Coble v. State

• Decision Date: 03 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 1183S388,1183S388
• Citation: 476 N.E.2d 102
• Parties: James M. COBLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 102

476 N.E.2d 102

James M. COBLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 1183S388.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 3, 1985.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, C.H. Gardner, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Hansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant James M. Coble was found guilty by a jury in the Tippecanoe County Superior Court of two counts of Burglary, a class C felony, and was further found to be an habitual offender. The Honorable William R. MaHanna sentenced him to a term of two (2) years on the first count of burglary and two (2) years on the second count of burglary, said terms to be served concurrently, and further enhanced that sentence by thirty (30) years upon finding him an habitual offender. Appellant now appeals this judgment and raises the following five issues:

1. error by the trial court by not declaring a mistrial when a court appointed psychiatrist referred to Defendant's habitual offender charge;

2. error by the trial court by admitting the same psychiatrist's testimony regarding Defendant's criminal history;

3. denial of effective assistance of counsel;

4. sufficiency of the evidence; and

5. imposition of a manifestly unreasonable sentence.

On January 1, 1983 Mark Grenat and Richard Gunckle were walking in downtown Lafayette, Indiana. At approximately 11:00 p.m., they heard a loud bang and noticed the glass door of O'Rear's bakery had been broken. They observed Appellant behind the counter rummaging through the cash register. Appellant came out of the bakery and headed eastward. He appeared to them to have been drinking.

At 11:26 p.m., Lafayette police officers responded to a burglar alarm at Eagle Lumber Company, only a few blocks from the bakery. They found the glass window pane of the office broken and the door ajar. When Appellant realized the police were present, he opened the door and stepped out. Again, he appeared to have been drinking, but not to the point of intoxication according to one of the officers who arrested Appellant. Nothing in the office had been disturbed, but the light over the doorway had been removed.

At trial, Appellant relied upon the defense of mental disease or defect. He presented two (2) witnesses in his defense. They basically testified Appellant had been drunk most of December, but neither witness had seen Appellant the night in question. After the State rested its rebuttal, the court presented testimony of two (2) court appointed psychiatrists. Both experts testified Appellant had been able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and had had the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to both counts of burglary and found Appellant to be an habitual offender. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of thirty-two (32) years imprisonment.

I

Appellant argues the trial court erred by allowing a court appointed psychiatrist, Dr Richard Mehne, to disclose to the jury that Appellant was also being charged as an habitual offender. Although the trial court admonished the jury, Appellant claims this remedy was inadequate to cure the prejudicial impact of Dr. Mehne's statement. Appellant urges us to find that a mistrial should have been declared.

Upon cross-examination by the State, Dr. Mehne was asked what documents he was relying on in regard to Defendant's criminal history. Dr. Mehne responded as follows:

"A. Two--Mr. Coble's report, when I obtained his legal history from him, and also the documents made available by the Court. And I can define it when I find it. I think it had to do with previous legal difficulties summarized by the Court. So it was two, what he told me and then also materials from the--Court.

"Mr. Troemel: Your Honor, there's not a question on the floor at this time, I'd ask that counsel direct a question to the witness.

"The Witness: I found it.

"The Court: In the process of answering the question.

"A. It's a --- it's a document labelled information of habitual offender.

"Mr. Troemel: Objection. We approach the bench?"

Record at 316.

Defense counsel requested that the habitual offender comment be stricken from the record. The court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard Dr. Mehne's statement.

The denial of a motion for a mistrial rests largely within the trial court's discretion, and the reviewing court will reverse the trial court's decision only when it is shown that the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Conley v. State, (1983) Ind., 445 N.E.2d 103, 104. Appellant did not motion for a mistrial, but claims the trial court should have declared one sua sponte. Appellant cites to Lawrence v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830, wherein we adopted the following language from State v. Ferrone, (1921) 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452:

"It cannot be believed that an accused man would ever have a fair trial, resulting in a verdict not affected by prejudice or by considerations by which the jury should not be influenced, if during that trial allegations that he has twice before been convicted of state prison crimes have been read to the jury, and evidence of his former convictions has been placed before them. It is beyond question that knowledge of such facts must necessarily prejudice the minds of his triers against the accused, and cause him more serious injury than that which he would suffer from any improper remarks of the state's attorney."

However, in Lawrence the defendant did not interpose the defense of mental disease or defect. Appellant Coble raised this defense and, as will be more thoroughly discussed in Issue II, this plea opened the door to evidence of Appellant's prior criminal conduct. Since Appellant's criminal history was properly before the jury, Appellant was not prejudiced to the same extent as he would have been had his case more closely resembled the defendant's in Lawrence. The jury was aware of Appellant's prior conviction for burglary and his being charged with theft at the age of fifteen because Dr. Mehne mentioned these crimes with regard to how he formulated his opinion that Defendant did not experience a blackout period the night in question. Since the jury was already aware of Appellant's criminal background, Dr. Mehne's mentioning of the habitual offender charge did not prejudice Appellant to the extent that a mistrial should have been declared. Appellant has failed to show the trial court erred by not deciding a mistrial was in order.

II

Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Mehne to testify in a narrative fashion in response to the question of why Dr. Mehne did not believe Appellant's version that he had a blackout period the night in question. Dr. Mehne testified that his opinion was partly attributable to Appellant's criminal history as evidenced by documents and told to him by Appellant. Appellant complains that the testimony about his prior burglary was hearsay and irrelevant and, therefore, should have been omitted. We do not agree.

Dr. Mehne's testimony concerning Appellant's prior burglary conviction was clearly relevant and offered for a non-hearsay purpose. A plea of insanity opens up all the defendant's life for examination. Flewallen v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d 239. Further, evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible may be admissible on the question of sanity. Lock v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 315, 403 N.E.2d 1360. The plea opens the door to evidence of past behavior, including prior criminal conduct. France v. State, (1979) 179 Ind.App. 539, 387 N.E.2d 66. Dr. Mehne heavily weighed Appellant's prior burglary and criminal history in general in formulating his opinion that Appellant did not experience a blackout episode during the commission of the offense. The jury was entitled to know the basis for Dr. Mehne's opinion so as to decide for themselves how much weight to attach to his opinion. Thus, Dr. Mehne's testimony was relevant. Further, Dr. Mehne's determination of sanity took into account Appellant's legal history as Appellant related it to him and he considered the documents provided by the trial court. In Phelan v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 542, 406 N.E.2d 237, 239, this Court found that determination of the admissibility of incriminating remarks made to a physician during a compulsory psychiatric examination hinges upon the purpose for which the evidence is offered. If it was offered to demonstrate the mental condition of the Defendant, then it should be admitted. On the other hand, if the remarks are offered to demonstrate the guilt of the Defendant, then they should not be admitted, over a proper objection. Id. In the case before us, the testimony was admissible as pertaining to the Defendant's mental condition.

Appellant further argues it was error for the trial court to allow Dr. Mehne to testify in a narrative fashion as this precluded objections and volunteered information to which Appellant objected. However, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit testimony in a narrative fashion rather than by question and answer. Hedges v. State, (1982) Ind., 443 N.E.2d 62, 66. Since testimony concerning Appellant's criminal history was relevant and not hearsay, and because we have found the trial court did not err by admonishing the jury to disregard Dr. Mehne's statement referring to the habitual offender charge, Appellant fails to show in what regard he was prejudiced by Dr. Mehne testifying in a narrative fashion. The only objectionable statement made by Dr. Mehne was properly treated by a curative instruction. Thus, Appellant fails to demonstrate prejudice by Dr. Mehne's testifying in a narrative fashion. We therefore find no error on this issue.

III

Appellant asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to...