Coates v. Anderson, 03-84.
Citation | 2004 WY 11,84 P.3d 953 |
Decision Date | 19 February 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-84.,03-84. |
Parties | Justin P. COATES, Rachel L. Coates, and Rak Holmes Coates, a minor, by and through his next friend, Justin P. Coates, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Ron ANDERSON, as successor trustee of Dixie Anderson Trust, Appellee (Defendant). |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Representing Appellants: James K. Lubing of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, WY.
Representing Appellee: James E. Phillips and Geoffrey J. Phillips of James E. Phillips, P.C., Evanston, WY.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] In this action, appellants Justin P. Coates, Rachel L. Coates, and Rak Holmes Coates, a minor, appeal the partial summary judgment entered by the district court in favor of appellee Ron Anderson, as successor trustee of the Dixie Anderson Trust (Trust).1 Appellants assert the district court erred in ruling that Ron Anderson, individually, was acting as an independent contractor when he parked a tractor in an allegedly negligent manner which caused an accident resulting in appellants' injuries. Appellants further contend the district court erred when it found Ron Anderson was not acting as the successor trustee of the Trust when the accident occurred. We affirm.
[¶ 2] Appellants set forth the following issues on appeal:
[¶ 3] On February 8, 2000, around 6:30 p.m., Rachel L. Coates was driving on Wyoming State Highway 237 in Lincoln County, Wyoming, with passengers Justin P. Coates, her husband, and Rak Holmes Coates, her son, when their vehicle collided with a parked tractor owned by Ron Anderson. This accident caused appellants to incur substantial injuries. Subsequently appellants filed a complaint against Ron Anderson, individually, but then later amended their complaint to also include the Trust. The amended complaint alleged that the Trust was vicariously liable for appellants' damages because Ron Anderson was acting as an agent of the Trust under the doctrine of respondent superior or, alternatively, under a de facto partnership with the Trust.
[¶ 4] After discovery was conducted, the Trust filed a motion for summary judgment that was opposed by appellants. The district court granted this motion stating:
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the Plaintiff[s], the Court finds no evidence which would create an inference to support the Plaintiff[s'] respondeat superior claim that the Defendant, Ron Anderson, was acting on behalf of Dixie Anderson or the Trust as trustee or manager or that Ron Anderson was a partner with Dixie Anderson or the Trust when the collision occurred involving Mr. Anderson's tractor and the Plaintiffs' vehicle.
The undisputed facts are that Defendant's mother, Dixie Anderson as trustee, allowed him to use the trust property as part of his ranching operation and received, in return, care taken of the property and sporadic payment depending on the crops. There is no evidence of Mrs. Anderson exercising control over the Defendant Ron Anderson's conduct of the operations, or of her assuming duties with respect to safety or of them having an employment contract. Mr. Anderson's payment to Mrs. Anderson for the use of the land and taking care of the property is more like a lease or license than a partnership because there is no showing of an agreement to share profits and losses. Mr. Anderson was driving the tractor for his own purposes of feeding his livestock and had parked it on the highway where the collision occurred.
This appeal followed.
[¶ 5] We recently reiterated our long-standing standard of review in summary judgment cases in Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 15, ¶ 8, 61 P.3d 1255, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2003) ( ):
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 620 (Wyo.2000); Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo.1997); Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo.1997); W.R.C.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it establishes or refutes an essential element of a claim or defense. Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Wyo.1995). In evaluating summary judgment, we apply the same standards as the trial court, without affording any deference to the trial court's decisions on issues of law. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo.1994).
We may uphold the grant of summary judgment upon any proper legal ground finding support in the record. Polo Ranch Co., at ¶ 8; Bevan, at ¶ 26.
Mize v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo.1997) (quoting Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Wyo.1975) (footnotes omitted)).
[¶ 6] Initially, appellants argue the Trust did not establish the lack of genuine issues of material fact as to whether an independent contractor relationship existed between Ron Anderson and the Trust. Citing our holding in Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1042-43 (Wyo.1978) as authority, appellants contend that the Trust failed to present sufficient evidence proving that 1) the Trust did not have the right to control the details of Ron Anderson's work, and 2) the Trust did not retain the right to terminate Ron Anderson without incurring liability. Therefore, appellants assert that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust.
[¶ 7] In Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wyo.1994), this court clearly adopted the general proposition set forth in the Restatement, Second, Torts § 409 (1965), that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm to another caused by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants. See also Hill v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Wyo.1988)
; Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1176 (Wyo.1989); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 898 (Wyo.1986); Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 164-67 (Wyo.1986); and 41 Am.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors § 24 (1968). Thus, with respect to vicarious liability, the controlling question is whether or not Ron Anderson was an independent contractor of the Trust. See Stephenson, at 1176; Noonan, at 165. We stated in Noonan, at 166 (quoting Simpson v. Home Petroleum Corp., 770 F.2d 499, 506-7 (5th Cir.1985)):
[T]he existence of a master-servant relationship is a necessary part of the plaintiff's case when recovery is sought on a respondeat superior theory, and in that regard "the essential inquiry is whether or not the employer has the contract right to control the opposite contracting party in the details of the work to be performed." [Citation.] Such a right to control is a prerequisite of the master-servant relationship. Conversely, the absence of such a right of control is a prerequisite of an independent contractor relationship. Master-servant and independent contractor are thus opposite sides of the same coin; one cannot be both at the same time with respect to the same activity; the one necessarily negatives the other, each depending on opposite answers to the same right of control inquiry.
[¶ 8] In determining whether an independent contractor relationship exists, this court has recognized two primary areas for consideration. The premier consideration is whether the employer has the right to control the details of the work wherein liability is sought to be established. Ordinarily this is a question of fact for the jury but becomes one of law when only one inference can be drawn. Combined Ins., at 1042; Noonan, at 165-67.
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