Coca v. City of Dodge City

• Decision Date: 18 April 2023
• Docket Number: 22-1274-EFM
• Parties: MIGUEL COCA and ALEJANDRO RANGEL-LOPEZ, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DODGE CITY, a municipal corporation, the DODGE CITY COMMISSION, E. KENT SMOLL, in his official capacity as Mayor of Dodge City, MICHAEL BURNS, in his official capacity as Vice-Mayor of Dodge City, RICK SOWERS, in his official capacity as a member of the Dodge City Commission, CHUCK TAYLOR, in his official capacity as a member of the Dodge City Commission, and JOSEPH NUCI, in his official capacity as a member of the Dodge City Commission, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

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MIGUEL COCA and ALEJANDRO RANGEL-LOPEZ, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DODGE CITY, a municipal corporation, the DODGE CITY COMMISSION, E. KENT SMOLL, in his official capacity as Mayor of Dodge City, MICHAEL BURNS, in his official capacity as Vice-Mayor of Dodge City, RICK SOWERS, in his official capacity as a member of the Dodge City Commission, CHUCK TAYLOR, in his official capacity as a member of the Dodge City Commission, and JOSEPH NUCI, in his official capacity as a member of the Dodge City Commission, Defendants.

No. 22-1274-EFM

United States District Court, D. Kansas

April 18, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ERIC F. MELGREN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) Plaintiffs Miguel Coca and Alejandro Rangel-Lopez's claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the Fifteenth Amendment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have brought these claims based on Dodge City's at-large voting scheme by which members of its governing body are elected. In Plaintiffs' view, this election system has resulted in Latino voters being unable to elect their preferred candidates because it unconstitutionally dilutes the Latino vote. For the reasons state below, the Court grants Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiffs' Fifteenth Amendment claim while denying it as to Plaintiffs' other claims.

I. Factual and Procedural Background^[1]

Both Plaintiffs are Latino U.S. citizens of legal voting age who reside in Dodge City (the “City”). The Defendants are the City itself and members of the Dodge City Commission E. Kent Smoll, who also serves as the City's Mayor; Michael Burns, the City's Vice-Mayor; Rick Sowers; Chuck Taylor; and Joseph Nuci. It is this Commission, specifically the voting scheme by which members are elected, that forms the basis of Plaintiffs' claims.

The City utilizes a commission-manager form of government as contemplated by K.S.A. § 12-184b(b)(3). Five members comprise the Commission, each serving either two-year terms or four-year terms depending on how many votes they receive. The City's citizens elect these members under an at-large voting system. In other words, the City is not divided into multiple districts-rather each member of the Commission receives votes from citizens all over the City.

Plaintiffs allege that this election method dilutes the votes of the Latino community in Dodge City. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that no Latino-preferred candidates have been elected to the Commission since at least before 2000.^[2] In 2000, 2006, 2014, 2017, and 2021, Latino candidates ran for a spot on the Commission, receiving large numbers of votes in Latino-dominant precincts within Dodge City. However, because these candidates received little or no support in the white-dominant precincts, they could not obtain seats on the Commission.

Considering how the Latino population has grown significantly in the past twenty years, Plaintiffs allege that the inability of Latino-preferred candidates to obtain a single seat on the Commission is evidence of vote dilution. In 2000, Latinos comprised 42.3% of the Dodge City's overall population. That number grew to 63.9% by 2020. Similarly, the number of Latino citizens of voting age (“CVAP”) increased from 19.53% in 2000 to 46.13% in 2021.

(Image Omitted)

Plaintiffs included the following demographic heat map in their Complaint, purporting to show the population density of Latinos around the Dodge City area.

According to Plaintiff's interpretation of the map, the south and southeastern areas of Dodge City are home to a Latino majority, while the north and northwestern areas consist mainly of white citizens. Plaintiffs allege that it is possible to draw five distinct districts, one for each Commission member, so as to make Latino voters the majority in at least one of those districts. This districting would then allow Latino voters to elect candidates of their choice to the Commission. However, Plaintiffs do not offer any suggested redistricting map to show where their proposed districts would lie.

Plaintiffs initiated the present lawsuit on December 15, 2022, asserting claims for violation of Section 2 of the VRA, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the Fifteenth Amendment. Defendants waited less than a month to bring the present Motion to Dismiss. On February 10, 2023, the United States filed an amicus brief in this matter, advocating on behalf of Plaintiffs' right to bring a private claim for Defendants' alleged violation of Section 2 and arguing against a higher pleading standard for vote dilution claims.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move for dismissal of any claim for which the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.^[3] Upon such motion, the court must decide “whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ”^[4] A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient for the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.^[5] The plausibility standard reflects the requirement in Rule 8 that pleadings provide defendants with fair notice of the nature of claims as well the grounds on which each claim rests.^[6] Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, but need not afford such a presumption to legal conclusions.^[7] Viewing the complaint in this manner, the court must decide whether the plaintiff's allegations give rise to more than speculative possibilities.^[8] If the allegations in the complaint are “so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.' ”^[9]

III. Analysis

Although Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiffs' claims, they spend most of their memorandum in support attacking Plaintiffs' Section 2 claim. After arguing against the availability of a Section 2 and asserting that Plaintiffs' claim would fail on the merits anyway, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' constitutional causes of action fail to state a claim. The Court will discuss each of Defendants' arguments in turn below.

A. Plaintiffs may bring a private claim violation of Section 2 of the VRA.

Plaintiffs' first count is violation of Section 2 of the VRA. Before addressing the merits of this claim, Defendants raise a monumental issue sure to find its ultimate conclusion beyond this Court-whether private plaintiffs may sue for violation of Section 2 of the VRA. In essence, this issue presents two questions: (1) does Section 2 provide a private right of action and (2) does it create private rights such that a private plaintiff could bring a claim under § 1983?

1. Does Section 2 create a private right of action?

Relying primarily on Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee^[10] and the district court's ruling in Arkansas State Conf. NAACP v. Arkansas Board of Apportionment,^[11] Defendants argue that Section 2 fails to provide a private right of action based on the express statutory language. Defendants admit that for decades and throughout hundreds of cases a private right of action has been assumed. Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in Brnovich, however, upends that distinct line of precedent, labeling Section 2's private right of action as “an open question” in lower courts.^[12] Taking Justice Gorsuch up on his invitation to address the “open question,” the Arkansas State court determined that Section 2 does not provide a private right of action.^[13] In a “thorough and well-reasoned-though admittedly, controversial-order,”^[14] the court determined that neither the text of Section 2 nor precedent required it to recognized a private right of action within Section 2.^[15]

To summarize, the court relied upon the recent string of Supreme Court cases beginning with Alexander v. Sandoval^[16] where the Supreme Court “made quite clear that judicially implied private rights of action are now extremely disfavored.”^[17] Under the Sandoval test, the statute must: (1) contain create a private right and (2) provide for a private remedy before a private party can enforce it.^[18] This test requires an in-depth analysis of the statutory text “to determine whether it displays an intent to create . . . a private remedy.”^[19]

The Arkansas State court went on to analyze the text and structure of the VRA, naturally emphasizing the language of Section 2.^[20] In its entirety, Section 2 of the VRA states:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right

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