Cochise County v. Copper Queen Consol. Min. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1903
• Docket Number: Civil 787
• Citation: Cochise County v. Copper Queen Consol. Min. Co., 8 Ariz. 221, 71 P. 946 (Ariz. 1903)
• Parties: COUNTY OF COCHISE et al., Defendants and Appellants, v. COPPER QUEEN CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

71 P. 946

8 Ariz. 221

COUNTY OF COCHISE et al., Defendants and Appellants, v. COPPER QUEEN CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee

Civil No. 787

Supreme Court of Arizona

March 20, 1903

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Cochise.George R. Davis Judge.Reversed.

Affirmed on rehearing.See opinion, post, p. 459.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Edward W. Land, District Attorney, Allen R. English, and W. C McFarland, for Appellants.

The allegations that defendant board acted fraudulently unlawfully, arbitrarily, and with intent to wrong, defraud and oppress the plaintiff, are mere conclusions of law, and only express the pleader's opinion.The further allegation that the board acted fraudulently, unlawfully, and for the purpose of placing an unfair and undue burden upon plaintiff, was also a mere conclusion of law, and only expresses the pleader's opinion.Grand Valley Irr Co. v. Lesher,28 Colo. 273, 65 P. 44.

Allegations which consist of mere conclusions of law and opinions of the pleader, without any statement of the facts from which these conclusions are drawn or upon which the pleader's opinions are based, are insufficient, and hence the demurrer should have been sustained for failure to state facts constituting a cause of action.Piccotte v. Watt, 3 Idaho, 447, 31 P. 805;History Co. v. Dougherty,3 Ariz. 387, 29 P. 649;Callahan v. Broderick,124 Cal. 80, 56 P. 782;Griffith v. Wright,21 Wash. 494, 58 P. 583;Weber v. Dillon,7 Okla. 568, 54 P. 894;Hieronymus v. New York Nat. D. and L. Assn.,101 F. 12;Naddo v. Bardon,47 F. 782;Gould v. Evansville etc. Ry. Co.,91 U.S. 526, 23 L.Ed. 416;Lockhart v. Leeds,10 N.M. 568, 63 P. 48;Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 134 Ill. 557, 25 N.E. 660.

No facts are alleged showing the cash value of plaintiff's property, or the cash value of the patented mine or mines, the assessed valuation of which were not raised or added to by the defendant board; hence no facts are alleged showing that plaintiff's property was assessed at more than its cash value, or that other patented mines were assessed at less than their cash value.No facts alleged showing that the patented mine or mines, the assessed value of which were not raised by the board, were "like properties" of the plaintiff, either in value or returns; hence no facts are alleged showing that the action of the board was to discriminate against, or to place an unfair and undue burden upon plaintiff.Pacific Postal Tel. Co. v. Dalton,119 Cal. 604, 51 P. 1072;Eureka Dist. Gold Min. Co. v. Ferry Co.,28 Wash. 250, 68 P. 727;Siegfried v. Raymond,190 Ill. 424, 60 N.E. 868;Weber v. Dillon, 7 Okla. 568, 54 P. 894.

There is no allegation that at the time the valuation of the plaintiff's property was raised and added to the defendant board knew there was a large number, or any number at all, of the three hundred and twenty-two mining claims, other than those of the plaintiff, of great value, or any value at all, or yielded large returns, or any returns at all, during the year 1901, nor are any facts alleged showing that any of them were of any greater value than that returned by the assessor; hence no facts are alleged showing the exclusion of other "like property," or that the purpose of the board was to place an unfair and undue burden on the plaintiff.Eureka Dist. Gold Mining Co. v. Ferry Co.,28 Wash. 250, 68 P. 727;People v. McCreery,34 Cal. 432;City of Muscatine v. Mississippi etc. Ry. Co., 1 Dill. 537, Fed. Cas.No. 9971.

The allegation that the board of equalization, at their session in the month of July, 1901, well knew that there were several thousand unpatented mining claims in said county of Cochise of great value, and that said board failed and neglected to require the assessor to enter upon the assessment-roll of said county the said unpatented claims, or any of them, by reason whereof the whole burden of taxation was laid upon the patented mining claims, constitutes no cause of action, and does not show fraudulent conduct upon the part of the defendants, nor discrimination against the plaintiff, for the reason that unpatented mines or mining claims are not subject to assessment or taxation.Rev. Stats. 1887, par. 2631;Organic Act, sec. 15, Rev. Stats. U.S., sec. 1851;Salisbury v. Lane,63 P. 383;Goldhill v. Caledonia etc. Co., 5 Saw. 275, Fed. Cas.No. 5512;Mammoth Mining Co. v. Juab Co.,37 P. 348;Eureka Dist. Gold Mining Co. v. Ferry Co., 28 Wash. 250, 68 P. 727.

The facts alleged do not constitute grounds for equitable interference.Courts of equity will refuse to restrain the collection of taxes, unless the facts alleged show that the tax was assessed upon property not subject to taxation, or that the tax was unauthorized by law.High on Injunctions, sec. 488;Dows v. Chicago,11 Wall. 108, 20 L.Ed. 65;Shelton v. Platt,139 U.S. 591, 11 S.Ct. 646, 35 L.Ed. 273.

The equitable powers of the court can only be invoked where the plaintiff has no plain and adequate remedy at law.In this casethe plaintiff's remedy at law was adequate and complete, "either by action against the officer making the collection or the body to whom the tax was paid."If the tax was illegal, the plaintiff protesting against its enforcement might have had his action against the officer or the county to recover back the money, or he might have prosecuted either for damages.No irreparable injury would have followed to him from its collection.Nor would he have been compelled to resort to a multiplicity of suits to determine his rights.His entire claim might have been embraced in a single case.Dows v. Chicago,11 Wall. 108, 20 L.Ed. 65;Erskine v. Van Arsdale,15 Wall. 75, 21 L.Ed. 63;State Ry. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 23 L.Ed. 669;Savings and Loan Assn. v. Austin,46 Cal. 486;New Haven Clock Co. v. Kochersperger,175 Ill. 383, 51 N.E. 629;Rose v. Durham, 10 Okla. 373, 61 P. 1100.

Where one seeks to enjoin the collection of a tax on the ground of excessive valuation or fraudulent conduct of the board in increasing the valuation of the property over the returned valuation, plaintiff must allege his property was returned for assessment at its true cash value.Any petition for injunction which fails to allege this fact will be held bad on demurrer.Martin v. Clay,8 Okla. 46, 56 P. 715;Streight v. Durham,10 Okla. 361, 61 P. 1096;Alva State Bank v. Renfrew,10 Okla. 26, 62 P. 285;First Nat. Bank v. Douglass County,3 Dill. 330, Fed. Cas.No. 4799;Cranmer v. Williamson, 8 Okla. 683, 59 P. 249.

The allegation in the complaint upon information and belief that the valuation placed by the board of equalization upon the patented mines of plaintiff, as aforesaid, is, according to any just known method of arriving at the full cash value of such property, grossly excessive, etc., is not an allegation that the property of plaintiff was assessed or that the board raised the value to an amount in excess of its cash value; hence the demurrer, for want of equity, should have been sustained.Martin v. Clay, supra;Streight v. Durham, supra.

It is not alleged that the valuations placed by the board on plaintiff's property were excessive or more than their cash value; hence no facts are alleged showing that the action of the board resulted in any injury to the plaintiff.If the assessed valuation of the property of the plaintiff was not raised to an amount in excess of or above the cash value, no injury or wrong is shown.Where one complains of the fraudulent conduct of another, it is necessary that facts be alleged showing some injury resulting from such conduct.It is only fraudulent conduct of the board that results in excessive valuation that constitutes ground for equitable relief.Keokuk etc. Bridge Co. v. People,161 Ill. 132, 43 N.E. 691;Clement v. People,177 Ill. 144, 52 N.E. 382;Spencer v. People, 68 Ill. 510.

There can be no wrong or injury resulting from a correct valuation placed upon plaintiff's property, "and the courts cannot examine the mode of reasoning or the basis adopted to ascertain the value of the property, unless the mode of reasoning or basis adopted results in excessive or overvaluation of properties of plaintiff."Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak,75 Ill. 292;Porter v. Rockford etc. Ry. Co.,76 Ill. 561;Siegfried v. Raymond,190 Ill. 424, 60 N.E. 868;Dundee Mfg. etc. Co. v. Charlton, 32 F. 192, 13 Saw. 25.

It may be there was inequality and want of uniformity in the assessment of property in Cochise County for the year 1901, and it is possible that, in a general way, the allegations in the complaint may show the existence of this condition, but, as said by Judge Miller, in the railroad tax cases, "Perfect equality and perfect uniformity of taxation as regards individuals or corporations, or the different classes of property subject to taxation, is a dream unrealized."Railroad Tax Cases, supra.

"To these boards of revision, or whatever name they may be called, the citizen must apply for relief against excessive or irregular taxation where the assessing officers had jurisdiction to assess the property.Their action is judicial in character.They pass judgment on the value of the property, upon personal examination and evidence respecting it.Their action being judicial, their judgment, in cases within their jurisdiction, are not open to collateral attack.If not corrected by some of the modes pointed out by statutethey are conclusive, whatever errors may have been committed in the assessment."Stanley v. County of Albany,121 U.S. 535, 7 S.Ct. 1234, 30 L.Ed. 1000;Standard Oil Co. v. Magee,191 Ill. 84, 60 N.E. 802;Oregon and W.M. Sav. Bank v. Jordan,16 Or. 113, 17 P. 621;New Haven Clock Co. v. Kochersperger,175...