Cochran v. State

• Decision Date: 13 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. S91A1505,S91A1505
• Citation: Cochran v. State, 414 S.E.2d 211, 262 Ga. 106 (Ga. 1992)
• Parties: COCHRAN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 211

414 S.E.2d 211

262 Ga. 106

COCHRAN v.The STATE.

No. S91A1505.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 13, 1992.

Reconsideration Denied April 1, 1992.

S. Richard Rubin, Rubin, Winter & Rapoport, Atlanta, for cochran.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Richard E. Hicks, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Robert D. McCullers, Staff Atty., Atlanta, for the State.

WELTNER, Presiding Justice.

Sanders Cochran was convicted of the shooting and killing of Darrell James with a handgun.He was sentenced to life imprisonment.¹ 1.The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Cochran and a co-defendant searched for, found, and assaulted the victim; that Cochran beat the victim with his hands and feet while the co-defendant beat him with a handgun; that the gun discharged twice during the assault; and that one projectile struck the victim in the head, killing him.The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979).

2.The trial court heard evidence on Cochran's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and denied his motion for new trial.Cochran raises this issue on appeal.

(a) As we stated in Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459, 396 S.E.2d 891(1990):

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674)(1984), establishes the benchmarks for determining whether trial counsel's representation of a defendant in a criminal case was so deficient as to result in the denial of the defendant's right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment....In determining whether the defendant has established that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, the court should keep in mind that "counsel's function ... is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case."Id. at 690 ."[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations."Id. at 691 .Moreover, the defendant must "overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' "[cits.][Id.260 Ga. at 461-2, 396 S.E.2d 891.]

The record establishes counsel's failure to prepare adequately for trial.²Counsel admitted these failures to act during testimony at the motion for new trial and attributed them to a lack of time to work on this case.Whatever the reason for counsel's failure to prepare, ³we conclude that Cochran has made the first showing required under Strickland.

(b) The second component of Strickland requires the defendant to show prejudice.The total failure of trial preparation in this case requires a disposition like that in Ross v. Kemp, 260 Ga. 312, 393 S.E.2d 244(1990), where we held that there was

evidence of ineffectiveness "so pervasive that a particularized inquiry into prejudice would be 'unguided speculation.'[Cit.]"House v. Balkcom[725 F2d 608, 620(11th Cir.1984) ][Id.260 Ga. at 315, 393 S.E.2d 244.]

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, J. who dissents, and SEARS-COLLINS, J., not participating.

BENHAM, Justice, dissenting.

Although I agree with the majority that appellant has demonstrated that he received deficient representation at trial, I cannot agree that he has shown such prejudice from that deficiency as to warrant a new trial.For that reason, I must dissent to the reversal of his conviction on that ground.

My review of appellant's numerous allegations of ineffectiveness and of the record at trial leads me to separate the allegations of ineffectiveness into three groups.The first group includes matters as to which the record does not support appellant's contentions and matters about which there was a conflict in the evidence.The former includes, by way of illustration, the assertion that counsel failed to impeach the testimony of the medical examiner that there were no drugs in the victim's body.In fact, the medical examiner testified only that he had not tested the victim's body for drugs.The latter is represented by the assertion that counsel did nothing to prepare appellant for testifying: although appellant testified that counsel told him only to be calm, counsel testified that they discussed appellant's testimony prior to his taking the stand.There being evidence to support a finding that the allegations in this group were not factually correct, we must accept as to these allegations the trial court's finding, implicit in the denial of the motion for new trial on this ground, that there was no ineffectiveness.The second group involves decisions made at trial with regard to voir dire and the admission of evidence.Bearing in mind

that every effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time [cit.] ... [and] that counsel is entitled to a "strong presumption"(which the defendant must overcome) that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct and that all significant decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment [cit.][Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782(1), 325 S.E.2d 362(1985) ].

I conclude that none of the conduct in that second group meets the first step in the analysis adopted in Smith, supra, i.e., "that counsel's performance was deficient."Id.

The third group of allegations is more problematical.These allegations primarily concern counsel's failure to prepare adequately for trial."Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations."Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984).The record establishes clearly that counsel failed to file any motions or to conduct any investigation, both of which failures limited counsel's effectiveness at trial in examining witnesses, and failed to file any written requests for jury charges.Counsel admitted these failures to act during testimony at the motion for new trial and attributed them to a lack of time to work on this case.I conclude, therefore, that appellant was not given the benefit of the duty to investigate mentioned in Strickland, and that trial counsel was ineffective in that regard.

I do not, however, agree with appellant and the majority that Jowers...