Coates v. United States, 83-385.

• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Mack
• Citation: Coates v. United States, 482 A.2d 1239 (D.C. 1984)
• Decision Date: 22 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-385.,83-385.
• Parties: Raymond C. COATES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Page 1239

482 A.2d 1239

Raymond C. COATES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 83-385.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 7, 1983.

Decided October 22, 1984.

Francis D. Carter, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., with whom A. Franklin Burgess, Jr., Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., at the time the pleadings were filed, was on the pleadings, for appellant.

Mary Incontro, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the pleadings were filed, Michael W. Farrell, and Mary Ellen Abrecht, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the pleadings, for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, MACK and ROGERS, Associate Judges.

MACK, Associate Judge:

This appeal raises issues not before addressed by this court. Specifically, we are asked to decide (1) whether the sentencing judge who imposed a term of treatment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976) (hereinafter YCA) may subsequently enter a finding of no benefit from further YCA treatment thereby withdrawing the directive to the Bureau of Prisons to provide such treatment, and (2) assuming such a finding is proper, what procedural due process requirements attach to that determination. We find that a sentencing judge may modify his previously imposed term of treatment under the Act but that a finding of no benefit from further treatment thereunder may be made only after a hearing affording procedural due process. Because the trial court acted to modify the treatment in this case without such a hearing, we reverse and remand for the court, in its discretion, to fashion and grant such procedural relief, concomitant to a hearing, as may be required prior to reentry of any order.

On August 15, 1977, appellant pled guilty to assault with intent to commit robbery while armed, D.C.Code §§ 22-501, -3202 (1973), in satisfaction of a pending sixcount indictment. Pursuant to this plea, on December 1, 1977, now Chief Judge Moultrie sentenced appellant under § 5010(c) of the YCA to a period of confinement of fifteen years. Appellant was sent to the Lorton Youth Center to serve his sentence.

According to the Bureau of Prisons, appellant was transferred in 1979 to federal custody from the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Lorton Youth Center.¹ Thereafter, he was transferred to seven different institutions² for disciplinary reasons. During that time, appellant had been the subject of forty-seven disciplinary reports. Moreover, on December 18, 1980, he received a three month consecutive adult term in the Western District of Oklahoma for assaulting a staff member at the federal institution in El Reno, Oklahoma.

On August 3, 1982, the Bureau of Prisons contacted Chief Judge Moultrie to advise him of appellant's poor institutional adjustment, as evidenced by the above incidents, and to request a statement from him that appellant would not benefit from further YCA treatment—a statement which, purportedly, would allow the Bureau to remove him from such treatment. A second letter reiterating this request was sent to Chief Judge Moultrie on August 30, 1982. On September 10, 1982, the Chief Judge notified the Bureau and appellant's attorney of record, the Public Defender Service (PDS), that he was prepared to make the requested finding, adding that if appellant's attorney objected, a hearing would be scheduled immediately.

On September 14, 1982, PDS wrote to Chief Judge Moultrie to acknowledge receipt of his September 10th letter and to request a delay in any final decision. PDS also requested a copy of the Bureau's two letters (dated August 3rd and 30th) and indicates its uncertainty as to whether a hearing would be necessary. On September 15, 1982, the Chief Judge sent PDS copies of the Bureau's letters, as requested.

On February 1, 1983, a letter and packet of materials was sent to Chief Judge Moultrie from the United States Department of Justice, to supplement the Bureau's earlier letters. The cover letter indicated that the packet included records of appellant's disciplinary transfers and reports, which reflected his "extremely poor institutional adjustment." We have not found this packet of material to be included as part of the record on appeal. In addition, we note that, while the Justice Department's letter stated that pursuant to policy provisions, appellant either received or would receive, upon request, access to all materials submitted therein, the record before us does not reflect that appellant received those materials or that PDS had any knowledge they were submitted to the Chief Judge.

On February 8, 1983, PDS, on behalf of appellant, filed an opposition to the Bureau's request for a finding of no benefit from further YCA treatment. Appellant argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the Bureau of Prisons' request, and maintained that the Bureau had never complied with the sentence he received on December 1, 1977, to place him in an institution "that has housing and treatment only for YCA inmates." Appellant, furthermore, requested a hearing in this matter and requested that he be present at it.

No hearing, however, was held, and on March 22, 1983, Chief Judge Moultrie entered an order finding that appellant would not benefit from further YCA treatment. Upon appeal from that order, appellant and the government have filed motions respectively, in lieu of briefing, opposing, and supporting that finding. On September 6, 1983, this court entered an order denying the above motions. As a result, the case was calendared for argument and the motions were treated as briefs for the parties. Such is the posture of the matter before us.

Appellant contends that the YCA does not permit the original sentencing judge to determine at a later time whether the offender would continue to benefit from further YCA treatment. We disagree. In our view, this conclusion is dictated by the Supreme Court's opinion in Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 233, 70 L.Ed.2d 345 (1981). In Ralston, the Court addressed whether a youth offender who is sentenced to a consecutive adult term of imprisonment while serving a YCA sentence must continue to receive YCA treatment for the remainder of his youth sentence. It held that the judge imposing the subsequent adult sentence "may modify the essential terms of treatment of a continuing YCA sentence if he finds that such treatment would not benefit the offender further." Id. 454 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 243 (footnote omitted). Recognizing that no statutory provisions governed the precise issue, the Court reasoned from the legislative history that Congress reposed authority in the Court to adjust, over time, the basic terms of confinement. Id. at 213-15, 102 S.Ct. at 241-42. Thus, the determination of the original sentencing court was not "irrevocable," id. at 211, 102 S.Ct. at 240, but rather had to be subject to modification so as to avoid "the continuation of futile YCA treatment." Id. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 242. The Court further supported its conclusion noting that under the statute, a second sentencing judge may impose a concurrent adult sentence thereby modifying the original sentencing judge's YCA term. Id. at 216 & n. 9, 102 S.Ct. at 243 & n. 9.

Despite the different factual circumstances of the instant case, the rationale and holding of Ralston necessarily resolve the issue at bar. If a subsequent sentencing judge may make a finding of no benefit from further YCA treatment, it logically follows that the original sentencing judge may make that same determination. To disallow that result would plainly be in disharmony with Ralston and would only serve to continue futile YCA treatment. Moreover we find further support for this position in that courts which have addressed the issue have reached identical conclusions. In re (Allen D.) Coates, 229, U.S.App.D.C. 67, 69, 711 F.2d 345, 347 (1983) (per curiam); King v. Kenney, 671 F.2d 1053, 1055 (7th Cir. 1982); Walls v. Kerr, 568 F.Supp. 684, 686-87 (W.D.Wis. 1983). But see United States v. Won Cho, 730 F.2d 1260, 1269-71 & n. 14 (9th Cir. 1984).

Given our conclusion that the original sentencing judge may make a finding of no further benefit, we turn to the critical question of what procedural due process requirements attach to that determination.

We are in full agreement with the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' statement in In re Coates, supra, that "a youth offender's right to segregation and treatment under the YCA constitutes a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 229 U.S.App.D.C. at 69, 711 F.2d at 347 (citing Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 1980)). Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-91, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261-62, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (liberty interest implicated by transfer of a state prisoner to a mental hospital); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (revocation of probation results in a loss of liberty implicating due process protections); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (termination of liberty of a parolee implicates due process protections). True, the determination of no benefit from further YCA treatment does not constitute a...