Cochran v. Harrison Memorial Hosp.

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DONWORTH; GRADY
• Citation: Cochran v. Harrison Memorial Hosp., 254 P.2d 752, 42 Wn.2d 264 (Wash. 1953)
• Decision Date: 17 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. 32019
• Parties: COCHRAN, v. HARRISON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al.

Page 264

42 Wn.2d 264

254 P.2d 752

COCHRAN, v. HARRISON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al.

No. 32019.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

March 17, 1953.

Frederick B. Cohen and John E. Bowen, Bremerton, for appellant.

Eggerman, Rosling & Williams and Henry E. Kastner, Seattle, Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann, Seattle, for respondents.

DONWORTH, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while a patient in Harrison Memorial Hospital at Bremerton, Washington. The defendants are the corporation, which operated the hospital, Evelyn G. James, a practical nurse employed by the hospital, Dr. Kenneth P. Jackson and his associate, Dr. George Whitacre.

The action was tried to the court sitting with a jury. At the close of plaintiff's evidence each of the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and moved to dismiss the action with prejudice. The trial court sustained the challenges and granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiff moved for a new trial. The motion was denied and judgment dismissing the action was entered on October 15, 1951. From that judgment plaintiff has appealed.

Appellant, an eighty-year-old widow, suffered a slight stroke early on the morning of April 22, 1950. When she awoke from her sleep she was extremely dizzy but managed to rap on the wall to summon her son, Harry Freed. He called Dr. Kenneth P. Jackson to care for this mother. Dr. Jackson assigned his assistant Dr. George Whitacre to the case. When Dr. Whitacre arrived at appellant's home he found that she had suffered a paralysis of the left side of the face which prevented her from swallowing. She had control over both her arms and legs. Because of appellant's inability to swallow or take nourishment through the mouth Dr. Whitacre decided she should be taken to the hospital where she could be given proper care. An ambulance was called and appellant was admitted to the Harrison Memorial Hospital about noon on that day.

Dr. Whitacre gave instructions for her care over the telephone. He ordered an injection of two grains of sodium luminal shortly after admittance along with an intravenous injection of glucose and saline solution. He further prescribed additional doses of two grains of sodium luminal at nine o'clock p. m. and again at two o'clock the following morning. These instructions were placed on the patient's hospital chart.

At six o'clock the following morning appellant was awakened by respondent Evelyn G. James, a practical nurse employed by the hospital, who had come on duty at eleven o'clock the previous night. The nurse placed a wash basin at the right of appellant's bed, told her to wash and left the room. Appellant had to change her position to reach the wash basin. She sat up, swung both her legs over the side of the bed and reached for the basin. In so doing she slipped off the edge of the bed and fell to the floor. She then screamed for help and four nurses answered her call and lifted her back into bed.

As a result of the fall appellant suffered an intertrochanteric fracture of the left hip. The fracture did not heal properly after it was set the first time and it was necessary to correct the non-union of the fracture with a bone grafting operation in November, 1950. At the time of the trial she was able to walk for a few minutes with the aid of crutches but used a wheel chair principally for moving around the house.

In reviewing the evidence in this case we are governed by the rule that a motion for nonsuit admits the truth of the evidence of the party against whom the challenge is made and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom and requires that the evidence be interpreted most strongly against the challenger and in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Derr v. Bonney, 38 Wash.2d 678, 231 P.2d 637; Hardung v. Green, 40 Wash.2d 595, 244 P.2d 1163.

In assignments of error two and three appellant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining respondent doctors' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and in dismissing the action as to them.

We have held that before a physician or surgeon may be held liable for malpractice, he must have done something in the treatment of his patient which the recognized standard of medical practice in his community forbids in such cases, or he must have neglected to do something required by that standard. In order to sustain a judgment against a physician or surgeon, the standard of medical practice in the community must be shown, and, further, that the doctor failed to follow the methods prescribed by that standard. Negligence on the part of the physician or surgeon by reason of his departure from the recognized standard of practice must be established by medical testimony. An exception to this rule is recognized where the negligence is so grossly apparent that a laymen would have no difficulty in recognizing it. Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wash.2d 14, 163 P.2d 148, and cases cited: Derr v. Bonney, supra.

Appellant argues that the instant case falls within the exception to the rule, citing Olson v. Weitz, 37 Wash.2d 70, 221 P.2d 537, and earlier decisions of this court. We do not think that those decisions are applicable because there the negligence involved was so obvious as to require no expert testimony. For example, in the Olson case a doctor had attempted to set a fractured arm. When the cast was removed the arm was so crooked that the partient's friends noticed it.

The complaint charged respondent doctors with negligence in failing to instruct the hospital's employees to install bed rails on appellant's bed while she was a patient there. No testimony was presented as to when or under what circumstances the standard of medical care in the community required the use of bed rails except that Dr. Whitacre testified that during her hours of sleep it would be a good idea to have a bed rail up to 'keep her from rolling out of bed.'

Appellant was not injured while she was asleep, so even viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to her, it had no application to the facts of this case.

As to the manner in which the accident occurred, appellant on cross-examination testified:

'Q. * * * Did you reach out to this stand with your right hand or left hand? A. (indicating right hand)

'Q. Your right hand. And you reached over while you were still lying down in bed? A. No, I tried to sit up and I swayed and I said, 'I don't think I can make it,' and down I went.

'Q. Before you did that, did you try to reach the stand--I will call it, 'the stand'? A. No.

'Q. You then sat up deliberately in bed? A. (Nodding head affirmatively)

'Q. And then did you swing your legs over and hang them over the side of the bed? A. (Nodding head affirmatively)

'Q. Say, 'Yes,' or 'No.' A. Well, she can see me. (Referring to reporter)

'Q. You swung your legs over and sat on the edge of the bed with your legs hanging over? A. Yes.

'Q. As I recall it, you sat there a few seconds before you slid on down? A. Not very long--I slid right off.

'Q. As I recall, you said, 'a few seconds.' A. Well, call it whatever you want to.

'Q. I don't want to argue with you. I've been checking back what you told us in the deposition. At any rate, you sat there and slid down? You didn't roll off, you slid off? You just sat there and slid down? A. Slid and landed on this side. (Pointing)' Appellant, in connection with her claim of negligence on the part of respondent doctors, refers to the fact that she was given two grains of sodium luminal when she was admitted to the hospital at noon on Saturday and similar doses at nine p.m. and two a.m. Dr. Whitacre testified that the purpose was to cause the patient to sleep.

The only other testimony as to the effect of administering this drug was given by Dr. Diefendorf who was the surgeon who operated on appellant's hip after her fall. He stated that normally its effect would last 'from several hours to perhaps six or eight hours' and that it might take a patient a little hazy.

Not only is there no testimony that appellant was affected by this drug at the time of her accident but her own testimony (quoted above) indicates that at that time she was alert and was fully aware of what was taking place. She testified that she did not roll out of the bed but swung her legs over the side and slid off.

We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the challenge of respondent doctors to appellant's evidence.

Next we consider the challenge of respondent nurse and the corporation operating the hospital. For convenience, we shall refer to them as the nurse and the hospital.

The complaint alleged that respondent nurse and the hospital were guilty of several different negligent acts. The only ones appellant relied on at the trial were: (1) that the hospital negligently failed to furnish appellant with a bed equipped with bed rails; (2) that the nurse negligently failed...