Coats v. Robinson

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: NAPTON
• Citation: Coats v. Robinson, 10 Mo. 757 (Mo. 1847)
• Decision Date: 31 July 1847
• Parties: COATS ET AL. v. ROBINSON & HENDLEY, ADM'RS, &c.

10 Mo. 757

COATS ET AL.

v.ROBINSON & HENDLEY, ADM'RS, &c.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1847.

APPEAL FROM CALLAWAY CIRCUIT COURT.

TODD & SHELEY, for Appellants. 1. The court cannot decree the sale of the slaves, as they were not made by contract subject to the debt. 2. The complainants' intestate concealed effects and misrepresented the location of the land, and the price agreed to be given is greatly beyond the true value of the land, and is not fair and reasonable, and specific performance should not be enforced. Story's Eq. § 769, and following; King v. Hamilton, 4 Peters, 311; 2 Story's Eq. § 778; Sugden on Vendors, 194; Gowger v. Gorden, 4 4 Blackf. 110; Gorden v. Gowger, 4 Blackf. 231; Cook, Ex'r, v. Grant, 16 Serg. & Rawle, 210. 3. The complainants should have shown themselves able to convey the land sold by their intestate, by exhibiting a chain of title papers, before the court could, upon their prayer, decree a specific performance. In this case they are unable to convey the land sold. Jarman v. Davis, 4 Monroe, 118; Judson v. Wass, 11 Johns. R. 525; Sugden on Vendors, 410; Hepburn & Dundas v. Colinauld, 5 Cranch, 262; Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige, 299. 4. Part performance of a contract cannot be enforced by a vendor against the vendee. The vendee is entitled to his whole contract, and any abatement in price must be made at defendants' request, and upon the prayer of defendante to take part and damages as the balance. Story's Eq. Jur. § 769 and following. It is then settled that it requires a much less strength of case for a vendee to resist than for a vendee to enforce specific performance. Jones v. Shackelford, 2 Bibb, 410; McConnel's Heirs v. Dunlap's Devisees, Hardin, 41; Sugden, 270; Waters v. Travis, 9 Johns. R. 450. 5. That portion of the land included in the farm of Johnson, and to which he had no title, being a material part of the farm, a deduction (if any at all is made) should have been made at the highest prices. Stevenson, &c., v. Harrison, &c., 3 Litt. 170; Pringle v. Samuel, 1 Litt. 46. A court of equity will not decree a specific performance of contract when it would be hard and unconscionable. Seymour v. Delancy and others, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 222. It may be shown in equity that the written contract does not contain all the contract. Dwight v. Pomeroy, 17 Mass. R. 303. The party taking personal security does not retain a lien even on the land, and such contract shows that a lien was not retained on the separate property of the wife. The bill alleges a special contract of lien on the slaves. None such is proven. Can a decree be made upon the implied equity to subject all the estate? And can such equity exist where personal security is taken? The law abolishing imprisonment for debt, applies to this case.

LEONARD, for Appellees. 1. A bond or promissory note of a married woman to pay a debt, is a charge upon her separate property, and equity will make this charge available by directing her separate property to be applied for the payment of the debt. Murray v. Barber, 9 Cond. Eng. Ch. R. 1-9; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown's Ch. R. 14. 2. The proof utterly fails to establish any false or fraudulent representations on the part of Johnson upon the sale of the land, in relation to its situation, quantity, and quality. 3. There is no proof of any deficiency in the quantity of land or improvements; but if there be even the alleged deficiency, it is a case for compensation, and no ground for withholding an execution of the contract, and the compensation allowed in the decree is ample for the alleged deficiency 4. Mr. and Mrs. Coats never tendered bonds to Johnson in his life-time in payment of the note; nor to his administrators since his death, except upon the condition that they would make an abatement in the amount of the note; but if bonds were tendered and refused before the commencement of the suit, that constitutes no bar to the relief given. The defendants have not alleged or shown their present willingness or ability to pay in bonds, nor have they brought the bonds into court, or offered to pay in that way.

NAPTON, J.

The administrators of Joseph D. Johnson filed a bill in chancery in 1845, against William Coats and his wife, and Thomas Callaway, and the heirs of said Johnson, for the purpose of obtaining payment of a note executed by said Coats and wife and Callaway, out of the separate estate of said Cena Coats. The facts charged in the bill were, that in 1843. Johnson, the intestate, sold his farm in Callaway county to Mrs. Coats for $1,250, and took a note signed by her and her husband and Thomas Callaway for the amount, payable in twelve months. The title was to be made when the purchase-money was paid, and for this purpose Johnson gave a title bond to Mrs. Coats. The bond for title calls for “162 acres including all the farm on which said Johnson resided,” being a half quarter and two quarter quarter sections of land. Immediately after the purchase, Mrs. Coats and her busband took possession of the land. Previous to the marriage of Mrs. Coats to Mr. Coats, a marriage contract had been made between them, by which she reserved to herself the exclusive management of her separate property. She was at the time the owner of four slaves, and of some real estate. Johnson died intestate in the Spring of 1844, and the complainants were his administrators. The bill charged, that Coats, the husband, and Callaway, were insolvent, and that there was no other property out of which the note could be made, except the separate property of Mrs. Coats.

The answers of Callaway, Mr. Coats and his wife, admitted the principal facts charged in the bill, but denied that Mrs. Coats intended to charge her separate property, and insisted that it was understood between the parties that Johnson was to take certain cash notes and bonds; that Johnson died before these notes were tendered, and that his administrators have since refused to receive them.

They also relied for a defense to this suit, that Johnson's conduct in the sale was fraudulent--that he represented that the tract contained one hundred acres of arable bottom land, when there were only about forty-three--that he represented that all his farm was upon his land, when there were about eight and a half acres, including a tobacco barn, upon public land--and that he further represented the tract to contain 162 acres, when in truth it only contained 156 acres.

Upon the hearing, it appeared in evidence that the parties went to Johnson's house to conclude the contract and prepare and execute the writings; that Mr. Coats wrote the title bond, and whilst writing it, inquired of Johnson for his title papers, who replied that he had only one of them in the house and that the others were in the clerk's office at...