Cochran v. Couzens

• Decision Date: 02 June 1930
• Docket Number: No. 4934.,4934.
• Citation: 42 F.2d 783
• Parties: COCHRAN v. COUZENS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

42 F.2d 783 (1930)

COCHRAN v. COUZENS.

No. 4934.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Argued May 6, 1930.

Decided June 2, 1930.

Harry Friedman, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

F. D. Jones and Joseph E. Davies, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

ROBB, Associate Justice.

Appeal from a judgment in the Supreme Court of the District, in an action for slander, sustaining defendant's (appellee here) motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

The declaration discloses that on the 12th of April, 1928, plaintiff was a tax consultant engaged in the practice of his profession in the District of Columbia, and that defendant was a United States Senator from the state of Michigan in attendance upon the meetings of the first session of the Seventieth Congress of the United States; that in 1919 defendant sold a portion of the capital stock of the Ford Motor Company which he long had owned, and filed an income tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue charging himself with the accruing profit; that prior to such sale a valuation as of March 1, 1913, had been placed on the stock by the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, upon which valuation the defendant had computed his profit; that on the 12th of March, 1925, the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the defendant and other holders of such stock an additional tax liability, based upon a valuation of the stock as of March 1, 1913, different from that fixed in the earlier valuation; that the additional tax liability approximated the sum of $30,000,000; that from this assessment an appeal was prosecuted before the United States Board of Tax Appeals; that thereafter the plaintiff consulted with the defendant on two occasions; and that the defendant did "in the chamber of the Senate of the United States * * * in the course of a speech but not in the course of a debate on the floor of the Senate * * * unofficially and not in the discharge of his official duties as a Senator of the United States * * * of and concerning a subject not then and there pertinent or relevant to any matter under inquiry by the said Senate of the United States, maliciously, wilfully, falsely and wrongfully speak, publish and declare of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning the conduct of the plaintiff in his said profession and vocation, the following false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory slander to wit."

The alleged slanderous words were to the effect that defendant, after being approached by plaintiff, had secured information that plaintiff "was quite well known around Washington as being one of the men who knew the inside tax game"; that he was a close friend of an employee of the Internal Revenue Bureau, and that the defendant had his secretary telephone plaintiff that he (defendant) was not interested in the matter; that plaintiff persisted and went to the office of defendant the following day, and was asked by defendant what interest the above-mentioned employee had in the case. Plaintiff admitted that he had conferred with this employee about plaintiff's proposition to defendant; that thereupon the defendant dismissed plaintiff, and thereafter wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning plaintiff's activities in the case. The Senator then said he desired to emphasize what he considered a perfectly logical conclusion — that plaintiff knew of the earlier action of the Bureau with reference to the valuation of his stock, and that no one else outside of the Department had such knowledge; that "it is apparent that this information was to be...