Coates v. Ocean State Jobbers Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008–140–Appeal.,2008–140–Appeal. |
| Citation | 18 A.3d 554 |
| Parties | Veronica COATESv.OCEAN STATE JOBBERS, INC. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Veronica Coates, Pro Se.Randall B. Johnson, Esq., for Defendant.Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
The plaintiff, Veronica Coates, appeals pro se from a Superior Court denial of her motion for a continuance and the dismissal of her complaint against the defendant, Ocean State Jobbers, Inc. The plaintiff contends that her motion for a continuance should have been granted because the defendant refused to provide her with the documents she allegedly needed to try her case and because of her physical disabilities. The plaintiff also argues that the dismissal of her complaint was in error because she had appealed the denial of her motion for a continuance and had requested a stay of trial. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
On December 2, 2004, Ms. Coates filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging that on October 4, 2002, as she was entering the Ocean State Job Lot store on Newport Avenue in East Providence, an automatic door that had been “negligently designed, installed, operated and maintained” struck her and caused her “serious bodily injuries” that required medical attention. On June 20, 2005, plaintiff filed interrogatories propounded to defendant, which defendant answered. On June 24, 2005, plaintiff filed a request for production of documents in which she asked defendant for (1) copies of maintenance and repair orders for the automatic doors; (2) a list of injuries suffered by patrons on defendant's premises; (3) information provided to employees about the procedure and treatment for injured customers; (4) any reports prepared by defendant's employees related to the incident in question; and (5) results of instances in which the doors were tested and action taken, if any. The defendant objected to these requests, but nevertheless produced a list of the 2002 work orders related to the doors at the Newport Avenue premises, a copy of the store policy concerning customer injuries, and a report, which included a witness statement, pertaining to plaintiff's incident.
On March 1, 2006, this case was designated for court-annexed arbitration. An arbitrator awarded plaintiff the sum of $2,500 plus interest and costs, but she rejected this award in June 2006. In December 2006, plaintiff's attorney filed a motion to withdraw,1 which was granted on January 10, 2007.2 In the interim, plaintiff had entered her appearance pro se.
Meanwhile, on June 23, 2006, defendant filed a supplemental answer to plaintiff's interrogatories in which defendant provided the name and address of the company that maintains the doors at defendant's Newport Avenue premises.
A trial originally was scheduled for the week of November 12, 2007, but the trial date later was continued to March 3, 2008. In November 2007, plaintiff served a subpoena on counsel for defendant. The subpoena referred to an addendum containing a list of items requested by plaintiff, including a transcript of the arbitration hearing; a copy of a tape recording of the arbitration hearing; records concerning the manufacture, installation, and maintenance of defendant's automatic doors; specifications and measurements related to the doors; building regulations; records identifying employees responsible for the inspection of the doors; and records of injuries that have taken place on defendant's premises since 2002. In December 2007, plaintiff filed a motion to compel the production of subpoenaed documents. The defendant objected to the motion to compel and also filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which was granted by a hearing justice in January 2008. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff served another subpoena, this time on the registered agent for defendant, requesting the same records that were listed in the first subpoena; she also later filed a motion to compel the production of the subpoenaed documents. The defendant again objected to the motion to compel and moved to quash the subpoena. On February 28, 2008, a hearing justice denied plaintiff's motion to compel the production of the subpoenaed documents from the agent.3
In addition, on February 18, 2008, plaintiff moved for a continuance of the trial, to which defendant objected. A hearing on the motion took place on February 29, 2008 before a trial justice.4 At the hearing, defendant reiterated its objection, pointing out that “this case has come up for trial calls for at least eight months,” during which time defendant had been “liberal” in giving plaintiff additional time to prepare for trial. The defendant also asserted that the documents that plaintiff was seeking through the subpoenas, which it alleged the hearing justice previously had ruled to be inappropriate, did not exist. In response, plaintiff filed with the trial justice a request for production of documents pursuant to Rule 34 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.5 The plaintiff also gave the trial justice a copy of an affidavit in support of her amended motion for a continuance,6 wherein she alleged that she needed a continuance because she had “[s]erious health issues,” including Sjögren's syndrome,7 that made it difficult for her to represent herself in this matter. The affidavit also stated that plaintiff had served on defendant a request for production of documents that were necessary for her case. The trial justice denied plaintiff's motion for a continuance,8 noting that this case “has been pending for four years” and that it was “time to try it.” The trial justice urged plaintiff “to be ready, to the extent [she could] be,” to proceed with the trial on its scheduled date of March 3, 2008.
On the same day that the trial justice denied plaintiff's motion for a continuance, February 29, 2008, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from that denial. At a hearing on March 3, 2008, the date this case was scheduled to go to trial, the trial justice asked the parties whether they were “ready to proceed.” The plaintiff responded by notifying the trial justice of her pending appeal on the motion for a continuance, by reiterating her request for more time to collect documents, and by filing a request for a stay of trial. At the hearing, plaintiff also complained of “terrible problems with [her] eyes” that she said had made it difficult for her to prepare for trial. The defendant argued that plaintiff's constant delays were “prejudicial to the defense” and moved for a dismissal. The defendant pointed out that “all the documents” that it could have produced had already been produced, that discovery had already concluded, and that there were no subpoenas or motions outstanding in this case. The trial justice dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice,9 stating that plaintiff's trial should not have “come as a surprise” to her because it had “been on the calendar” and plaintiff had “been on many occasions before different judges on this court urging [her] to get [her] documents together.” The justice also noted that plaintiff was “beyond” requesting documents for production and refused to issue a stay in this case.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate judgment, which was denied. The plaintiff appealed on March 19, 2008.10
When reviewing a trial justice's decision to grant or deny a request for a continuance, this Court uses an abuse-of-discretion standard. Bergeron v. Roszkowski, 866 A.2d 1230, 1235 (R.I.2005); see also State v. Kowal, 8 A.3d 1036, 1037 (R.I.2010) (mem.); Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC v. Rossi, 857 A.2d 231, 238 (R.I.2004). “[T]he widest discretion must be given to calendar justices and trial justices” in managing a trial calendar, a task that is “among the most difficult of all judicial assignments.” Bergeron, 866 A.2d at 1235 (quoting Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 469 (R.I.2003)). That is why, absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial justice's denial of a motion for a continuance. Id.
Similarly, “[a]buse of discretion is the applicable standard to be used by [this Court] when reviewing a trial justice's dismissal of a civil action for lack of prosecution pursuant to [Rule 41(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure].” Bergeron, 866 A.2d at 1236 (quoting Harvey v. Town of Tiverton, 764 A.2d 141, 143 (R.I.2001)). In applying this standard, this Court must determine “whether [the trial justice's] findings are supported by the evidence or whether in making such findings [the trial justice] misconceived or overlooked any material evidence.” Harvey, 764 A.2d at 143 (quoting Finney Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Cordeiro, 485 A.2d 910, 911 (R.I.1984)).
On appeal, plaintiff raises two issues. First, she argues that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a continuance. According to plaintiff, a continuance should have been granted because defendant refused to comply with plaintiff's requests for documents that she needed to try her case. The plaintiff also suggests that defendant's attorney lied to the hearing justice about plaintiff's document requests being improper. In addition, plaintiff asserts that the trial justice should have granted the motion for a continuance because plaintiff's physical disabilities made it difficult for her to try her case.
Second, plaintiff contends that her complaint should not have been dismissed because she appealed the denial of her motion for a...
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