Coblentz v. State Indus. Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 02 February 1955
• Citation: 279 P.2d 503,203 Or. 258
• Parties: Chris COBLENTZ, Appellant, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of Oregon, Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 503

279 P.2d 503

203 Or. 258

Chris COBLENTZ, Appellant, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of Oregon Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 12, 1955.

Decided Feb. 2, 1955.

W. A. Franklin, Portland, for appellant. On the brief were Anderson, Franklin & Landye, Portland.

Ray H. Lafky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., and Howard R. Lonergan and Roy K. Terry, Asst. Attys. Gen.

TOOZE, Justice.

This action involves the right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state, ORS 656.002 et seq., commenced by Chris Coblentz, as plaintiff, against the State Industrial Accident Commission, as defendant. Defendant's general demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained, and, plaintiff refusing to plead further, judgment was entered dismissing the cause with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.

It is alleged in plaintiff's complaint that he was employed by Columbia River Logging Company as a truck driver; that he was hired within the state of Oregon, and that his employer's office and principal place of business were in Brookings, Curry county, Oregon; that both he and his employer were contributors to the industrial accident fund of this state; that on or about October 6, 1953, he sustained personal injury by accident arising out of and within the course of his employment by violent or external means in that he had pulled his truck into the logging dump of the Dutton Lumber Company at Crescent City, California, and was engaged in loosening the binder chain on a load of logs when a log rolled from the truck, striking him; 'that at the time of said accident plaintiff had left the state of Oregon temporarily but was within the course of his employment with the Columbia River Logging Company, and that at the time of said accident plaintiff was not subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law of California or any other jurisdiction but Oregon.' (Italics ours.) The complaint alleges that plaintiff filed a claim for compensation with the defendant, and that it was rejected for the reason that 'there is no evidence that said plaintiff was employed subject to the provisions of the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Law at the time of said alleged accidental injury.'

The dispute between plaintiff and defendant in this case arises solely from the fact that plaintiff was injured in the state of California. ORS 656.126 provides:

'(1) If a workman employed to work in this state and subject to ORS 656.002 to 656.590 temporarily leaves the state incidental to such employment and receives an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, he is entitled to the benefits of ORS 656.002 to 656.590 as though he were injured within this state, if at the time of the accident he was not subject to the workmen's compensation law of the jurisdiction in which he was injured.

'(2) Whenever in any appeal or other litigation the construction of the laws of another jurisdiction is required, the courts shall take judicial notice thereof.

'(3) If any such workman files, in the jurisdiction in which he is injured, a claim for an accidental injury and the claim is denied for the reason that he was not subject to the workmen's compensation law of such jurisdiction, he may file a claim for such injury under ORS 656.002 to 656.590 within 60 days after the order denying his claim became final.' (Italics ours.)

An express condition of the right of a workman to recover compensation for injuries received when the accident causing such injuries occurred in a foreign state is that at the time of the accident he was not subject to the workmen's compensation law of that state. It is, therefore, necessary for a workman who has been injured in a foreign state and seeks to recover compensation under the laws of this state to allege in his complaint and prove the facts necessary to show that at the time of the accident he was not subject to the workmen's compensation law of the jurisdiction in which he was injured. It is not necessary for him to plead the laws of the foreign jurisdiction, because under the statute we are required to take judicial notice thereof, but it is necessary for him to plead such facts as will enable the court to determine therefrom whether he is subject to the workmen's compensation law of the foreign state. Facts and not conclusions must be pleaded.

In his complaint in this case plaintiff attempted to satisfy this requirement of good pleading by simply alleging 'that at the time of said accident plaintiff was not subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law of California [Labor Code, § 3201 et seq.]'. That is a legal conclusion. It is the ultimate question for determination by the court as a matter of law based upon facts well pleaded and proved.

Although a demurrer admits as true all facts well pleaded and all the intendments and inferences therefrom that can properly and reasonably be drawn, Musgrave v. Lucas, 193 Or. 401, 408, 238 P.2d 780, yet it does not admit as true mere conclusions of the pleader. In the instant case the complaint is defective in that it did not allege the necessary facts from which, as a matter of law, the court could determine whether plaintiff was subject to the California law at the time of the accident. The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and entering judgment in favor of defendant.

However, plaintiff argues that inasmuch as the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act should always be, and by this court have been, liberally construed in favor of an injured workman, the court should also be liberal in its construction of a workman's pleading in court. There is nothing whatever in the Workmen's Compensation Law itself that even remotely suggests such a liberal construction of pleadings.

Insofar as pleadings are concerned, a court action based upon the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law stands upon the same footing as any other action. The complaint in such a case is tested by the same rules applying to complaints in other actions, and, when challenged by demurrer, is construed strongly against the pleader. If the demurrer is sustained, the pleader is fully protected by the liberality with which the trial court permits an amended pleading to be filed to cure the defect.

In the briefs filed by the respective parties on this appeal neither plaintiff nor defendant discussed the California statutes applicable to the problem before us. Upon the oral argument and at the court's request, the assistant attorney general undertook to supply us with a digest of those statutes, serving a copy thereof upon opposing counsel. In compliance with his undertaking, the assistant attorney general has submitted a typewritten copy of the laws in question. However, with commendable frankness and in a spirit of utmost fairness, he has, of his own volition, appended to the digest of the California statutes the following statement:

'In a further attempt to assist the Court this office called Attorney T. Groezinger, Chief Counsel for the California Commission. We were advised that the California Commission and Court decisions support the proposition that the mere presence of an employe in California in course of employment subjects employer and employe alike to the California Law. This coincides with the past policy upon which the Oregon Commission has relied.

'However, this office was further advised that the entire procedure depends upon gaining jurisdiction of the employer where there has been no insurance obtained as required by Section 3700. The employe may proceed under Section 3706 for either claim or by way of action for damages, but both processes...