DEL. COCA-COLA BOTTLING v. GENERAL TEAMSTERS, Civ. A. No. 77-303.

Citation474 F. Supp. 777
Decision Date18 July 1979
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 77-303.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware
PartiesDELAWARE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 326, Defendant.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard G. Elliott, Jr. of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Del., and O. R. T. Bowden of Hamilton & Bowden, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff.

Francis S. Babiarz and John E. Babiarz, Jr. of Biondi & Babiarz, Wilmington, Del., for defendant.

OPINION

LATCHUM, Chief Judge.

Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. ("Coca-Cola" or "the Company") instituted this action for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement on August 5, 1977.1 (Docket Item 1). The Amended Complaint seeks both compensatory and punitive damages from the General Teamsters Local Union 3262 ("the Union") as the result of a strike that occurred at Coca-Cola's Wilmington bottling plant in the summer of 1977. (Docket Item 22). A two-day trial to the Court was held on January 29th and 30th and the case is now ready for final disposition.3 This Opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52(a), F.R. Civ.P.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Coca-Cola is a Delaware corporation which is wholly owned by Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Miami ("Miami Coke"). (Docket Item 5, ¶ 1; Transcript, p. 23).4 The Company is engaged in the production, distribution and sale of Coca-Cola products. (Tr. 20, 25). It purchases soft drink ingredients under a franchise agreement with The Coca-Cola Company U.S.A. and then processes and bottles those ingredients for distribution and sale in Delaware, Maryland and Pennsylvania. (Tr. 20, 25). The processing and bottling operations are carried on at plants in Wilmington, Delaware and Salisbury, Maryland. (Tr. 20-21, 24). Two other plants are also maintained in Maryland for the purpose of distribution and sales. (Tr. 20).

The Union is an organization which exists in part for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning wages, grievances, and conditions of employment. (Docket Item 22, ¶ 4; Docket Item 5, ¶ 4). In November, 1975, the Union was certified by the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") as the collective bargaining representative of both the drivers, and the production and maintenance ("P & M") employees at Coca-Cola's Wilmington plant. (Tr. 4).

Following its certification, the Union and Coca-Cola held a series of bargaining sessions in an effort to develop a collective bargaining agreement. (Tr. 4). Eventually, they did reach an agreement ("contract") with regard to the P&M employees. (Tr. 5). That contract contained a broad "No-Strike" clause and two other separate clauses which set up a grievance and arbitration procedure. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Articles 14, 15, and 16).5 The effective dates of the agreement were June 1, 1976 to May 31, 1979.

The parties thereafter continued to negotiate for approximately a month with respect to the drivers at the Wilmington plant. Those negotiations were suspended after July 9, 1976 because Coca-Cola decided to engage Countrywide Personnel ("Countrywide") to supply it with drivers and it transferred all of its drivers to that company. (Tr. 5). The Union agreed with that arrangement and proceeded to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with Countrywide. (Tr. 5, 78).

The parties operated in that fashion until March 22, 1977. (Tr. 6). At that point Coca-Cola terminated its relationship with Countrywide and the drivers reverted to their status as employees of Coca-Cola. (Tr. 6). On the following day Frank Sheeran, the President of the Union, ordered both the drivers and the P & M employees to strike. (Tr. 7, 9, 85). That strike lasted one day. (Tr. 9, 85).

Coca-Cola and the Union then held two negotiating sessions in an effort to reach an agreement with respect to the drivers. (Tr. 7, 85). At the second meeting on April 12, 1977, Mr. Sheeran threatened to call a strike if Coca-Cola did not agree to a separate contract for the drivers. (Tr. 11, 59, 86-87). Mr. Jones, the General Manager of the Wilmington plant, responded by telling Mr. Sheeran that the P & M workers would be breaching the P & M Contract if they went out on strike. (Tr. 11-12, 58, 86). Mr. Sheeran then replied that he didn't care; that the time to strike the Coca-Cola plant was in the summertime, and he wasn't going to wait until the issue was resolved. (Tr. 12, 59, 86-87). The parties thereafter broke off negotiations. (Tr. 12).

Approximately three months later the Union went out on strike. (Tr. 11, 59, 90, 107). The strike began on the morning of July 19, 1977 when the drivers set up a picket line in front of the plant. (Tr. 13, 59, 79). On the first morning all of the P & M employees reported outside of the plant but they did not cross the drivers' picket line. (Tr. 13, 111-112, 125, 127). The same scenario was repeated each morning thereafter through July 27, 1977. (Tr. 21, 66, 111-112, 130). On the afternoon of the 27th the Union ordered the P & M employees back to work and by the following day they had all returned for work at the plant. (Tr. 21, 32, 105-107). The drivers continued to picket at the Wilmington plant until approximately August 12, 1977. At that point they abandoned their strike and returned to work.6 (Tr. 21, 92).

Coca-Cola contends that the nine-day work stoppage by the P & M employees was authorized by the Union; and it further contends that the work stoppage was a clear and intentional breach of the contract which can only be remedied by an award of both compensatory and punitive damages. (Docket Items 57 & 61). The Court now turns to consider the merits of those claims.

II. UNION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRIKE

Coca-Cola contends that the Union should be held responsible for the strike by the P & M employees even though the Union denies that it authorized that strike. (Docket Item 57, p. 10). That contention is based on the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (C.A. 3, 1975).

In Eazor the Third Circuit held that a Union which does not authorize or call an illegal strike may nevertheless be held responsible for the strike if it fails to take all reasonable steps to end it. Eazor, supra, at 959. The Union contends that Eazor is inapplicable to this case. (Docket Item 59, pp. 12-13). For the reasons that follow, however, the Court concludes that it is unnecessary to decide whether the Union may be held responsible for the strike under the theory adopted in Eazor.

The entire discussion in Eazor was premised on the findings by the district court that the unions in that case had not authorized or called the strike. Eazor, supra, at 959. In the present case, on the other hand, the Court finds that the Union did authorize or call the strike. That finding is based on the following evidence.

There were approximately twenty-five P & M employees working at the Wilmington plant in the summer of 1977. (Tr. 29). On the first day of the strike all of those employees showed up at the plant, but none of them crossed the drivers' picket line. (Tr. 13, 111-12, 125, 127). Each morning thereafter for eight straight working days those same twenty-five people showed up at the plant and then left without crossing the picket line.7 (Tr. 13, 111-12, 125, 127). On the 28th of July, however, after being told to report to work by the Union, all twenty-five P & M employees crossed the picket line. (Tr. 21, 32, 105-107).

In addition to the above evidence of concerted action, there was direct testimony by the Union's own witnesses that the P & M employees were told by the Union's own officers that they should not cross the drivers' picket line. For example, Leon Robinson, a union member and a P & M employee at the time of the strike, testified that Joe Baray, the steward for the P & M employees, told him that P & M employees were supposed to honor the drivers' picket line. (Tr. 110, 112-13). Similarly, Donald Watson, another union member and P & M employee, testified that Mr. Baray told him to go to the plant each morning but to stay on the other side of the street and not get involved with the strike. (Tr. 129). The substance of those conversations was essentially confirmed by Mr. Baray, who testified that the steward for the drivers "advised him" that he should tell all of the P & M employees that they should come to the plant each morning but that they should not cross the picket line or get involved with the drivers' strike. (Tr. 120-21). Finally, there was evidence that on the first day of the strike Mr. Sheeran applied to the Eastern Conference for strike benefits for all of the P & M employees in addition to the drivers. (Tr. 97-99, PX-3). On the basis of all of the evidence the Court finds that the Union was directly responsible for the strike by the P & M employees.8

III. THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

The next question the Court must decide is whether the strike by the P & M employees was illegal. Under the National Labor Relations Act ("Act") employees have the right to engage in sympathy strikes. 29 U.S.C. § 157; Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287 (C.A. 7), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 269, 46 L.Ed.2d 252 (1975); Kellogg Company v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 522 (C.A. 6), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850, 93 S.Ct. 58, 34 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). That right, however, may be bargained away by the employees' union in the course of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967); Labor Board v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80, 73 S.Ct. 519, 97 L.Ed. 832 (1953).

In the present case the Union signed a collective bargaining agreement which contained a clause ("No-Strike clause") providing that:

The Union will not cause nor will any member of the bargaining unit take part in any strike, sit-down, stay-in, slow down in any
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • United States v. Boffa
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • February 19, 1981
    ...and was timely, reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 1. Judge Latchum presided over the case of Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Incorporated v. General Teamsters Local Union 326 and handed down an opinion on July 18, 1979 in favor of the plaintiff. (474 F.Supp. 777 (1979)). Subsequent......
  • California Trucking Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local 70
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • June 3, 1982
    ...1058, 1062-63 (E.D.Pa.1969); Airco Speer Carbon-Graphite, 479 F.Supp. at 258 (W.D.Pa.1979). Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 474 F.Supp. 777, 787 (D.Del.1979), rev'd on other grounds, 624 F.2d 1182 (3rd Cir. 1980).Second, Local 70 argues that the tempora......
  • BROTH. OF RY. CARMEN OF US v. Delpro Co., Civ. A. No. 82-464 MMS.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • January 24, 1984
    ...under Labor Management Relations Act against union for breach of duty of fair representation); Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 474 F.Supp. 777 (D.Del.1979), rev'd on other grounds, 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir.1980) (no punitive damages under Labor Management ......
  • Denzer v. PUROFIED DOWN PRODUCTS CORP., ETC.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • July 18, 1979
    ... ... No. 79 Civ. 223 ... United States District Court, S. D. New ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT