Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Kincannon

• Decision Date: 14 April 1941
• Docket Number: 4-6403
• Citation: 150 S.W.2d 193,202 Ark. 235
• Parties: COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY v. KINCANNON, JUDGE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

150 S.W.2d 193

202 Ark. 235

COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY v. KINCANNON, JUDGE

4-6403

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 14, 1941

Prohibition to Crawford Circuit Court; J. O. Kincannon Judge; writ denied.

Application denied.

Pryor & Pryor, for petitioner.

Partain & Agee, for respondent.

G L. Grant, J. C. Brookfield, amici curiae.

OPINION

SMITH, J.

The Coca-Cola Bottling Company filed here its petition for a writ of prohibition against the Honorable J. O. Kincannon, judge of the Crawford circuit court, and, as grounds therefor, alleged the following facts. Mattie Cromwell filed suit in the Crawford circuit court against petitioner, in which she alleged that she purchased a bottle of Coca-Cola, bottled by petitioner, in Sebastian county, and after having drunk a part thereof became suddenly and violently ill, and she prayed judgment for $ 10,000 to compensate the illness.

The summons which issued out of the office of the clerk of the Crawford circuit court was directed to the sheriff of Sebastian county, in which county it was served upon petitioner, and no service was had upon petitioner in Crawford county.

Respondent held this service sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Crawford circuit court under the authority of act 314 of the 1939 Acts of the General Assembly of Arkansas, p. 769.

It is alleged that this service is not sufficient, for the reason that act 314 contemplated only such causes of action as result from accident or casualty, and does not include a claim for damages by reason of being sick or ill.

Act 314 is entitled, "An act to fix the venue of actions for personal injury and death," and, exclusive of its emergency clause, which failed of adoption, reads as follows:

"Section 1. All actions for damages for personal injury or death by wrongful act shall be brought in the county where the accident occurred which caused the injury or death or in the county where the person injured or killed resided at the time of injury, and provided further that in all such actions service of summons may be had upon any party to such action, in addition to other methods now provided by law, by service of summons upon any agent who is a regular employee of such party, and on duty at the time of such service.

"Section 2. This act shall not repeal any provision for venue of actions except such as are inconsistent herewith and all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are repealed. "

This act is--as it professes to be--a venue statute, and localizes actions for personal injury by requiring that such actions shall be brought (a) in the county where the accident occurred which caused the injury or death, or (b) in the county where the person injured or killed resided at the time of the injury, and its interpretation, as applied to the issues here presented, is unaffected by act 21 of the Acts of the 1941 session of the General Assembly. This latter act provides that "In any action which may lawfully be brought only in some one or more particular counties in this state, and not in any county of the state in which service may be had on the defendant, so that the venue for such action is local and not transitory in nature, summons may be served upon the defendant or defendants in such action in any county in this state."

Without reference to act 21 of 1941, act 314 of the Acts of 1939 confers jurisdiction upon the Crawford circuit court, in which county the injury was sustained, and in which the plaintiff resides, provided the injury was a personal injury. The question for decision is, therefore, whether the complaint alleges a personal injury within the meaning of act 314.

The insistence of the petitioner is that the clause, "where the accident occurred which caused the injury or death," indicates a legislative intention to localize only those suits for traumatic injuries resulting from collisions, and that if not so construed the act would localize suits for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, alienation of affections, and other like causes of action. But that clause is to be read and interpreted in connection with the remainder of the sentence of which it is a part, and, when so read, we find that the act provides that "All actions for damages for personal injury or death by wrongful act shall be brought . . ., etc." The act is not limited to traumatic injuries, but covers wrongful acts from which personal injury results.

The word "accident" has been defined in many cases, both of our own and of other jurisdictions. It was defined in the case of Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588, 53 S.W. 49, 74 Am. St. Rep. 112, as meaning "happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected." This is the dictionary meaning as defined in Webster's New International Dictionary.

The word "accident" was not used in a metaphysical sense, but as commonly employed and usually understood, and in the act means the incident or the wrongful act which caused the injury. For a pure accident, not caused by negligence or wrongful act, there would be no liability.

The controlling question in the case appears, therefore, to be whether the complaint alleges that a personal injury was sustained. The...