Cobb v. Jones

• Decision Date: 02 October 2015
• Docket Number: CIV. ACTION NO. 14-0745
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
• Parties: MICHAEL COBB v. VICTOR JONES, SHERIFF OF NATCHITOCHES PARISH, in his official capacity, NATCHITOCHES PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and DEPUTY HERMAN GLENN SERS, individually and in his official capacity

MICHAEL COBB v. VICTOR JONES, SHERIFF OF NATCHITOCHES PARISH, in his official capacity,

NATCHITOCHES PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

and DEPUTY HERMAN GLENN SERS, individually and in his official capacity

CIV. ACTION NO. 14-0745

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

October 2, 2015

JUDGE DRELL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KIRK

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20) in which Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against them in the above-captioned civil rights suit. For the reasons expressed below, the court finds that Defendants' motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

This suit arises out of an altercation which occurred on or about April 6, 2013 at the home of Dorothy Conlay ("Conlay"). Plaintiff, Michael Cobb, ("Plaintiff" or "Cobb") asserts that he visited Conlay, his mother-in-law, in order to discuss his concerns about his daughter's welfare because his daughter was in the custody of her mother, Conlay's daughter, whom Plaintiff suspected to be on a "meth binge." Plaintiff alleges that, while at Conlay's home, his brother-in-law, Sylvian LeVasseur ("LeVasseur"), called Plaintiffoutside and began arguing with him.

Plaintiff asserts that Deputy Herman Glenn Sers ("Deputy Sers"), an off-duty Natchitoches Parish Sheriff's Deputy, arrived in his personal vehicle and parked in Conlay's driveway, observing the ongoing argument between Plaintiff and LeVasseur. Plaintiff alleges that he withdrew from the argument and was walking back toward the house when LeVasseur threatened that "he had a gun and knew how to use it." Plaintiff admits that, upon hearing this threat, he turned around and struck LeVasseur twice, knocking him unconscious. Plaintiff recalls that he then turned back around and resumed his route to the house to continue speaking with Conlay.

Plaintiff alleges that, as he was walking back to the house, Deputy Sers "came running from behind Plaintiff and, without warning or identification, stomped on the side of Plaintiff's left ankle, causing...a blister fracture..." Plaintiff asserts that Deputy Sers placed him in handcuffs and, while Plaintiff was handcuffed and lying on his stomach, punched Plaintiff twice in the head. Plaintiff recalls that Deputy Sers then took out his cell phone and handed it to LeVasseur, who had regained consciousness, and advised him to press charges against Plaintiff, adding that he didn't trust Plaintiff. Plaintiff also recalls that Deputy Sers advised the bystanders not to feel sorry for him, but to feel sorry for Conlay, instead.

Plaintiff further alleges that Deputy Sers informed the emergency medical personnel arriving at the scene that Plaintiff was a "druggy." LeVasseur filed assault charges against Plaintiff, which were later dismissed. Plaintiff claims that he gave a statement after his arrest regarding the altercation with LeVasseur, but did not include any information about what he now alleges was excessive force and slander by DeputySers.

Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Deputy Sers in his official and individual capacities, Natchitoches Parish Sheriff Victor Jones ("Sheriff Jones") in his official capacity and the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff's Department. Plaintiff asserts federal and Louisiana law claims for excessive force, false arrest, assault and battery, defamation and invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants filed the instant motion and, noting that all necessary briefs have been filed, we find the motion is now properly before the court for decision.

B. Applicable Standard

A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We consider "all evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion." Seacor Holdings, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 2011)(internal quotations omitted). It is important to note that the standard for a summary judgment is two-fold: (1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Excessive Force Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants' motion first challenges Plaintiff's federal excessive force claim on thegrounds that Plaintiff is unable to overcome Defendants' affirmative defense of qualified immunity and, for that reason, summary judgment in their favor on this claim is appropriate.¹

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a "source of substantive rights" and is, instead, the mechanism that confers a private right of action to citizens for the redress of federal law violations by those acting under color of state law.² An excessive force claim advanced under Section 1983 is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment "objective reasonableness standard."³ In order to prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show that

1. he was seized;

2. he was injured;

3. his injury resulted directly and only from a use of force which was excessive to the need for force; and

4. the excessiveness of the force used was clearly unreasonable.⁴

In assessing the fourth factor, the court must ask whether or not the officer's actions were "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the incident, without regard to underlying intent or motivation.⁵ The facts "must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."⁶

In the instant matter, the court finds no dispute among the parties as to the fact that Plaintiff was "seized" and "injured" during the altercation with Deputy Sers. We note at this point it is immaterial in this case that Deputy Sers was off duty at the time he arrived at Conlay's house to inquire about her safety. Whether or not an officer is "on duty" is not definitive regarding whether an officer was acting "under color of law."⁷ Similarly, even if Plaintiff proves that Deputy Sers was acting for purely personal reasons, the finding that Deputy Sers was acting under color of state law is not foreclosed.⁸ In the instant case, it is undisputed that Deputy Sers seized Plaintiff by tackling him, handcuffing him and preventing him from moving freely until officers from the Natchitoches Police Department arrived at the scene.⁹ Based on the foregoing, we find that Deputy Sers was clearly acting under color of state law when he arrested or seized Cobb.¹⁰

The parties do not agree to the facts regarding the remaining two (2) factors in the analysis. Defendants assert that Deputy Sers drove to Conlay's house out of concern for her safety and, while turning into her driveway, spotted two men standing in her yard. Before he could park his vehicle, Deputy Sers asserts that one of the menpunched the other, knocking him to the ground.¹¹ Deputy Sers further recalls that, upon seeing one man punch the other, he quickly parked, exited his vehicle and "tackled [Cobb]" and "[held] him down.¹² Deputy Sers asserts that Plaintiff was combative, struggling against him while on the ground and forcing him to hold Plaintiff down until help arrived.¹³

Plaintiff denies the accuracy of the facts alleged by Defendants. Cobb contrarily asserts that Deputy Sers arrived at Conlay's home before Plaintiff punched LeVasseur, while they were still merely arguing with one another, and sat in his vehicle in the driveway, observing the argument.¹⁴ Plaintiff alleges that, before he punched LeVasseur, he turned away and began walking toward Conlay's house. It was then that LeVasseur threatened him, stating, "'I have a gun and I know how to use it.'"¹⁵ Plaintiff asserts that this threat caused him to react by punching LeVasseur, who fell to the ground. Plaintiff says that, at this point, Deputy Sers exited his vehicle and, as Plaintiff was returning to Conlay's house, ran up behind him, grabbed his neck and head and stomped on his ankle, immediately breaking it and causing him tremendous pain.¹⁶Plaintiff asserts that he fell to the ground and remained there on his stomach, unable to move, as Deputy Sers handcuffed him and held him down with his knee on Plaintiff's neck.¹⁷ Plaintiff further alleges that Deputy Sers punched Plaintiff in the head twice with his fist while he was lying on the ground handcuffed.¹⁸ Plaintiff also offers the sworn declaration of Jason LeVasseur, another brother-in-law present for a portion of the events at issue, who declares that he witnessed Deputy Sers "strike [Plaintiff] in the head twice" while he was already in handcuffs.¹⁹

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages alleged to result from the performance of discretionary functions, as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.²⁰ If a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to the protections of that defense.²¹

In order to determine whether or not a particular defendant is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, the court may ask: (1) whether the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (2) whether the defendant's actions were objectivelyreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.²² Qualified immunity is available unless the defendant's conduct unless it can be said that no reasonable government official could consider the defendant's conduct lawful under then-existing law and jurisprudence.²³

The court finds that, as of April 6, 2013, Plaintiff's general...