Coates v. United States, 15203.

• Citation: 273 F.2d 514,106 US App. DC 389
• Decision Date: 10 December 1959
• Docket Number: No. 15203.,15203.
• Parties: William H. COATES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

106 US App. DC 389, 273 F.2d 514 (1959)

William H. COATES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 15203.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued October 12, 1959.

Decided December 10, 1959.

Mr. Richard Arens, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Rufus King, Washington, D. C. (both appointed by this court) was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. John Philip Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FAHY, DANAHER and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.

DANAHER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant pro se sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Without a hearing his motion was denied with a notation by the District Judge: "The court finds and certifies that the motion and the files and the records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. The motion is therefore denied." His petition in the District Court to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis was likewise denied. We allowed an appeal and appointed counsel.

28 U.S.C. § 2255 reads in pertinent part:

"Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." (Emphasis added.)

The verified motion shows that the appellant was under the influence of drugs when he entered a guilty plea. The District Judge, made aware of the facts at the time, ordered an examination by a medical official. We will later refer to his report.¹

Dr. Griffin, Chief of the Legal Psychiatric Services Division, with offices here in the Court House, by order of court had examined the appellant on January 8, 1957. He found that appellant was a user² of drugs who had last used drugs at 9:15 that morning. At 11 a. m. he was still "mildly under the influence of narcotics." The doctor stated as his opinion that he was then well enough in control of his faculties to be able to understand the proceedings, to assist counsel and to plead to the charges. Had appellant been arraigned then and there, we might have had a very different problem.

But appellant was not then arraigned. Some time after the medical examination, apparently several hours later, appellant was again presented to the court, and that lapse coupled with all other facets of this case creates the basis for our present action. We cannot tell — nor does the record disclose how the files or any material to be found therein could demonstrate "conclusively" that appellant was entitled to no relief. Thus the clear command of the statute required that a hearing be held.

At the commencement of the proceeding on January 8, 1957 when appellant appeared to change his plea, the judge (now deceased) was advised by appellant's counsel that he and his client had previously agreed with the Government on a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. But, it was added, the prisoner had appeared in court that morning, apparently about 10 a. m., under the influence of narcotics. Counsel wished to have the judge commit the appellant to a hospital for treatment so that "he cannot come back and say he did not understand." The judge asked if the appellant talked "intelligently." Thoroughly experienced counsel replied "I have talked to people under the influence of narcotics and I think he is."

Obviously in doubt as to how to proceed, as the record reveals, the judge described appellant as "hopped up," and so decided to ask Dr. Griffin to "see if he is sufficiently conscious to enter a plea."

Dr. Griffin's report³ showed that the prisoner would "soon" begin to suffer withdrawal symptoms. How soon was "soon"? What are "symptoms of withdrawal from drugs"? How are they manifested? What is their effect? That they were to intensify as time went on is clear. The "symptoms will reach their maximum in about 24 hours," the doctor advised the court. He even recommended hospitalization during the withdrawal period, as appellant's counsel had asked.

Dr. Griffin was not called to explain his findings and conclusions. When the appellant some hours later appeared to enter his plea, the judge queried him as to his understanding.⁴ The plea was accepted and the appellant was committed. Dr. Griffin's original report was sent to the jail with the judge's recommendation that hospitalization be afforded. Two months later appellant was sentenced, no attempt to withdraw the plea having been made, as the Government points out. It is further emphasized that the section 2255 motion was not filed until October 30, 1958.

As to the Government's first point, just why appellant's retained counsel did not move to withdraw the plea of guilty, we do not know. Perhaps he wished to abide by his earlier agreement to enter a plea of guilty to one count when two other counts were being dismissed. Perhaps he had satisfied himself that his client had obtained as great an advantage as he was entitled to receive. Perhaps he thought his client had fully understood and was competent to enter the plea when it was offered. Suffice it to say that the issue here is the one raised by appellant's verified motion, namely that he was under the influence of drugs and did not understand. As to the second point, the delay of sixteen months in seeking relief, the statute says the motion for such relief may be made at any time.

The plain fact is that a thirty minute hearing on the allegations of the motion might have cleared up all misapprehension. Dr. Griffin, perhaps the appellant's counsel on January 8, 1957, and possibly others could have testified. If the appellant failed⁵ to show that the plea had not been validly and competently made, that would have ended the matter, for the appellant would have been entitled to no relief. On the other hand, if not validly and competently made, the Government was not entitled to the plea. The only way to have resolved the issue was by a hearing after which the facts could have been found and applicable conclusions of law could have been made.

We reverse to the end that appellant now receive the hearing contemplated by section 2255.

Reversed.

BASTIAN, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

Appellant was indicted on September 24, 1956, for violation of the narcotics laws. On January 8, 1957, with able and experienced counsel of his own choosing, appellant appeared before the late Chief Judge Laws to plead guilty.¹ Due to statements made to the court by his counsel, Chief Judge Laws directed that a medical examination be made by Dr. Thomas E. Griffin with regard to appellant's competence to plead. Dr. Griffin was then, and is now, not only a well known psychiatrist but also Chief of the Legal Psychiatric Services, D. C. Department of Welfare, attached to the District Court, and in charge of the drug addict probationary program in the District of Columbia. In his report, made the same day, Dr. Griffin stated that it was his opinion that appellant was "well enough in control of his faculties to be able to understand the proceedings against him, to assist in his own defense, and to plead to the charges pending against him." It is true that Dr. Griffin further stated in his report that appellant would "soon begin to suffer from symptoms of withdrawal from drugs and that these symptoms would reach their maximum in about 24 hours."

Upon receipt of the report, the trial court made the following inquiries of appellant, who again was accompanied by his counsel:

"The Court. Mr. Coates, your counsel has explained to you what this is about, has he?

"The Defendant. Yes, sir.

"The Court. And you are fully familiar with what you are pleading guilty to, is that right?

"The Defendant. Yes, sir.

"The Court. And the doctor has been over you today and he says that you have had some narcotics but that he thinks you know perfectly well what you are doing. You do?

"The Defendant. Yes, sir.

"The Court. You understand everything that is going on?

"The Defendant. Yes, sir.

"The Court. And you are, therefore, pleading guilty to Count 9 which charges you with violation of the narcotic laws because you are guilty and for no other reason whatever?

"The Defendant. Yes, sir."

The plea of guilty was thereupon accepted and the matter referred to the probation officer of the...