Coburn v. Spaulding
| Decision Date | 15 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-01389 |
| Parties | BRANDON MICHAEL COBURN, Petitioner, v. STEPHEN SPAULDING, Warden of FPC-Lewisburg, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(MANNION, J.)
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
This is a pro se habeas corpus action arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, initiated upon the filing of the original Petition in this matter by Petitioner Brandon Michael Coburn ("Coburn") on August 7, 2020. (Doc. 1). In his Petition, Coburn alleges that (1) the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") violated section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") when they denied his request for home confinement, "as other inmates, similarly situated, have been released"; (2) the BOP violated the United States Constitution by "depriving Petitioner of liberty interests without due process of law"; and (3) the BOP's inaction towards Petitioner's request is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. 1, at 7-8). Petitioner requests waiver of the exhaustion requirement outlined by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). (Doc. 1, at 4). Coburn is currently incarcerated at Lewisburg Federal Prison Camp ("FPC-Lewisburg") and seeks an order dictating that the remainder of his sentence be completed on home confinement. (Doc. 1, at 8). Respondent Stephen Spaulding, the Warden of FPC-Lewisburg, responded to the Petition on September 29, 2020, and Coburn filed a Traverse on October 9, 2020. (Doc. 10; Doc. 12). Accordingly, Coburn's Petition is ripe for review and disposition.
For the following reasons, it is recommended that Coburn's Petition be denied and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
On August 9, 2017, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York sentenced Coburn to a 108-month term of imprisonment relating to the distribution of fentanyl. (Doc. 2, at 8; Doc. 10, at 7). Coburn initiated the present action by filing his Petition on August 7, 2020, upon Respondent's denial of Coburn's request for home confinement by means of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act ("CARES Act"). (Doc. 1). On September 29, 2020, Respondent filed his Response. (Doc. 10). Petitioner filed his Traverse on October 9, 2020. (Doc. 12). In addition, Petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Action on December 28, 2020, along with multiple notices, a declaration, and a supplement.1 (Doc. 13; Doc. 14; Doc. 15; Doc. 16; Doc. 18; Doc. 19).
In his Petition, Coburn first requests that the requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies set forth by the PLRA be waived because COVID-19 is present at FPC-Lewisburg, FPC-Lewisburg's attempts "to mitigate the spread of the virus" are insufficient, and Petitioner believes "the BOP is intentionally 'stalling'" his appeals. (Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 2, at 19-22). Second, Coburn alleges that the BOP violated APA § 706 when they denied his request for home confinement because other inmates that were in a similarsituation as Coburn were released and the severity of Coburn's cerebrovascular disorder as it pertains to COVID-19 was overlooked by the warden. (Doc. 1, at 6-7; Doc. 2, at 30). Third, Coburn argues that the BOP is depriving him "of liberty interests without due process of law" because the prison conditions do not comply with the COVID-19 recommendations by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), which result in a deprivation of Coburn's liberty. (Doc. 1, at 7; Doc. 2, at 36-37). Fourth, Coburn states that the BOP treated him "differently from other similarly situated inmates intentionally and without rational basis as a 'class of one'" in violation of the Equal Protection clause. (Doc. 1, at 7; Doc. 2, at 41). Respondent argues that Coburn has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that the decision to deny Coburn home confinement lies exclusively with the BOP and is not subject to judicial review, that the BOP's decision to deny Coburn home confinement is adequately supported, and the BOP's decision to deny Coburn home confinement "does not amount to a constitutional violation." (Doc. 10, at 1-2). Coburn seeks an order dictating that the remainder of his sentence be completed on home confinement. (Doc. 1, at 8).
"Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," possessing "only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants this Court jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions. Habeas corpus review under § 2241 "allows a federal prisoner to challenge the 'execution' of his sentence." Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005). A habeas corpus petition may be brought by a prisoner who seeks to challenge either the fact or duration of his confinement in prison. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), Telford v. Hepting, 980 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 920 (1993). Federal habeas relief is availableonly "where the deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily impacts the fact or length of detention." Learner v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002). In the instant habeas petition, Coburn claims that the BOP wrongfully denied his request for home confinement in violation of his Due Process rights under the United States Constitution, APA § 706, and the Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. 1, at 6-7).
Coburn requests that the Court waive his requirement to exhaust his administrative remedies "due to the exceptional circumstances and to prevent irreparable harm." (Doc. 12, at 8). Respondent states that Coburn must exhaust his administrative remedies and that Coburn's request to waive this requirement is meritless. (Doc. 10, at 9, 11).
"Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion requirement, a federal prisoner may not ordinarily bring a § 2241 petition, challenging the execution of his sentence, until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies." Kmet v. Ortiz, Civ. No. 19-9185 (RBK), 2020 WL 1685648, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2020) (citing Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000)) (denying Petitioner's claims due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies when Petitioner filed a final appeal a month after the filing of his Petition). The PLRA "mandates that an inmate exhaust 'such administrative remedies as are available' before bringing suit to challenge prison conditions." Gardner v. Wetzel, 1:18-cv-2285, 2020 WL 1244372, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020) (quoting Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016)); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) (). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consistently held that inmates must exhaust proceduralremedies before bringing a federal habeas claim. Speight v. Minor, 245 F. App'x 213, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential); Callwood, 230 F.3d at 634; Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). In Moscato, the Third Circuit explained that exhaustion serves three valuable purposes: "(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy." 98 F.3d at 761-62.
Coburn therefore needed to satisfy the procedural requirements of the BOP's administrative remedy program in order to properly exhaust the claims in his Petition. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761 () (quoting Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1986)). Although Coburn has now completed the administrative review process outlined by the BOP, "a prisoner may not fulfill the PLRA's exhaustion requirement by exhausting administrative remedies after the filing of the complaint in federal court." (Doc. 18); Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F. App'x 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006) (); see also Jenkins v. Dancha, 723 F. App'x 174, 175 (3d Cir. 2018). Coburn concedes that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his petition. (Doc. 12, at 8).
An inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused where the inmate can show that there was no opportunity to obtain adequate redress or that exhaustion would be futile. See Azzara v. Martinez, Civ. Action No. 4:CV-11-1363, 2014 WL 2180163, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2014); see also Spencer v. Martinez, Civ. No. 4:CV-09-0932, 2009 WL 4544744, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009). Here, Coburn has been provided the opportunity to obtain adequate redress in that he was able to complete the administrative review process and filed all of his appeals with the BOP. (Doc. 2, at 17-24; Doc. 2-1, at 12-13, 31, 52-53; Doc. 18; Doc. 20, at 6-7, 8, 9-10, 11). To the extent that Coburn did not receive responses to his appeals, § 542.18 dictates that he "may consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that level" and proceed to the next appeal level. Therefore, Coburn has failed to demonstrate that he was unable to obtain adequate redress through the administrative remedies process. Additionally, the Third Circuit has affirmed that when the BOP acts "within its statutory...
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