Coates v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ.

• Citation: 559 F.2d 445
• Decision Date: 01 August 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1997,76-1997
• Parties: Linda F. COATES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 445

559 F.2d 445

Linda F. COATES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 76-1997.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 18, 1977.

Decided June 20, 1977.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 1, 1977.

Aldus S. Mitchell, Sophia H. Hall, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Mary F. Stafford, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., William McD. Frederick, Julian E. Cannell, Peoria, Ill., James R. Schirott, Park Ridge, Ill., Richard T. Buck, Joliet, Ill., George B. Collins, Chicago, Ill., Nicholas E. Sakellariou, Joliet, Ill., Dale F. Conde, Rockford, Ill., Michael M. Mihm, State's Atty., Peoria, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before CUMMINGS, PELL and TONE, Circuit Judges.

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

On October 8, 1975, plaintiff school children and their parents filed this school desegregation action on behalf of the class of all black citizens who reside within the geographical boundaries of certain school districts in Rockford, Peroia and Joliet, Illinois. Named as defendants were the Illinois Office of Education, the Illinois State Superintendent of Education, individual members of the Illinois State Board of Education (the three groups collectively termed the "state defendants"), the various school districts, the Superintendent of these school districts, the geographically pertinent Regional Boards of School Trustees, the Superintendents of these Regional Boards and the individual members of the Regional Boards. The complaint asserts subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3). The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) are pleaded as causes of action under the 28 U.S.C. § 1331 subject-matter jurisdictional fount, and three provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1988, ¹ are pleaded in conjunction with the 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) jurisdictional grant. A pendent state action under the Armstrong Act is also alleged. 1975 Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 122, § 10-21.3.

The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that plaintiffs' constitutional rights have been violated, as well as an injunction against future violation. In addition, the plaintiffs ask that the expenditure of all federal funds by the Peoria, Rockford and Joliet school districts be enjoined pendente lite. Finally, the complaint prays that $50,000 damages be jointly and severally assessed against the individual defendants.

The response of the defendants to the complaint was mixed. Several defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and others answered the complaint. On August 3, 1976, the trial court held that the case failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted "(b)ecause this complaint does not allege that the underlying condition of school segregation was caused, in whole or in part, by any purposeful action of any of the defendants * * * " (419 F.Supp. at 27). The cause was dismissed with prejudice. Judge Grady also expressed advisory views on the impropriety of joinder of separate school districts in one action. He further indicated that "the very fact of the separate districts, geographically distant from one another, make(s) this proposed class an implausible creature which could not possibly satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" (id. at 28). ²

The only facts available to us are those detailed in the complaint. In support of the motions to dismiss we take all well-pleaded facts as true, but we will not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs which are not apparent on the face of this civil rights complaint. Metcalf v. Ogilvie,436 F.2d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1970). Especially in the school desegregation area, conclusory pleading such as evidenced in this complaint is woefully inadequate. Direct linkage between the facts pleaded and the violation asserted must exist on the face of the complaint. Put another way, a "plaintiff is required to set forth specific illegal misconduct and resultant harm in a way which will permit an informed ruling whether the wrong complained of is of federal cognizance." Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1972), certiorari denied, 409 U.S. 894, 93 S.Ct. 116, 34 L.Ed.2d 152.

According to the complaint, the local school boards were required to prevent the segregation of school facilities under 1975 Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 122, § 10-22.5. ³ Further, pursuant to the Armstrong Act, they were affirmatively required to change attendance units with a view to the prevention of future and elimination of preexisting segregation. 1975 Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 122, § 10-21.3. ⁴ In 1971, under rules which had been adopted by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, ⁵ he found that the named defendant school districts "were in violation of the laws of the State of Illinois because of segregation and discrimination within said school districts" (Complaint P 22). The complaint asserts that plaintiffs have been denied equal educational opportunities because of defendants' failure and refusal to correct the segregation and discrimination in the schools in the named Rockford, Peoria and Joliet school districts.

The State Board of Education has duties which "shall encompass all duties currently delegated to the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and such other duties as the General Assembly shall designate." 1975 Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 122, Section 1A-4C. The Superintendent of Public Instruction has the duty to "supervise all the public schools in the State." Section 2-3.3. In discharge of this duty, the Superintendent is granted the power, and indeed the resulting duty, to "make rules necessary to carry into efficient and uniform effect all laws for establishing and maintaining free schools in the State." Section 2-3.6. Certain sections of Article 10 of the School Code, the organic statute providing for local school boards with various powers and duties, are plainly "laws for establishing and maintaining free schools in the State." In particular, the Armstrong Act (Section 10-21.3) which sets forth the local school board's duties with respect to attendance units and Section 10-22.5, which sets forth the local school board's powers with respect to the assignment of pupils, are such laws. Therefore, under Section 2-3.6 the State Superintendent has the power to make "rules necessary to carry into efficient and uniform effect" the local school board's charge under 10-21.3 and 10-22.5. The only extrinsic limit on the State Superintendent with respect to the regulations he may issue to effectuate these provisions is the anti-busing clause of Section 10-22.5. See note 11 infra.

Manifestly, the statutory scheme does not contemplate that the State Superintendent discharge a "hands on" responsibility with respect to attendance units and pupil assignment. Actual implementation is, of course, the province of the local school boards within the guiding boundaries established by any Section 2-3.6 regulations which the State Superintendent has promulgated. Thus the State Superintendent has an overseer's responsibility with respect to attendance units and pupil assignment, and his discharge of this responsibility by the 1971 citation of the defendant school districts seems to have been the triggering event in this lawsuit. Needless to say, the actual and primary implementational duties under these Sections reside with the local boards who possess the normal sort of discretion usually inherent to an administrative body.

I.

Read liberally, ⁶ the complaint alleges a federal statutory school segregation claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a constitutional claim under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and a state statutory claim under the Armstrong Act. Since federal jurisdiction over the Armstrong Act claim is strictly pendent to the alleged federal claims, we must initially determine whether a federal cause of action exists. To avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication, we will construe the Title VI claim first. ⁷ Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 56 S.Ct. 588 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

II.

The complaint alleges that the defendant Rockford, Peoria and Joliet school districts were receiving federal funds during all pertinent times. Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:

"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

Section 601 has been used in the equal education opportunity area. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1; Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 851-852 (5th Cir. 1967). But even if arguendo Section 601 can be read to imply a private cause of action against administrative actions or inactions having the effect of discriminating " 'in the availability or use of any academic * * * or other facilities of the grantee or other recipient' " ⁸ even though no purposeful design is present (cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396), the discrimination must be the actual causative resultant of the actions under scrutiny. Cf. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599. When, under state imposed standards, federal and state money is spent on equality of treatment, by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers and curriculum, the ancillary fact of racial imbalance does not state a claim under Section 601. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 786. And without a recitation of how specific...