Coca-Cola Bot'Lg Works v. Andrews
| Decision Date | 12 June 1939 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2096. |
| Citation | 173 Va. 240 |
| Parties | RICHMOND COCA-COLA BOTTLING WORKS, INCORPORATED, v. OTIS L. ANDREWS, ET AL. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Present, Campbell, C.J., and Holt, Hudgins, Gregory, Eggleston and Spratley, JJ.
1. AUTOMOBILES — Rear-End Collision — Proximate Cause — Following Too Closely in Violation of Statute — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for damages received in an automobile accident, plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the center automobile of three automobiles proceeding in the same direction. The driver of the leading automobile brought his car to a stop at a traffic light, and the middle car ran into the rear of the leading car. Shortly thereafter the third car collided with the middle car, in which plaintiff was riding. According to the admitted testimony of the driver of the last car, under the conditions then obtaining he could not have stopped his car within ten feet, and yet he was following the car in which plaintiff was riding at a distance of from eight to ten feet.
Held: That the jury had a right to find that the driver of the last car was following the car in which plaintiff was riding too closely, in violation of section 2154(119) of the Code of 1936, providing that the driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the speed, traffic and conditions of the highway at the time, and that his doing so was the proximate cause of the second collision.
2. AUTOMOBILES — Rear-End Collision — Proximate Cause — Failure to Keep Lookout — Sudden Stop without Signal — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for damages received in an automobile accident, plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the center automobile of three automobiles proceeding in the same direction. The driver of the leading automobile brought his car to a stop at a traffic light, and the middle car ran into the rear of the leading car. Shortly thereafter the third car collided with the middle car, in which plaintiff was riding. The evidence showed that the first car made a "normal stop" from twenty-five to twenty-seven feet ahead of the car in which plaintiff was riding, and the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding admitted that under the conditions then obtaining his car could have been stopped in less than this distance by the prompt and proper application of its brakes, but plaintiff testified that the driver did not even start to apply his brakes until plaintiff had observed that the collision was imminent and had cried, "Watch out!" The driver of plaintiff's car admitted that he gave no signal or warning of any kind to traffic behind him.
Held: That the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to plaintiff's injury.
3. JUDICIAL NOTICE — Automobiles — That "Light Blow" Does Not Crumple Fenders, Bumper, etc. — It is a matter of common knowledge that when a front fender of an automobile is crumpled, and the thick steel bumper guard and nickeled steel grill in front of the radiator bent beyond repair, such damage did not result from a "very light blow" or a mere touching of the fenders, but required considerable force.
4. AUTOMOBILES — Proximate Cause — Collision Which Caused Second Collision Resulting in Injury — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for damages received in an automobile accident, plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the center automobile of three automobiles proceeding in the same direction. The driver of the leading automobile brought his car to a stop at a traffic light, and the middle car ran into the rear of the leading car. Shortly thereafter the third car collided with the middle car, in which plaintiff was riding. Plaintiff testified that all of his injuries were caused by the second and not by the first collision.
Held: That it did not necessarily follow from plaintiff's testimony that the second collision was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, since the first collision made the second collision inevitable.
5. AUTOMOBILES — Rear-End Collision — Concurring Negligence — Following Too Closely — Failure to Keep Lookout — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for damages received in an automobile accident, plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the center automobile of three automobiles proceeding in the same direction. The driver of the leading automobile brought his car to a stop at a traffic light, and the middle car ran into the rear of the leading car. Shortly thereafter the third car collided with the middle car, in which plaintiff was riding. The first car came to a stop from twenty-five to twenty-seven feet in front of the car in which plaintiff was riding, and the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding admitted that under the existing conditions he could have stopped his car in less than this distance by the prompt application of his brakes. According to the testimony of the driver of the last car, under the conditions then obtaining he could not have stopped his car within ten feet, and yet he was following the preceding car at only a distance of from eight to ten feet.
Held: That, under the circumstances, both the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding and the operator of the last car were following too closely the vehicles ahead, or were not keeping a proper lookout for them, or both, and they were guilty of concurring negligence which proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.
6. AUTOMOBILES — Contribution and Exoneration — Right of Joint Tort-Feasor to Complain of Verdict in Favor of Co-Defendant — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for damages received in an automobile accident, plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the center automobile of three automobiles proceeding in the same direction. The driver of the leading automobile brought his car to a stop at a traffic light, and the middle car ran into the rear of the leading car. Shortly thereafter the third car collided with the middle car, in which plaintiff was riding. The first car came a stop from twenty-five to twenty-seven feet in front of the car in which plaintiff was riding, and the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding admitted that under the existing conditions he could have stopped his car in less than this distance by the prompt application of his brakes. According to the testimony of the driver of the last car, under the conditions then obtaining he could not have stopped his car within ten feet, and yet he was following the preceding car at only a distance of from eight to ten feet. The jury found a verdict in favor of plaintiff against the owner of the last vehicle but found in favor of the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding, and the trial court refused to disturb the verdict on the ground that the driver of the last vehicle had no right to complain that the jury improperly returned a verdict in favor of a co-defendant.
Held: Error, since the negligence of the two defendants having concurred in producing a single indivisible injury and the jury's verdict having fixed plaintiff's damages, the ends of justice would be better served if the owner of the last car were permitted to enforce its right of contribution, given by section 5779 of the Code of 1936, against the joint tort-feasor, its co-defendant, in the then pending proceeding instead of requiring new and further litigation for that purpose.
7. NEGLIGENCE — Joint and Several Liability — Where Concurring Negligence Produces Single Injury. — If two defendants are negligent, one of them can not be exonerated by urging and showing the negligence of the other. Where the concurring negligence of the two produces a single injury and each is its proximate cause they are both liable.
8. AUTOMOBILES — Joint Tort-Feasors — Effect of Verdict against One and in Favor of Another — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action against co-defendants in an automobile accident case, the jury found a verdict against one defendant and in favor of the other, and the trial court refused to disturb the verdict on the ground that defendant had no right to complain that the jury improperly returned a verdict in favor of a co-defendant.
Held: That while the action of the trial court was erroneous, the defendant against whom the verdict was found could not escape responsibility for its negligence and was bound to plaintiff for the full amount of the judgment, but such defendant would be allowed in the same proceeding, in which all of the parties were before the court, to compel contribution against the other joint tort-feasor, its co-defendant.
9. AUTOMOBILES — Damages — $5,000 for Precipitation of Bank Strain upon Arthritic Spine — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for damages received in an automobile accident, plaintiff sustained a precipitation of a back strain upon an arthritic spine, causing considerable pain and discomfort, the loss of sixteen pounds within a period of several months, necessitating the wearing of a brace and interfering considerably with his work as an electrician. There was not much improvement after the lapse of nearly a year, and it was the opinion of the attending physician that a complete recovery was problematical. The jury returned a verdict of $5,000.
Held: That while the verdict was large, the Supreme Court of Appeals could not say that it was excessive as a matter of law.
Error to a judgment of the Law and Equity Court of the city of Richmond, Part Two. Hon. Frank T. Sutton, Jr., judge presiding.
The opinion states the case.
Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr., A. Scott Anderson and H. Armistead Boyd, for the plaintiff in error.
Thomas A. Williams, L. C. O'Connor, Sinnott & May and V. P. Randolph, Jr., for the defendants in error.
Otis L. Andrews has obtained a verdict and judgment against Richmond Coca-Cola...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hartley v. Crede
...v. Douglas, 121 W.Va. 638, 5 S.E.2d 799; Starcher v. South Penn Oil Company, 81 W.Va. 587, 95 S.E. 28; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240, 3 S.E.2d 419; Yonker v. Williams, 169 Va. 294, 192 S.E. 753; Price v. Burton, 155 Va. 229, 154 S.E. 499. The proximate cause of a......
-
Wilson v. Edwards
...recovery against them may be had.' Point 2, syllabus, Sigmon v. Mundy, 125 W.Va. 591, 25 S.E.2d 636. Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240, 3 S.E.2d 419; Yonker v. Williams, 169 Va. 294, 192 S.E. 753; Price v. Burton, 155 Va. 229, 154 S.E. In placing and leaving the truc......
-
Hamilton v. Southern Ry. Co., 5583.
...S.E. 402." See also Brown v. Parker, 167 Va. 286, 291, 189 S.E. 339, and authorities there collected; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240, 251, 3 S.E.2d 419; Goldstein v. Southern Ry. Co., 188 N.C. 636, 639, 125 S.E. 177, cited with approval in Virginian Ry. Co. ......
-
Georgia Power Co. v. Blum
...Fontaine v. Charas, 87 N.H. 424, 181 A. 417; Godfrey v. Queen City Coach Co., 201 N.C. 264, 159 S.E. 412; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240, 3 S.E.2d 419. It is apparent from all these authorities that although each case must be decided upon its own facts, and in suc......