Coalition v. Brewer

Citation757 F.3d 1053
Decision Date07 July 2014
Docket NumberNo. 13–16248.,13–16248.
PartiesARIZONA DREAM ACT COALITION; Jesus Castro–Martinez; Christian Jacobo; Alejandra Lopez; Ariel Martinez; Natalia Perez–Gallegos, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Janice K. BREWER, Governor of the State of Arizona, in her official capacity; John S. Halikowski, Director of the Arizona Department of Transportation, in his official capacity; Stacey K. Stanton, Assistant Director of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Arizona Department of Transportation, in her official capacity, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Victor Viramontes (argued) and Jorge M. Castillo, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Los Angeles, CA; Jennifer Chang Newell, Cecillia D. Wang, Araceli Martinez, Michael Tan, and R. Orion Danjuma, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants' Rights Project, San Francisco, CA; Linton Joaquin, Karen C. Tumlin, Shiu–Ming Cheer, Nora A. Preciado, and Nicholas Espiritu, National Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, CA; Daniel J. Pochoda, Kelly J. Flood, and James Duff Lyall, ACLU Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix, AZ, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Timothy Berg (argued), Douglas C. Northup, and Sean T. Hood, Fennemore Craig, P.C., Phoenix, AZ; Joseph Sciarrotta, Jr., Office of Governor Janice K. Brewer, Phoenix, AZ, for DefendantsAppellees.

Lawrence J. Joseph, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:12–cv–02546–DGC.

Before: HARRY PREGERSON, MARSHA S. BERZON, and MORGAN CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Concurrence by Judge CHRISTEN.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

The federal government has enacted a program called “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (“DACA”), which authorizes certain immigrants who came to the United States as children, without permission, to remain in the United States. In response, Arizona officials—Defendants here—implemented a policy that prevents DACA recipients from obtaining Arizona driver's licenses.

Plaintiffs—five individual DACA recipients living in Arizona, plus an organization promoting the interests of young immigrants—sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing their policy, arguing that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause and is preempted. The district court found that Defendants' policy deprives Plaintiffs of driver's licenses for no rational reason, and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause. The district court nonetheless denied the preliminary injunction, because it found Plaintiffs were not likely to suffer irreparable harm from this constitutional violation.

We agree that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection claim. And contrary to the district court's conclusion, we hold that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm unless Defendants' policy is enjoined. The remaining injunction factors—the public interest and the balance of the equities—also tip in Plaintiffs' favor. We therefore reverse the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. We remand for entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing its policy by which the Arizona Department of Transportation refuses to accept Plaintiffs' Employment Authorization Documents, issued to Plaintiffs under DACA, for purposes of obtaining an Arizona driver's license.

BACKGROUND
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

Many immigrants come to the United States as children, without permission, and subsequently remain in this country as they mature into adults. The Secretary of Homeland Security has determined that our nation's immigration laws were not designed “to remove productive young people to countries where they may not have lived or even speak the language”—particularly when “many of these young people have already contributed to our country in significant ways.” Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012). On June 15, 2012, the Secretary announced that her Department would begin exercising prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases involving these young people. Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would offer “certain young people who were brought to this country as children and know only this country as home” a form of deferred action, which would allow them to remain present in the United States without fear of removal. This policy came to be known as “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,” or “DACA.”

To be eligible for DACA, immigrants must have come to the United States before the age of sixteen and have been under thirty-one years old as of June 15, 2012; they must have been living in the United States when DACA was announced and have continuously resided in the United States for at least the previous five years; and they must have graduated from high school, or obtained a GED, or have been honorably discharged from the United States Armed Forces or the Coast Guard, or be currently enrolled in school. Additionally, they must not pose any threat to public safety: anyone who has been convicted of multiple misdemeanors, a single significant misdemeanor, or any felony offense is ineligible for DACA.

Like recipients of other forms of deferred action, DACA recipients enjoy no formal immigration status. Nevertheless, DACA recipients are permitted by DHS to remain in the United States for a renewable two-year period. DHS considers DACA recipients not to be unlawfully present in the United States because their deferred action is a period of stay authorized by the Attorney General. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii);8 C.F.R. 214.14(d)(3); U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Servs., Adjudicator's Field Manual Ch. 40.9.2(b)(3)(J). DACA recipients are also eligible to receive Employment Authorization Documents, allowing them to work in the United States. Indeed, would-be DACA recipients are required to apply for employment authorization when they apply for DACA.

Arizona Law and Defendants' Policy

Arizona law prohibits the Arizona Department of Transportation from issuing driver's licenses to anyone “who does not submit proof satisfactory to the department that the applicant's presence in the United States is authorized under federal law.” Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 28–3153(D). Arizona does not further define “presence ... authorized under federal law,” except through an Arizona Department of Transportation policy listing the documents it accepts as establishing authorized presence. Ariz. Dep't of Transp. Policy 16.1.2. Until August 2012, that policy listed all Employment Authorization Documents issued by the federal government as sufficient to establish “that the applicant's presence in the United States is authorized under federal law” within the meaning of this Arizona statute.

On August 15, 2012—the same day the federal government's DACA policy took effect—Arizona Governor Janice Brewer issued an executive order. Executive Order 2012–06, “Re–Affirming Intent of Arizona Law In Response to the Federal Government's Deferred Action Program,” (Aug. 15, 2012). The executive order warned that, under DACA, the federal government “plan[ned] to issue employment authorization documents to certain unlawfully present aliens....” The order directed state agencies to prevent DACA recipients from becoming eligible for any “state identification, including a driver's license.” Governor Brewer later explained that her executive order was designed to ensure that there would be “no driver licenses for illegal people.” In Governor Brewer's words, DACA recipients “are here illegally and unlawfully in the state of Arizona.... The Obama amnesty plan doesn't make them legally here.”

Pursuant to Governor Brewer's executive order, the Arizona Department of Transportation's Motor Vehicle Division revised its relevant policy to ensure that DACA recipients would not become eligible for Arizona driver's licenses. Specifically, the Motor Vehicle Division announced that it would not accept Employment Authorization Documents issued to DACA recipients—identified by the category code (c)(33)—as proof “that the applicant's presence in the United States is authorized under federal law,” pursuant to Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 28–3153(D). At the time, the Motor Vehicle Division continued to accept all other federally issued Employment Authorization Documents as proof of lawful presence.

The Present Case

Plaintiffs are five individual DACA recipients (all of whom reside in Arizona) and the Arizona DREAM Act Coalition, an organization that seeks to promote the interests of young immigrants. All five individual Plaintiffs possess Employment Authorization Documents issued under DACA. Thus, all five individual Plaintiffs are prevented from obtaining Arizona driver's licenses under Defendants' policy.

Together, Defendants are responsible for implementing and enforcing the policy by which Plaintiffs are unable to obtain Arizona driver's licenses. Plaintiffs sued Defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants' policy violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and sought ( inter alia ) a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing their policy.

The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court agreed that Plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on their equal protection claim, but it concluded that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of irreparable harm. The district court also concluded that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their preemption claim, and that neither the public...

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