Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1937
• Docket Number: 177-1936
• Citation: 189 A. 687,125 Pa.Super. 293
• Parties: Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

189 A. 687

125 Pa.Super. 293

Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Appellant

No. 177-1936

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

January 29, 1937

Argued October 15, 1936

Appeal from judgment of M. C. Phila. Co., April T., 1935, No. 215 in case of Sarah J. Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Assumpsit on insurance policy. Before Crane, J., without a jury.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Finding and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was refusal of judgment n. o. v.

Judgment reversed with a venire.

Owen B Rhoads, with him Dechert, Smith & Clark and Harry Cole Bates, for appellant.

Albert L. Moise, for appellee.

Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker, James and Rhodes, JJ.

OPINION

Rhodes, J.

Plaintiff is the beneficiary named in four policies of insurance issued by the defendant company on the life of her husband. Upon the death of the insured, on February 16, 1935, the defendant paid the plaintiff the face amount of the policies. Plaintiff brought this suit to recover under a rider attached or applicable to each of the policies allowing double indemnity if the insured died under the conditions therein set forth. The case was tried in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County before a judge without a jury. The trial court made a finding in plaintiff's favor, and judgment was entered on the finding. Defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial were dismissed. Defendant appealed.

The accidental death benefit rider, attached to two of the policies upon which suit was brought, and admitted by defendant to be applicable to the other two policies to which they were not attached and upon which suit was likewise brought, provided: "Industrial Policy Accidental Death Benefit. Upon receipt of due proof that the Insured . . . . has sustained . . . . bodily injuries, solely through external, violent and accidental means, resulting, directly and independently of all other causes, in the death of the Insured . . . . the Company will pay in addition to any other sums due under this Policy and subject to the provisions of this Policy an Accidental Death Benefit equal to the face amount of insurance then payable at death . . . .

"No Accidental Death Benefit will be paid if the death of the Insured is the result of self-destruction, whether sane or insane, nor if death is caused or contributed to, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity."

Defendant defended the action on the grounds that the death of the insured was the result of his self-destruction; that, while temporarily deranged, he took his own life by gas; that plaintiff never furnished defendant any information or proofs of accidental death in accordance with the terms and conditions of the policy; and that plaintiff accepted the face amount of the policies in full settlement of all liability of defendant under said policies.

We are of the opinion that judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, because the court below failed to fully recognize that the burden of proof to show that the death of the insured came within the provisions and conditions of the accidental death benefit rider was on the plaintiff. In its opinion the court below stated: "Defendant avers that the death of said insured was the result of self-destruction and that said insured, while temporarily deranged, took his own life by gas. Under such an averment, the burden of proof is placed upon the defendant, who, in the instant case, offered no evidence except the certificate of death attached to the proofs of death . . . . [The record before us shows that this certificate was offered by plaintiff and not by defendant.] The party alleging suicide must prove it, because the mere fact of death in an unknown manner creates no legal presumption of suicide. Preponderating evidence is necessary to establish the latter . . . . The Court having found as a fact that insured's death was not the result of suicide and there being no credible evidence presented to prove contributory disease, plaintiff's claim against defendant became liquidated in the sum of $ 3613.44." Although this case was tried before a judge without a jury, nevertheless that fact-finding body is governed by the same legal principles as are applicable when the case is tried by the court with a jury. Had the trial judge charged a jury that they should proceed in the same manner to determine the issues as he sets forth in his opinion as the method by which he sustained plaintiff's claim, it would have constituted reversible error.

The defense of death by suicide is an affirmative defense, and in this case the burden of such proof would be upon defendant. Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. , 315 Pa. 497, 508, 173 A. 644, 650; Ligouri v. Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle, 318 Pa. 424, 426, 178 A. 398.

Plaintiff nevertheless had the burden to make out a prima facie case notwithstanding the nature of the defense. To do this plaintiff had to do more than merely produce the policy and prove the death of the insured. She had the burden of proving by competent evidence that the insured's death was caused by external, violent, and accidental means, and that it resulted solely from such means, i.e., was not "caused, or contributed to, directly or indirectly or wholly or partially, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity": Lubowicki v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Pa.Super. 596, at page 599, 174 A. 649, at page 650.

The trial judge should have based his finding for plaintiff on the proofs produced by plaintiff, and not on the failure of defendant to sustain its affirmative defense of suicide.

Where, as here, plaintiff alleges that the insured came to his death solely through external, violent, and accidental means, and the defense is suicide, "the burden to prove all the operative facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence rests upon the plaintiff," and "the necessary proof-element of accidental death is not supplied, prima facie, by the so-called 'presumption against suicide'": Marlowe v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 320 Pa. 385, at page 388, 181 A. 592, at page 593.

Defendant contends that it was a condition precedent to plaintiff's right to recover for double indemnity that she first comply with the provisions of the policies requiring her to furnish to defendant due proofs that death of the insured resulted from external, violent, and accidental means.

Defendant cannot take advantage of the plaintiff's failure to file what it may call "due proof," if such failure was caused by, or was the result of, the action of defendant. Upon plaintiff's demand for double indemnity, after having filed proofs of death, a waiver of additional proofs may be inferred if defendant denied liability on other grounds than failure to file such proofs. In this case the proofs of death which were...