Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., Civ. A. No. 56-1816-1822-SLR.

• Decision Date: 14 August 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 56-1816-1822-SLR.
• Citation: 901 F. Supp. 784
• Parties: COALITION TO SAVE OUR CHILDREN, Plaintiff, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the STATE OF DELAWARE, the Board of Education of the Brandywine School District, the Board of Education of the Christina School District, the Board of Education of the Colonial School District, and the Board of Education of the Red Clay Consolidated School District, and Delaware House of Representatives Committee on Desegregation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

901 F. Supp. 784

COALITION TO SAVE OUR CHILDREN, Plaintiff, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the STATE OF DELAWARE, the Board of Education of the Brandywine School District, the Board of Education of the Christina School District, the Board of Education of the Colonial School District, and the Board of Education of the Red Clay Consolidated School District, and Delaware House of Representatives Committee on Desegregation, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 56-1816-1822-SLR.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

August 14, 1995.

Victor F. Battaglia, of Biggs & Battaglia, Wilmington, Delaware; Leonard L. Williams, Wilmington, Delaware; Thomas D. Barr, David Boies, Sandra C. Goldstein, and Katherine B. Forrest, of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City; and Thomas J. Henderson, Sharon R. Vinick, Washington, DC; and Pace J. McConkie, Salt Lake City, UT, of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, attorneys for plaintiff.

Bertram S. Halberstadt, Wilmington, Delaware, and Sandra Del Valle, New York City, attorneys for Intervening Hispanic Plaintiffs.

Rodman Ward, Jr., Andrew G. Bouchard, Daniel V. Folt, and Joel E. Friedlander, of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Wilmington, Delaware; and M. Jane Brady and Ann Woolfolk, Wilmington, DE, attorneys for the State Board of Education of the State of Delaware. OF COUNSEL: David J. Margules, of Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, Wilmington, Delaware.

David H. Williams, and Barbara D. Crowell, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Delaware, attorneys for the Brandywine, Christina, and Colonial School Districts.

Alfred J. D'Angelo, Jr., M. Duncan Grant, and Kathryn A. Kelly, of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Wilmington, Delaware, attorneys for the Red Clay Consolidated School District.

Donald E. Marston, of Williams, Sullivan, & Marston, Wilmington, Delaware; and Charles J. Cooper, and Michael W. Kirk, of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, DC, attorneys for Delaware House of Representatives Committee on Desegregation.

OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Under consideration is a motion filed by defendants¹ seeking a declaration of "unitary status."² (D.I.1542) Having reviewed the materials submitted by the parties during the evidentiary hearing held in this matter,³ in light of the history of school desegregation litigation in this country, the court is satisfied that the defendants at bar have carried their burden of proof and that the school districts of Northern New Castle County have attained unitary status.

II. BACKGROUND

Although there has always been a perceived link in this country between the duties of citizenship and the need for education,⁴ the Constitution of the United States is silent on the issue of education. The power to control the education of American children was one reserved to the states and, in turn, delegated to the local community. Thus, there was never an "equivalent of Britain's Education Act of 1870 which ushered in a national system of public education in the United States."⁵ Instead, the organization of public school systems in the United States was undertaken over time at the local level, community by community. Public primary schools, organized on a neighborhood basis and, therefore, relatively homogeneous in class and ethnic backgrounds, were fairly commonplace by the mid-nineteenth century.⁶ By this time, the right of American citizens⁷ to publicly funded schooling was not so much debated as was the role of public education â to promote assimilation or to preserve cultural diversity.⁸

With the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the obligation to provide publicly funded education for black citizens led in many parts of the country (including Delaware) to the founding of separate school systems for blacks, which schools were provided with meager resources for the many waiting to be served. The movement to eliminate these "dual" school systems culminated in the seminal case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) ("Brown I").

The Supreme Court in Brown I accepted the proffered findings that

the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications, and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases.⁹ We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.

Id. at 492, 74 S.Ct. at 690-91. Again recognizing education as "the very foundation of good citizenship" and "the opportunity of an education" as the key to "success in life," the Court declared that "such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." Id. at 493, 74 S.Ct. at 691. The Court went on to hold that "equal educational opportunities" were not afforded to children who were "separated from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race," because segregation sanctioned by law "generates a feeling of inferiority as to the children's status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id.

Having decreed that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," id. at 495, 74 S.Ct. at 692, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 299, 75 S.Ct. 753, 755-56, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) ("Brown II"), addressed the question of how best to accomplish "the transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination." Although acknowledging that "substantial steps to eliminate racial discrimination in public schools had already been taken" in communities such as Delaware, the Court nonetheless remanded the cases and directed the lower courts to implement the constitutional principles announced in Brown I and II.

In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public school as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.

While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.

Id. at 300-01, 75 S.Ct. at 756 (emphasis added).

Prior to Brown I, the Delaware Supreme Court had ordered the immediate admission of black children to schools previously attended only by white children. Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del.Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. Supr.1952). However, that court also ruled that no school district could lawfully desegregate more rapidly than the State Board permitted. Steiner v. Simmons, 35 Del.Ch. 83, 111 A.2d 574 (Del.Supr.1955). In response to the Steiner holding, a class action was filed in 1957 by black children to compel their admission into the public schools of the state on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F.Supp. 886 (D.Del.1957), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.1958). Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in its decision captioned Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir.1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933, 81 S.Ct. 379, 5 L.Ed.2d 365 (1961), rejected defendants' plan to desegregate the Delaware public school system on a grade-by-grade basis over a period of 12 years, holding that such a plan "did not follow the intent and substance of the rulings of the Supreme Court" in Brown I. Id. at 387. The defendants had argued in support of their plan that the State's formerly all-white facilities were inadequate to absorb all of the State's black school children. Noting first that "a large number of Negro children may not seek integration even when offered the opportunity," the court observed:

Doubtless integration will cost the citizens of Delaware money which otherwise might not have to be spent. The education of the young always requires, indeed demands, sacrifice by the older and more mature and resolute members of the

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