Coates v. State

• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CARR
• Citation: Coates v. State, 36 Ala.App. 371, 56 So.2d 383 (Ala. App. 1952)
• Decision Date: 15 January 1952
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 309
• Parties: COATES v. STATE.

Page 383

56 So.2d 383

36 Ala.App. 371

COATES v. STATE.

6 Div. 309.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Jan. 15, 1952.

Matt H. Murphy, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.

Si Garrett, Atty. Gen., and Robt. Straub, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

CARR, Presiding Judge.

The accused was tried under an indictment containing two counts, larceny of an automobile under the first count and buying, receiving, concealing, or aiding in concealing the said property under the second count.

The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment of guilty as charged under the second count of the indictment.

The effect of this finding was an acquittal under the larceny count. Jacobs v. State, 28 Ala.App. 585, 190 So. 295; Stuckey v. State, 28 Ala.App. 83, 180 So. 116.

All the witnesses who testified during the progress of the trial appeared at the call of the State.

According to this evidence J. A. Naul, the owner of the automobile in question, left the car in a used car lot or 'sales lot' in the city of Birmingham, Alabama. This was on Friday.

It appears that Mr. Naul's brother contemplated buying the car, and the vehicle was left at the indicated place until the prospective purchaser could have his eyes treated at a hospital across the street from the storage place.

The automobile remained constantly at the lot until some time the following Sunday night. It was last seen by an employee of the parking lot about 5 o'clock P.M. on this day. When he returned to work early Monday morning the car was missing.

About 2:30 A.M. on the same Monday the officers arrested the appellant while he was driving the automobile along the streets of Birmingham. The switch to the car had been 'jumped.' A man named Murphy was a riding companion of the defendant.

The appellant made two statements to the arresting officers. The voluntary nature of these confessions was not a question at the time of their introduction in evidence.

In one statement he said that he and Murphy took the car from the lot and drove it around the city until the arrest was made. In the other statement he claimed that Murphy took the automobile from the lot and picked him up on the street later.

As we view the record the only question which merits any discussion is the action of the court in refusing the general affirmative charge in defendant's behalf.

Appellant's attorney in brief poses the position that the corpus delicti was not established by the proof. It is well settled by the authorities that, before one can be convicted for receiving or concealing stolen property, it must be shown by the required measure of proof that the property in question was stolen. Latikos v. State, 19 Ala.App. 214, 96 So. 377; Jordan v. State, 17 Ala.App. 575, 87 So. 433; Sanders v. State, 167 Ala. 85, 52 So. 417, 28 L.R.A., N.S., 536.

It is not required that the corpus delicti be proved by direct proof. It may be established by circumstantial evidence. Rowe v. State, 243 Ala. 618, 11 So.2d 749; Moss v. State, 32 Ala.App. 250, 25 So.2d 700; Ratliff v. State, 212 Ala. 410, 102 So. 621.

The Supreme Court in Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 So. 460, 462, pronounced this rule: '* * * it must be considered as settled that inconclusive facts and circumstances tending prima facie to show the corpus delicti may be aided by the admissions or confession of the accused so as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and so to support a conviction, although such facts and circumstances, standing alone, would not thus satisfy the jury of the existence of the corpus delicti.' See also, Ratliff v. State, supra; Rutland v. State, 31 Ala.App. 43, 11 So.2d 768.

In the instant case Mr. Naul, the owner of the automobile, did not testify. The evidence discloses that the...