Cocciola v. Wood-Dickerson Supply Co.

• Citation: 33 So. 856,136 Ala. 532
• Parties: COCCIOLA ET AL. v. WOOD-DICKERSON SUPPLY CO.
• Decision Date: 28 February 1903
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

33 So. 856

136 Ala. 532

COCCIOLA ET AL. v. WOOD-DICKERSON SUPPLY CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 28, 1903

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; W. H. Wilkerson, Judge.

Bill by the Wood-Dickerson Supply Company against Louis Cocciola and Jennie E. Cocciola. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

A Latady, for appellants.

White &amp Howze, for appellee.

DOWDELL J.

The bill in this case is one by a materialman, and seeks to enforce a lien which is claimed on account of materials furnished in the erection of several buildings on the same lot under one general contract. The case was heard on demurrer to the bill, and the present appeal is taken from the decree of the chancellor overruling the demurrer.

The only question presented for our consideration, and that is here insisted on, is one that calls for an interpretation of the act of March 4, 1901 (Acts 1900-01, p. 2115), relating to liens of mechanics and materialmen in the county of Jefferson. The portion of the act calling for a construction reads as follows: "When the improvement consists of two or more buildings united together and situated upon the same lot or contiguous lots or upon separate buildings upon contiguous lots and erected under one general contract, it shall not be necessary to file a separate lien upon each building for the work done and materials, fixtures, engine boiler or machinery furnished in the erection of such improvement." The question raised by the demurrer is that, as it is not alleged that the buildings were united together or were being erected upon contiguous lots, the statute does not apply, or, in other words, that, although the statute does apply to buildings on the same lot when connected together, and to separate buildings on contiguous lots, it does not apply to separate buildings on the same lot.

The act in question is amendatory of certain sections of the Code making the same, as amended, applicable alone to the county of Jefferson. By section 12 of the act it is made purely a local statute.

Statutes which are in derogation of the common law, or which confer extraordinary rights and remedies, as a general rule, are to be construed with reasonable strictness. It has been a number of times held by this court, in cases of statutory liens, that the requirements necessary to create the lien must be substantially complied with. In respect to these matters, these statutes have always been subjected to a reasonably strict construction. See Duncan v. Ashcraft, Adm'r, 121 Ala. 552, 25 So. 735, where authorities are cited and commented on. But the facts of the present case are different from those, where the question was as to a compliance by the party with the requirements of the statute in order to obtain a lien. Nothing of the kind arises here, and a different rule of interpretation is to be applied.

One of the cardinal rules in the interpretation of all statutes is to arrive at the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of the law, and to this end the courts will look to the object of the enactment, and the mischief or defect against which it is intended to provide. Thompson v. State, 20 Ala. 54; Huffman v. State, 29 Ala. 40, 43.

Prior to this statute, in order to acquire a lien, the particular goods must have been furnished for the erection of the particular building on which the lien is sought. Cook v Rome Brick Co., 98 Ala. 410, 12 So. 918; Johnson v. Simmons, 123 Ala. 564, 26 So. 650. And, to secure the benefits of the lien, it was necessary to allege and prove that each piece of material so furnished was actually used upon the particular building so designated. Leftwich v. Florence, 104 Ala. 585, 18 So. 48; Lee...