Cochran v. Boar's Head Provisions Co.
Decision Date | 10 February 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-00134-KGB |
Parties | SARAH COCHRAN and TIFFANY WARD PLAINTIFFS v. BOAR'S HEAD PROVISIONS COMPANY INC., et al. DEFENDANTS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss or in the alternative motion to sever or order separate trials filed by defendants Boar's Head Provisions Company, Inc. ("Boar's Head"), Patricia Byers, and Gillette Drone (collectively, "defendants") (Dkt. No. 3). Plaintiffs Sarah Cochran and Tiffany Ward (collectively, "plaintiffs") have filed a response (Dkt. No. 9). For the following reasons, the Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative motion to sever or order separate trials (Dkt. No. 3).
Plaintiffs initially filed this action in the Circuit Court of St. Francis County, Arkansas, on May 7, 2020 (Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiffs were both Boar's Head employees when their causes of action arose, and plaintiffs assert that they were terminated discriminatorily in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 ("ACRA"), Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-107, et seq. (Id., ¶ 2). On June 17, 2020, defendants removed this action from the Circuit Court of St. Francis County, Arkansas, to this Court (Dkt. No. 1).
Plaintiffs present Ms. Cochran's cause of action as follows (Dkt. No. 2, ¶¶ 15-21). On September 9, 2019, Ms. Cochran was involved in a car wreck (Id., ¶ 15). Ms. Cochran had previously undergone extensive lumbar surgery in the form of a spinal fusion, and she experienced immediate pain in that area after the wreck as well as later weakness and paralysis in both her right arm and right leg (Id.). Ms. Cochran was hospitalized for two days at University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences in Little Rock (Id.). Ms. Cochran's daughter called Ms. Byers to inform her that Ms. Cochran was in the hospital; Ms. Cochran's daughter was not informed that company rules required a call each day that Ms. Cochran was in the hospital (Id.). When Ms. Cochran was discharged from the hospital, she called Ms. Byers to ask when she might return to work (Id., ¶ 17). Ms. Byers said that she would call Ms. Cochran back, but she did not call back for about a week (Id.). On September 18, 2019, Ms. Cochran was informed by the Human Resources Department ("HR") at Boar's Head that she was being terminated for failure to call two days in a row (Id.). Ms. Cochran's Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") coverage, health insurance, AFLAC insurance, and all other benefits were cancelled (Id.).
Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Cochran was entitled to be free from discrimination "because . . . the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right" under Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-107(a) (Id., ¶ 18). Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Cochran was operating under a disability—and defendants regarded her as having a disability—when defendants discriminated against her by firing her and terminating her insurance and other benefits (Id.). Plaintiffs maintain that defendants discriminated against Ms. Cochran by failing to provide her reasonable accommodation under the circumstances and by firing her after her discharge from the hospital, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-102(3) (Id., ¶¶ 18-19). Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated Ms. Cochran's right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-102(3) and refused toprovide reasonable accommodation in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-107(a) (Id., ¶ 20).
As a result of defendants' alleged violations, plaintiffs allege that Ms. Cochran has lost a significant sum of income in the past and will continue to do so in the future; stands unable to pay the medical bills she incurred for her treatment and surgery; has lost the fringe benefits of her employment; remains unable to procure employment due to her having been fired by Boar's Head; remains unable to pay her bills, which has caused chaos in her life; and has incurred and will incur substantial attorneys' fees (Id., ¶ 21).
Plaintiffs present Ms. Ward's cause of action as follows (Dkt. No. 2, ¶¶ 3-14). Ms. Ward presented to the emergency room with severe and sharp abdominal pain on June 2, 2019 (Id., ¶ 3). Ms. Ward was treated and released from the emergency room and directed to see her primary care physician; her primary care physician immediately admitted her to CrossRidge Hospital (Id.). Ms. Ward called Boar's Head and reported her inability to come to work to HR at Boar's Head (Id.). Additionally, Ms. Ward's fiancée, John Steverson, asked HR to credit Ms. Ward with two of his vacation days so as to offset June 3 and June 4, the two days that Ms. Ward was hospitalized at CrossRidge (Id., ¶ 9). Ms. Ward's condition worsened, and she was transferred to St. Bernard's Hospital in Jonesboro, Arkansas, on June 5, 2019 (Id., ¶ 3). Each day that she was absent, Ms. Ward notified HR at Boar's Head prior to the end of her shift, as was required by Boar's Head (Id.). Also on June 5, 2019, Ms. Ward informed a woman named Wendy in HR that she was going to have to undergo surgery and be out for some time, and Wendy informed Ms. Ward that she would not have to call back since HR now knew that she was going to be hospitalized (Id., ¶ 9).
Ms. Ward experienced complications at St. Bernard's which led to her undergoing surgery on June 10, 2019 (Id., ¶¶ 4-5). Each day that Ms. Ward was absent, she or Mr. Steverson called HR at Boar's Head to report that she would not be present, and Ms. Ward called Boar's Head prior to her surgery to advise it of her condition and why she was absent (Id., ¶ 5). On June 11, 2019, Ms. Ward called Boar's Head to advise that she had undergone surgery and would be absent from work for some time after her discharge (Id., ¶ 6).
Upon her discharge on June 18, 2019, a nurse informed Ms. Ward that her insurance had been cancelled by Boar's Head due to her allegedly not having called in sick (Id.). Ms. Ward called Ms. Byers, who worked in HR at Boar's Head but was told that Ms. Byers was busy (Id.). Mr. Steverson went to see Ms. Byers to ask if Ms. Ward's insurance could be reinstated, but Ms. Byers told him that it could not be reinstated because Ms. Ward had already been terminated (Id.). Plaintiffs assert that either Ms. Drone or Ms. Byers stated that Ms. Ward failed to call and advise that she would be absent on either June 10 or June 11 (Id.). Mr. Steverson offered to show a screenshot proving that Ms. Ward had called on both June 10 and June 11, but Ms. Drone and Ms. Byers demurred (Id., ¶¶ 6, 10). Ms. Ward repeatedly attempted to call Tim Botham, the plant manager, regarding her situation, but she was unsuccessful (Id., ¶ 7).
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Ward was entitled to be free from discrimination "because . . . the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right" under Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-107(a) (Id., ¶ 11). Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Ward was operating under a disability—and defendants regarded her as having a disability—when defendants discriminated against her by firing her and terminating her insurance and other benefits (Id., ¶ 12). Plaintiffs maintain that defendants discriminated against Ms. Ward "by failing to provide her reasonable accommodation under the circumstances and by firing her, after herdischarge from the hospital" (Id.). Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated Ms. Ward's right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-102(3) and refused to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-107(a) (Id., ¶ 13).
As a result of defendants' alleged violations, plaintiffs allege that Ms. Ward has lost a significant sum of income in the past and will continue to do so in the future; stands unable to pay the medical bills she incurred for her treatment and surgery; has lost the fringe benefits of her employment; remains unable to procure employment due to her having been fired by Boar's Head; remains unable to pay her bills, which has caused chaos in her life; and has incurred and will incur substantial attorneys' fees (Id., ¶ 14).
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "because the Complaint fails to state facts that plausibly suggest that an ACRA violation or unlawful discrimination occurred as to either Plaintiff" (Dkt. No. 3, ¶ 2). Defendants argue that the ACRA does not require private employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees and that, as a result, plaintiffs' failure to accommodate claims fail to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted (Id., ¶ 3). Defendants also argue based on the facts asserted in the complaint that plaintiffs' alleged medical conditions are not covered disabilities under the ACRA and that plaintiffs are not entitled to protections from any alleged disability discrimination (Id., ¶ 4). Defendants maintain that individual supervisor liability of the sort asserted against Ms. Drone and Ms. Byers is undisputedly barred under the ACRA pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-123-107(c)(1)(A) (Id., ¶ 5). Defendants assert that plaintiffs'claims under the respondeat superior doctrine cannot survive as plaintiffs have alleged no intentional tort committed by Ms. Drone or Ms. Byers (Id., ¶ 6).
Should the Court decline to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims, defendants maintain that plaintiffs' claims should be severed as Ms. Cochran's and Ms. Ward's claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and stem from separate and unrelated fact patterns (Id., ¶ 8). Defendants assert that joinder of these two individual alleged discrimination cases is improper...
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