Coates v. Kelley

• Citation: 957 F.Supp. 1080
• Decision Date: 27 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. LR-C-96-525.,LR-C-96-525.
• Parties: Clifton COATES and Nancy Hunter, Plaintiffs, v. Henry C. KELLEY, Stephanie D. Kelley, and John J. Flake, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

957 F.Supp. 1080

Clifton COATES and Nancy Hunter, Plaintiffs, v. Henry C. KELLEY, Stephanie D. Kelley, and John J. Flake, Defendants.

No. LR-C-96-525.

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division.

February 27, 1997.

Luther Oneal Sutter, Little Rock, AR, for Clifton Coates and Nancy Hunter.

John W. Fink, Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., Little Rock, AR, for Henry C. Kelley.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

EISELE, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Henry C. Kelley's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs have responded to Defendant Kelley's Motion, and the Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties. For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court will grant the Motion.

I Background

This case revolves around the alleged lack of accommodations for disabled individuals at the United Artists Theatre Circuit's (hereinafter "UATC's") Cinema City movie theater in Little Rock's Breckenridge Village Shopping Center. On July 10, 1996, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit, and, on August 26, 1996, they amended their original complaint to name the current defendants, each of whom owns, apparently along with other unnamed individuals, a partial undivided interest in the real estate under the UATC Cinema City complex.

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have failed to require their tenant to make certain readily achievable changes to the architecture of the Cinema City theater in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter the "ADA") and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (hereinafter the "ACRA"). Plaintiffs indicate that Defendants should have required their tenant to install a raised toilet seat; to install full-length bathroom mirrors; to rearrange toilet partitions to increase maneuvering space; to reposition paper towel dispensers in bathrooms; to reposition public telephones; to rearrange tables, chairs, vending machines, display racks, and other furniture to make routes accessible; to reposition shelves; to rotate films "between accessible locations"; to provide adequate and accessible parking; and to provide "accessible path of travel." Plaintiff's request an injunction requiring the Defendants to provide "proper access to theaters for persons with disabilities," compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

In a prior lawsuit, Connie Arnold, et al. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., et al., No. C-93-0079-THE (N.D.Cal.1996), in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the court certified a nationwide class of all mobility-impaired individuals who have attended or will attend a movie in a theater owned and operated by UATC. After several years of litigation and negotiation, the parties reached a settlement. The court approved that agreement on August 14, 1996. The settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that UATC would make certain alterations in its theaters and stated that "neither the DOJ nor any Class member will hereafter assert or claim that UATC is required to make additional or different modifications to its Existing Theatres or Recently-Constructed Theatres, or is required to follow different standards for Future Construction, beyond what it agreed to herein, in order to comply with federal ... laws...." Settlement Agreement (Exhibit A to Defendant Kelley's Brief in Support) at 2-3. In its order approving the agreement, the court found the agreement "fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable." Order (Exhibit B to Defendant Kelley's Brief in Support) at 10.

Plaintiff Kelley filed his Answer to Amended Complaint, Affirmative Defenses and Motions to Dismiss on September 27, 1996. In his Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff Kelley argues that, under the doctrine of preclusion, the Arnold settlement agreement and the judicial order approving it bar Plaintiffs' federal ADA claim and that the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss Plaintiff's state ACRA claim

II The Relevant Law

A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

As the term is often expansively used, res judicata encompasses two separate but related doctrines regarding the preclusive effect of one judgment on a subsequent lawsuit — namely, res judicata and collateral estoppel See Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., et al. v. Leco Engineering and Machine, Inc., et al., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir.1978). The preclusive effect of a prior judgment presents a question of law. See, e.g., United States of America ex rel. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gambler's Supply, Inc., 925 F.Supp. 658, 663 (D.S.D.1996).

In general, the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents repetitive lawsuits based on the same cause of action and thereby promotes judicial economy. See United States v. Brekke, 97 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.1996), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, November 18, 1996, petition for cert. filed, February 13, 1997 (No. 96-7857). Application of res judicata to bar a claim requires the satisfaction of three requirements: "(1) the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the decision was a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the same cause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in both cases." Id; see also Richardson v. Alabama State Board of Education, 935 F.2d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir.1991); Marlene Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1011, 1015-16 (6th Cir.1983); Quigley v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 74, 76 (N.D.Tex.1979) (citing Wasoff v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 451 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir.1971)). The bar of res judicata applies to every ground of recovery which was or could have been presented in the prior action. See Quigley, 85 F.R.D. at 76 (citing Supreme Court precedent).

On the other hand, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact determined by a valid and final judgment in another lawsuit involving a party to the prior litigation. See Brekke, 97 F.3d at 1049; In re Monument Record Corp., 71 B.R. 853, 857 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1987) (citing Marlene Industries, 712 F.2d at 1015-16); Bogosian, et al. v. Gulf Oil Corp., et al., 1983 WL 1824 (E.D.Pa.). Like res judicata, collateral estoppel prevents the expense and vexation of multiple lawsuits, promotes judicial economy, and minimizes the number of inconsistent judicial decisions. See Monument Record, 71 B.R. at 857 (quoting Marlene Industries, 712 F.2d at 1015-16). To determine whether collateral estoppel prevents litigation of a certain issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applies four criteria: "(1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have been litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; and (4) the determination must have been essential to the prior judgment." In re Miera, 926 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir.1991).

B. Preclusion in the Context of Consent Decrees

Consent judgments are two-faced: they are, in some respects, like formal judgments on the merits and, in other respects, like contracts between parties. See In re Carrero, 94 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1988). Some courts unequivocally accord the respect of a final judgment to a consent decree and apply preclusion doctrines with full force. See Richardson, 935 F.2d at 1244; Surgical Laser Technologies, Inc. v. Heraeus Lasersonics, Inc., 1995 WL 20444 (E.D.Pa.) (citing Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Trans Tech, Inc. v. Interdynamics, Inc., 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S.Ct. 658, 70 L.Ed.2d 631 (1981)); Quigley, 85 F.R.D. at 75; Monument Record, 71 B.R. at 859 (citing Harrison v. Bloomfield Bldg. Indus., Inc., 435 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir.1970)).

The courts within the Eighth Circuit, however, have not uniformly applied preclusion doctrines to consent decrees. See In re Olson, 170 B.R. 161, 166 (Bankr.D.N.D.1994)(noting difficulty with respect to collateral estoppel); compare United States v. Bryant, 15 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that res judicata barred litigation of issue that could have been raised in Tax Court despite decision based on parties' agreement); United States Environmental Protection Agency v. City of Green Forest, Arkansas, 921 F.2d 1394, 1404 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956, 112 S.Ct. 414, 116 L.Ed.2d 435 (1991) (dismissing private enforcement action after consent decree in subsequently filed government enforcement action); Crane Boom Life Guard Co. Inc. v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 362 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908, 87 S.Ct. 853, 17 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (noting that a valid judgment entered by consent or agreement operates as res judicata to the same extent as a judgment after adjudication); Gambler's Supply, 925 F.Supp. at 663 (noting that, when causes of action are the same, consent decree has preclusive effect of judgment); Falk v. Hecker, 88 B.R. 957, 964 (Bankr.D.Minn 1988) (indicating that "[i]n Minnesota, as well as the Eighth Circuit, a consent decree has the same preclusive effect as if it was fully litigated"); with Gall v. South Branch National Bank, 783 F.2d 125, 127 (8th Cir.1986) (indicating that consent judgment or stipulation makes preclusion doctrines inapplicable); United States v. Young, 804 F.2d 116, 119 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 3184, 96 L.Ed.2d 673 (1987) (stating that collateral estoppel does not apply to consent judgments); In re Chinnery, 181 B.R. 954, 962 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1995) (finding that Eighth Circuit law does not apply collateral estoppel to consent judgments). Thus, the Court is left to examine the rationales behind the relevant decisions and to reach the most legally sound conclusion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that res judicata applies to consent decrees in the context of Title VII. See ...