Cockerham v. Willis
| Decision Date | 27 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | EP-15-CV-382-PRM |
| Parties | JOHN LEE COCKERHAM, JR., Reg. No. 97305-180, Petitioner, v. J.S. WILLIS, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this day, the Court considered pro se Petitioner John Lee Cockerham, Jr.'s "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241" (ECF No. 1-2)1 [hereinafter "Current Petition"], filed on December 14, 2015, in the above-captioned cause. Petitioner, an inmate confined at the La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution in Anthony, Texas,2 challenges Respondent J.S. Willis's custody over him based onhis guilty-plea convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States, bribery as a public official, and conspiracy to commit money laundering.3 Petitioner argues that the trial court "lacked the subject matter jurisdiction and power to hear the case brought against" him.4 After reviewing the record, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss Petitioner's cause, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, because it appears from his pleading that he is not entitled to relief.5
From June 2004 through December 2005, the Department of Defense ("DOD") deployed Petitioner, then a Major in the United States Army, to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, where he served as a contracting officerin support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.6 While deployed, Petitioner solicited bids and awarded DOD contracts for goods and services necessary to support military operations in Southwest Asia.7 Petitioner's wife, Melissa Cockerham, and sister, Caralyn Blake, were also "employed as a government contractor[s]" in Kuwait, Dubai, and Iraq.8
While in Kuwait, Petitioner agreed to accept approximately $ 9.6 million in bribes from numerous contractors in return for using his official position as a contracting officer to award DOD contracts to them.9 Petitioner thereafter deposited the bribe proceeds in safe deposit boxes and bank accounts in Kuwait and Dubai in the names of Melissa Cockerham and Caralyn Blake.10
On August 22, 2007, a federal grand jury sitting in the WesternDistrict of Texas, San Antonio Division, returned a six-count indictment against Petitioner, Melissa Cockerham, and Caralyn Blake.11 Petitioner pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to three counts: conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 ("Count One"); bribery by corruptly agreeing to receive things of value in return for being influenced in the performance of his official acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) and (C) ("Count Four"); and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) ("Count Five").12 The Court accepted Petitioner's pleas and sentenced him to 60 months' imprisonment on Count One, 180 months' imprisonment on Count Four, and 210 months' imprisonment on Count Five, to run concurrently.13 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions, and, on May 2, 2011, the Supreme Court deniedhis petition for a writ of certiorari.14
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence dated July 19, 2012. In his § 2255 motion, Petitioner asserted, among other grounds for relief, that he was actually innocent with regard to the money laundering conspiracy.15 Nevertheless, the Court denied Petitioner's § 2255 motion as time barred,16 and the Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability.17
Petitioner then filed a second motion seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 7, 2013.18 Relying on the SupremeCourt's opinion in United States v. Santos19 — which held the federal money-laundering statute applied only to transactions involving criminal profits, not criminal receipts20 — Petitioner maintained that he was actually innocent of the money laundering conspiracy because "it was never found that [he] had profited from any of the alleged unlawful activity."21 The Court dismissed the second motion, however, for want of jurisdiction after finding that Petitioner could have raised the issue in his initial § 2255 motion.22 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Court's decision.23
Petitioner then filed an original writ of habeas corpus in the United States Supreme Court on June 9, 2015.24 In his single issue, Petitioner asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him as a major inthe United States Army:
Whether the judgment entered against a Major in the Army and member of [the] Armed Forces, for admitted conduct occurring in foreign countries and during war, was entered without subject matter jurisdiction and in violation of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, as well as both Article I and Article III of the Constitution.25
The Supreme Court denied the petition on October 19, 2015.26 The Current Petition followed on December 14, 2015.
In his Current Petition, Petitioner challenges the trial court's constitutional and statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction over him as a member of the Armed Forces subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"):
The Judgment dated 18 December, 2009, was entered without Article III, §§ 1 and 2 Judicial Power and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the conduct of an Article I Military Officer, occurring during a time of and theater of War in Iraq and Kuwaite [sic], and where Petitioner's only two co-defendants were at all times subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice as was Petitioner.27
Petitioner argues that in 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d), Congress withheld jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ from Article III courts unless the "'indictment charges that member committed the offense with one or more other defendants, at least one of whom is not subject to'" the UCMJ.28
29 Federal courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to grant writs of habeas corpus. However, "[h]abeas corpus relief is extraordinary and 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that . . . if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'"30 To prevail, ahabeas corpus petitioner must show that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."31 Furthermore, a § 2241 petition is subject to summary dismissal if it appears from the face of the pleading that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.32
Generally, "[a] section 2241 petition on behalf of a sentenced prisoner attacks the manner in which a sentence is carried out or the prison authorities' determination of its duration."33 In the instant case, however, Petitioner challenges his underlying convictions. The primary means of collaterally attacking a federal conviction is generally a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.34
There is, however, a "savings clause" in § 2255 which acts as alimited exception to the general rule outlined above.35 Pursuant to this savings clause, a federal court may consider a § 2241 petition that challenges a federally imposed sentence when the petitioner establishes that the remedy under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective."36 In order to meet this "inadequate or ineffective" requirement, the claim must be "based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense," and the claim must have been "foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner's trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion."37
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to Petitioner's claim.
In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner seeks relief from his conviction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, an Article III court, for conspiracy to defraud the United States, bribery, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. He claims that "at all times [he] was a member of the armed forces and subject to the [UCMJ]."38 He argues that his custody violates 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d)(2), which he maintains limits the jurisdiction of an Article III court over a member of the Armed Forces.
As discussed above, a petitioner may proceed with an attack on the validity of a conviction and sentence in a § 2241petition only if he can meet the requirements of the "savings clause" in § 2255(e).39 In this case, Petitioner does not: (1) base his claim on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision; (2) contend that he was convicted of a nonexistent offense; and (3) argue that circuit law precluded him fromasserting his claim at the time of his trial, appeal, or § 2255 motion.40 Thus, Petitioner does not meet the requirements of the "savings clause."
Moreover, even if Petitioner meets the requirements of the "savings clause," the Court will deny him relief for three reasons. First, district courts share concurrent jurisdiction with military courts. Second, the indictment did not charge Petitioner with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d)(2). Finally, Petitioner pleaded guilty to three offenses—conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) and (C); and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)—all of which have extraterritorial reach.
It is well settled that "federal district courts share concurrent jurisdiction with military courts over 'all offenses against the laws of theUnited States' committed by...
To continue reading
Request your trial