Cobb v. United States

Decision Date22 April 1965
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 967.
Citation240 F. Supp. 574
PartiesP. COBB and Osro Cobb, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

Osro Cobb, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiffs.

Charles M. Conway, U. S. Atty., Robert E. Johnson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Fort Smith, Ark., for defendant.

JOHN E. MILLER, Chief Judge.

There is before the court a motion filed by defendant March 31, 1965, to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant controversy.

In passing on the motion the court has considered the allegations of the complaint, brief submitted by defendant in support of the motion to dismiss and the brief submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to the motion, together with the Mineral Lease that was executed March 1, 1953, by the plaintiff P. Cobb and the Director, Bureau of Land Management, Assistant Chief, Division of Minerals, on behalf of and for the United States of America.

In paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs' complaint they predicated jurisdiction upon "a dispute existing between the parties as to the amount of rentals (or royalties) accrued and owing to the United States under a certain mineral lease contract executed"1 between the plaintiffs and the United States on March 1, 1953, covering 300 acres of land in Montgomery County, Arkansas. It is further alleged that the suit is "authorized against the United States under the provisions of Subsection (a)2 of Section 1346, U.S.C.A." Following the jurisdictional allegations, it is stated in the complaint that the plaintiffs made a "contract" with the National Lead Company assigning their interest to that company, and that the plaintiffs executed and delivered the assignment to the Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior, together with an application for transfer. The Bureau of Land Management refused to approve the assignment because of the failure of National Lead to qualify to complete the transfer by declining to pay the minimum royalties to the United States.

On December 30, 1964, in the U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, plaintiffs obtained a judgment for specific enforcement of their contract with National Lead. Prior to January 1962 plaintiffs had advised the Bureau of Land Management of their difficulties with National Lead and the impending court action for specific performance and asked that agency for suspension of the minimum royalties pending disposition of the litigation. There has been no production of the ore from the property subject to the lease, and the plaintiffs alleged that the failure to produce during the interval involved in their litigation with National Lead in no way adversely affected the interest of the United States. Prior to the execution of their lease with the United States, plaintiffs placed upon deposit a U. S. Government bond in the face amount of $1,000 to guarantee their obligations under the lease. Defendant United States, through the Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior, declined to suspend the rentals, and the plaintiffs have been billed for rentals, as follows: $300.00 per year from March 1, 1961, to February 28, 1965, or a total of $1,200.00. Plaintiffs, however, admit rental of $300 due the United States for that period from March 1, 1961, to February 28, 1962.

It is further alleged as an additional ground of jurisdiction that the action of the governmental agency in denying plaintiffs' application for suspension of rentals was "arbitrary in character and offensive to the provisions of the lease agreement when construed as a whole." The complaint concludes with a prayer asking that the government bond be impounded and sold, and an order fixing the rentals due in the sum of $300, same to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of said bond, with remainder to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs contend that jurisdiction is granted by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), which provides that the District Court shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of "any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."

The defendant contends that the consent of the Government to be sued under the Tucker Act is limited to suits for recovery of a money judgment and any incidental relief in equity in aid of such judgment, citing Blanc v. United States, (2 Cir. 1957) 244 F.2d 708. The defendant also contends that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, does not give jurisdictional support to the plaintiffs' claim as the Declaratory Judgment Act does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the District Court, citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips, 339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194, and Wells v. United States, (9 Cir. 1960) 280 F.2d 275.

As the court views the instant record the issues presented are thus: (a) whether the United States, by virtue of the Constitution or statute, has consented to such suit; (b) whether the instant controversy seeks the recovery of a money judgment; or (c) whether the action by the Governmental agency involved is subject to judicial review.

In Blanc v. United States, supra, the plaintiff brought an action to review a decision denying death benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. The District Court dismissed the suit after the appropriate administrative board denied the widow's claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that no cause of action was stated under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), and further that the court could not judicially review the administrative decision under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009, because judicial review of that type of claim was expressly prohibited by the statute under which the benefits were claimed.

The defendant relies heavily upon Wells v. United States, (9 Cir. 1960) 280 F.2d 275, which states that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not in itself create jurisdiction but merely adds an additional remedy where the District Court already has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In its brief the defendant quotes from page 277 as follows:

"The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, upon which appellant relies as the basis for the relief sought herein, provides as follows:
"`In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.'
"It is well settled, however, that said Act does not of itself create jurisdiction; it merely adds an additional remedy where the district court already has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. See Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Manufacturing Co., 9 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 121. It is appellant's theory that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a)(2), authorizes the present suit against the United States. That Act in relevant part reads:
"`(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of:
* * * * * *
"`(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.'
"This Act does not give consent to suits where only declaratory or other equitable relief is sought. It applies only to suits for recovery of money damages."

In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194, the court held that the Congress by the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act did not enlarge the range of remedies available in federal courts and did not extend their jurisdiction. It said at page 671 of 339 U.S., 70 S.Ct. at page 879:

"When concerned as we are with the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain litigation within the restricted area to which the Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them, `jurisdiction' means the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Prior to that Act, a federal court would entertain a suit on a contract only if the plaintiff asked for an immediately enforceable remedy like money damages or an injunction, but such relief could only be given if the requisites of jurisdiction, in the sense of a federal right or diversity, provided foundation for resort to the federal courts. The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be given by way of recognizing the plaintiff's right even though no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But the requirements of jurisdiction — the limited subject matters which alone Congress had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate —were not impliedly repealed or modified."

It is established that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not enlarge the substantive jurisdiction of the District Court, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Co., supra; Wells v. United States, supra; and United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 9 S.Ct. 669, 33 L.Ed. 90.2 The defendant's arguments are predicated upon the premise that the only relief sought is a construction of the parties' obligation under the lease executed between them. Should the relief sought be limited only to an interpretation of the substantive rights and duties of the parties as contained in this agreement, it would not, of course, be a suit for "the...

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3 cases
  • King v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • February 16, 1968
    ...a suit for a declaratory judgment); and Yeskel v. United States, 31 F.Supp. 956, 957-958 (D.N.J.1940). See also Cobb v. United States, 240 F.Supp. 574, 577-579 (W.D. Ark.1965) (construing a prayer for declaratory relief as a prayer for money On the other hand, Raydist Navigation Corp. v. Un......
  • American Federation of Government Emp. v. Hoffmann
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • August 13, 1976
    ...(1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 101 (1974); Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381 (3rd Cir. 1968); Cobb v. U. S., 240 F.Supp. 574 (W.D. Ark.1965). Nor is it for this court to apply its own interpretation of these regulations so long as the interpretation applied by th......
  • United States v. 599.86 ACRES OF LAND, ETC.
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    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas
    • April 23, 1965
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