Coates v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 27 October 1942
• Parties: COATES v. LAWRENCE, Superintendent and Warden of Georgia State Prison.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

46 F. Supp. 414

COATES v. LAWRENCE, Superintendent and Warden of Georgia State Prison.

District Court, S. D. Georgia, Savannah Division.

July 8, 1942.

Judgment Affirmed October 27, 1942.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James R. Venable and F. A. Bowers, both of Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.

E. L. Reagan, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Georgia, and Chas W. Walker, of Macon, Ga., for respondent.

Judgment Affirmed October 27, 1942. See 131 F.2d 110.

LOVETT, District Judge.

Petitioner, under sentence of death upon conviction for murder in the superior court of Catoosa county, Georgia, has filed his petition for habeas corpus in this court, alleging upon oath violations of certain rights guaranteed to him by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Art. III, § 2, clause 3, and Art. IV, § 2, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States¹. 28 U.S.C.A. § 451 et seq. The respondent, the warden of the state prison where petitioner is confined, has made his return, denies any invasion of petitioner's constitutional rights, and has also filed a plea in bar in the nature of a plea of res judicata. An amendment to the petition has been allowed, but it invokes no other clauses of the Constitution.

Evidence has been submitted, orally and by deposition, the petitioner, his counsel, the warden and others have testified, transcripts of records previously made have been offered and received without objection², and arguments of counsel for the respective parties been heard and considered.³

I find the facts to be:

On December 31, 1940, petitioner was indicted by the grand jury in Catoosa county, Georgia, for the murder of a state highway patrolman. The killing occurred on December 20, 1940. The arrest was made five days later in the state of Tennessee, and continuously since that time petitioner has been in the custody of the officers of the state, confined first in a hospital and later in the county jail in Atlanta, Georgia. The trial took place on February 5, 1941.

Promptly after indictment, probably the same day, the petitioner was taken before the Judge of the superior court of the Circuit in open court in the county where he was indicted. Being informed he was without counsel, the Judge inquired if he was able to employ a lawer. This inquiry was prompted by the fact he was an escaped convict from a prison in the state of Missouri where he was serving a life sentence and where he had previously resided, and there had come to the attention of the Judge a rumor that a substantial amount of money was found on his person when arrested. It turned out the money was being held by the officers of the law in the state of Tennessee, where the arrest was made. This appearing, and the prisoner saying he was unable to employ counsel, being without means or money, the Judge asked if he had communicated with his people in Missouri and, finding he had not, inquired if he wanted the court to appoint counsel for him. The prisoner said he did. Being a stranger he knew none of the lawyers in the county or section and expressed no preference as among the several in the court room whose names were called for his information. The Judge thereupon named two reputable and experienced lawyers, of good reputation, one of whom had practiced his profession for about forty years, and who was then the representative of the county in the General Assembly of Georgia; the other had practiced fifteen years or more. The court room was vacated and turned over to the prisoner and his two designated counsel where a conference between them was then held, after which he was returned to Atlanta.

While he was in Catoosa county at the time mentioned, the Judge assigned the case for trial at a special or adjourned term of the court to be held on January 17th. Later, at the request of prisoner's counsel and because of his physical condition, the trial was postponed to February 5th, which was the regular term. The Judge arranged for the county to pay the expenses of the counsel to and from Atlanta to confer further with their client, and this was done. The prisoner's feet had been frozen while he was a fugitive and some of his toes had to be amputated. The county physician examined him prior to the day first fixed for the trial, and on the doctor's first report the case was continued as stated. A later report showed he was no longer suffering pain, though he was unable to walk when tried. The trial was then set for February 5th.

When the case was tried, one of the counsel named by the court was in Atlanta attending a regular session of the General Assembly of Georgia and did not appear. He had conferred with his client in Atlanta, and could get no information from him as to the facts of the case to properly prepare a defense. The prisoner informed both counsel designated by the court that he had been "double-crossed" in his experience by lawyers he did not know, and he would tell the facts only when he went on the witness stand on the trial. There was some discussion between the lawyer not present at the trial and the prisoner touching a motion for change of venue, at which time counsel informed his client such a motion would avail nothing in his opinion, as there was no local prejudice against him, the slain man did not reside, and was almost unknown, in the county, and he thought a fair trial could be had there. On the date the case was finally set for trial, the legislature of Georgia was in session, and the counsel, a member of that body, testifying he felt he could personally be of no real assistance to the prisoner because of his refusal to co-operate in the preparation of the case, did not attend the trial, going to his legislative duties instead, but arranged with his law partner, a former State Revenue Commissioner, also an experienced lawyer, to take his place, which he did. This was approved by the petitioner.

The other designated counsel was present, with his father, even a more experienced lawyer, and the three assisted in striking the jury, the father and son remaining throughout the trial. When the state offered testimony of witnesses, the petitioner's counsel, after explaining to the court the handicaps they suffered because of their client's unwillingness to tell them the facts or nature of the defense he wanted presented, were granted the privilege of reserving cross-examination until the accused had made his statement (not under oath under the laws of Georgia) to the jury.

After the evidence had been submitted, and while one of the counsel was making his argument to the jury, the presiding Judge learned that one of the jurors prior to the trial had made certain statements tending to disqualify him as a juror. The statement was that the state patrolman alleged to have been killed by the petitioner on one occasion had arrested the juror's nephew, and had abused him, calling him a vile name, and that the juror thought the patrolman when killed "got what was coming to him". On receiving this information, near the close of the trial, the presiding Judge sent the jury to their room, called counsel for the state and defendant up to the bench, and held a conversation with them, relating what he had heard. The petitioner's counsel who had actively conducted the trial, cross-examining the witnesses, etc., agreed with the Judge that if the juror had made the statement attributed to him he was disqualified. A discussion followed as to declaring a mistrial or excusing this juror and proceeding with the remaining eleven. According to the Judge's testimony, the prisoner's counsel left the bench and went to the prisoner who was in the court room at the time and discussed the subject with him, returning to the bench and informing the Judge he consented for the juror to be excused and for the trial to proceed. The petitioner denies he was consulted. The counsel has testified (by deposition, being unwell) that he consented to the juror being withdrawn and the trial to go on, in the presence of the petitioner, but that his best recollection was he did not consult his client before so agreeing. It is not disputed that the juror was excused in the presence of the petitioner, and, of course, he knew of it at the time. No objection was made. The petitioner, a white man, was in no sense an illiterate or unintelligent person or inexperienced in the ways of the law. On the contrary, he testified in this court that he had been arraigned in court charged with crime perhaps two dozen or more times prior to the trial in Georgia.

Petitioner's counsel who conducted the trial became ill at the end of it and before he had made an oral argument. His father who sat through the trial made the argument. No objection was made at the time by the petitioner to this substitution of the father for the son to make the argument to the jury in his behalf.

There is some suggestion in the testimony of the petitioner that he wanted certain witnesses subpoenaed and a further continuance of his case. This his counsel deny. The witnesses of whom he now speaks apparently knew nothing about the facts of the case, and I fail to see how their testimony could have been helpful to him.

There was no show of mob violence or any disorder or unseemly conduct of any kind at the trial. Some fifteen state patrolmen were present to aid in preserving order, and, more particularly, to prevent a rescue of the prisoner if rescue were attempted, it having been reported to the state officers the prisoner was a member of an organized band of criminals and on another occasion in a different state such an attempt had been made by his friends or associates.

After conviction the petitioner, through other counsel of his own choosing, filed a motion for new trial. When denied, a bill of exceptions was sued out, and the case reviewed by the State Supreme Court. There were no assignments of error for any irregularity in the trial or because of a denial of any constitutional right. The errors...