the challenged law also provides that "[a]ny person who manufactures, causes to be manufactured, transports, ships, sells or disposes of an assault firearm without being registered or licensed to do so pursuant to N.J.S.2C:58-1 et seq. is guilty of a crime of the third degree." N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9g.
The law also touches upon the civil liability of individuals who legally possess assault weapons that are later used in the commission of a crime. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-5(h), if a registered assault firearm is used in a crime, "the holder of the license for that assault firearm shall be civilly liable for any damages resulting from that crime." An exemption from liability applies if the weapon was stolen and reported within 24 hours of discovering such theft. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-5(h). Presumably this provision in the law discourages individuals from owning assault firearms, or it at least encourages quick reporting of theft.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint can be found in their brief in the following paragraph:
Plaintiffs cannot determine whether they possess "assault firearms" or "large capacity ammunition magazines" because those terms are vague. They are threatened with prosecution if they possess firearms and magazines in New Jersey, and incur costs and are deprived of their use when stored outside of New Jersey. Plaintiffs who were not members of a club could not register assault firearms the Attorney General labeled "legitimate." Plaintiffs ArmaLite, Springfield, and Bob's Little Sportshop have lost profits because they cannot market numerous firearms in New Jersey.
(Plaintiffs' Br., 7/24/98, at 3).
Based on these and other allegations, plaintiffs filed suit on June 28, 1996, asserting as grounds for the action 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the United States Constitution. Defendants first filed a pre-Answer motion urging this court to abstain from deciding state law questions under the doctrine of Pullman abstention. In the alternative, defendants sought dismissal or summary judgment. Plaintiffs responded by filing a cross-motion to stay defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In an Order entered on June 24, 1997, this court denied defendants' motion for abstention, finding instead that defendants demonstrated only one of three circumstances which might have counseled for Pullman abstention. See Order dated June 24, 1997. The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and accordingly held that plaintiffs' motion to stay summary judgment was moot. After further discovery ensued, both sides filed these motions for summary judgment. This court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
The entry of summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about it might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view the facts and all reasonable...
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