Coats v. Harris

• Decision Date: 16 January 1904
• Citation: 9 Idaho 458,75 P. 243
• Parties: COATS v. HARRIS
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

75 P. 243

9 Idaho 458

COATS v. HARRIS

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 16, 1904

RIGHT OF HEIR-DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION-POWER OF HEIR TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY IN EXPECTANCY-WITNESS-QUALIFICATION OF.

1. A will giving to the wife a life estate and the son all property after her death, empowers the son to transfer by written instrument to his mother and her heirs and assigns forever property to become his after the death of the mother.

2. A decree of distribution by the probate court will not defeat an action of one who was not an heir and was not a party to any of the proceedings in that court when it was settling the estate of a deceased person; he not being a party to the proceedings could not appeal from the order of that court.

3. Section 5957 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho precludes evidence of conversations with the deceased relating to the disposition of her property.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of Owyhee County. Honorable George H Stewart, Judge.

Judgment for respondent from which, together with an order overruling a motion for new trial, appellant appeals.

Judgment for plaintiff--respondent here. Judgment affirmed with costs to respondent.

Affirmed with costs.

E Nugent and J. F. Nugent, for Appellant.

It is conceded that when Levi Harris, who was the owner and possessor of all the property involved in this connection died, his immediate family consisted of his wife and Alvin M. Harris, his son. His relatives were his stepchildren, who had not lived with him for years. They were David Coats, John C. Coats and Mary Loveridge, respectively, about forty years, forty-seven years and forty-four years. Levi Harris, a short time before his death, executed in writing, his last will and testament, in which he devised and bequeathed the whole of his estate to his wife, Nancy Harris, to hold and enjoy so long as she might live. In the same instrument he used the following language in reference to his son, the said Alvin M. Harris: "Fourthly: I devise the remainder of my property after the death of my said wife, Nancy Harris, to my said son, Alvin Milton Harris, and to his heirs and assigns forever; provided that my said son shall leave my said wife in the quiet and peaceable possession of said property during her lifetime, undisturbed. But should my said son give my said wife any trouble in her possession of said property, or cause her any litigation in relation thereto, then, and in that event, the whole of my said property to go to my said wife, Nancy Harris, and to her heirs and assigns forever. Fifthly: I, having given unto my said son, Alvin Milton Harris, in my lifetime, property to the value of about six thousand dollars; it is my desire that he receive no part of or interest in my estate, except the part and in the manner and under the conditions herein above described." It is to the above-recited words that the respondent is supposed to trace the right of A. M. Harris, the administrator, to make the nominal exchange with his mother, by which the respondent obtained a title to the property in question. It was simply an exchange made without right, and for which no money or valuable consideration ever passed. In addition, it was accompanied by an understanding with his mother by which she agreed to hold said title in trust for him, and which she subsequently carried into execution by the decree, made at her request, by which she afterward vested any rights she obtained thereby to A. M. Harris. This attempt to trace a title to the property must manifestly fail if we succeed in making it clear that under the will of Levi Harris, A, M. Harris and his mother had no authority to enter into the exchange in question. In other words, if we establish beyond question that the said A. M. Harris was inhibited by the will and the law from entering into the agreement in question, then there is no legal principle which they can ever attempt to apply. At as comparatively an early date as the year 1832, the supreme court of the United States laid down certain rules for the construction of wills, which have been adhered to since by every court in the land. In that somewhat celebrated case, Chief Justice Marshall uses the following language: "The first great rule in the exposition of wills, to which all rules must bend, is that the intention of the testator expressed in his will shall prevail, provided it be consistent with the rules of law. This principle is generally asserted in the construction of every testamentary disposition. It is emphatically the will of the person who makes it, and is defined to be 'the legal declaration of a man's intentions, which he wills to be performed after his death.' These intentions are to be collected from his words, and ought to be carried into effect if they be consistent with law." (Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L.Ed. 322; Page on Wills, sec. 461, and large number of cases cited; Schouler on Wills, secs. 466-468 et seq.) On the twenty-seventh day of October, 1896, the executrices of the estate of said Levi Harris made their final account of the affairs of said estate, and prayed for a distribution of said estate in accordance with the terms of the will of the said Levi Harris. In due course said petition was heard by the probate court, which duly rendered the decree prayed for. That decree has never been appealed from or in any manner legally drawn in question until this proceeding, and then only indirectly. Upon this state of facts we contend that the rights herein sought to be litigated were fully, fairly and finally litigated, at the time when said decree was rendered, and is no longer subject to litigation. (In re Trescony's Estate, 119 Cal. 568, 51 P. 951; Jewell v. Pierce, 120 Cal. 79, 52 P. 132; Crew v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 51 P. 41-43; Goldtree v. Allison, 119 Cal 344, 51 P. 561; Hill v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 P. 323; Daly v. Pennie, 86 Cal. 552, 21 Am. St. Rep. 61, 25 P. 67.) There is only one error in the ruling of the court we care to notice. It occurred when it decided that we were not at liberty to introduce the testimony of Alvin M. Harris to prove the trust agreement between himself and his mother, by which she engaged herself to hold the property he conveyed to her, and to see that it was distributed to him in accordance with the terms of his father's will, which she afterward did. We were not trying to prove a trust in real estate, but in personal property, and which by her petition to the probate court she afterward executed. We were not trying to establish a moneyed claim against the estate, but merely to establish a "status." For both of said reasons the sections of the statute cited by respondent had no application. (Idaho Rev. Stats., sec. 5957; Myers v. Reinstein, 67 Cal. 80-92, 7 P. 192; Booth v. Pendola, 88 Cal. 44, 23 P. 200, 25 P. 1101; Fallon v. Butler, 21 Cal. 24, 81 Am. Dec. 140; 4 Notes on Cal. Rep., notes on Myers v. Reinstein, 67 Cal. 89, 7 P. 192.)

E. M. Wolfe and R. Cunningham, for Respondent.

The title to property is always in someone, and in this case upon the death of Levi Harris it immediately vested in Alvin M. Harris, and if he had died instead of having transferred it to his mother, his children would have inherited it. (State v. Stevens, 6 Idaho 367, 55 P. 886, 887; Page on Wills, secs. 658, 659, 695; Gingrich v. Gingrich, 146 Ind. 227, 45 N.E. 227; In re Garcelon's Estate, 104 Cal. 570, 43 Am. St. Rep. 134, 38 P. 417, 32 L. R. A. 595.) Did the decree of the probate court in the Levi Harris case reinvest Alvin Harris with the title he so conveyed? It will be remembered that in the probate court a decree of distribution was entered in the Levi Harris estate, by which the property was decreed to Mrs. Nancy Harris for life and upon her death to her son, Alvin M. Harris. Did that decree reinvest him with title? We say no. The decree simply executed the will. It settled the rights of the legatees as legatees only. It did not affect contracted rights, controversies between heirs and outsiders. Where the question has been before the courts, nearly, if not all of them, have held that decrees of probate courts in distribution of estates are not conclusive outside of these strictly "in probate matters." In California--and our worthy opponents rely solely on California--the supreme court in very late decisions hold that the decree is conclusive against them "only so far as they claim in their capacities as heirs, legatees or devisees." Counsel cite several California cases, and strong language can be copied from them. But opinions are valuable only by comparison and relevancy of facts involved. The cases cited are probate court cases and pass upon the effect of decrees of final distribution, but these facts do not give them value as precedents in their cases, as compared with a case exactly in point. (Chever v. Ching Hong Poy, 82 Cal. 68, 22 P. 1081.) "An heir may contract about or convey the title which the law had cast upon him on the death of his ancestor, and the validity or force of such contract is not affected by the fact that a probate court afterward, by its decree of distribution, declares his asserted heirship to be valid." The above case is approved in the latest case in Re Burdick's Estate, 112 Cal. 387, 44 P. 734. (Martinovich v. Marsicano, 137 Cal. 354, 70 P. 459; Hall v. Pierson, 63 Conn. 332, 28 A. 544; Dobberstein v. Murphy, 44 Minn. 526, 47 N.W. 171; Farnham v. Thompson, 34 Minn. 330, 57 Am. Rep. 59, 26 N.W. 9.) Counsel claim that the court erred in refusing to permit Alvin Harris to testify to alleged conversation with his mother to establish a trust in this property. On this question we cite Rice v. Rigley, 7 Idaho 115, 61 P. 290.

STOCKSLAGER, J. Sullivan, C. J., and Ailshie, J. concur.

OPINION

The facts are...