Cockrell v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 08 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 53A01-0107-CV-275.,53A01-0107-CV-275.
• Citation: 764 N.E.2d 289
• Parties: William F.F. COCKRELL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Dorothy HAWKINS, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

764 N.E.2d 289

William F.F. COCKRELL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Dorothy HAWKINS, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 53A01-0107-CV-275.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 8, 2002.

Daniel M. Mills, Bloomington, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Edward F. McCrea, Aaron E. McCrea, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Judge.

William F.F. Cockrell appeals the trial court's judgment denying his request for an easement of necessity over the land of Dorothy Hawkins. Cockrell raises a number of issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's denial of Cockrell's request for an easement of necessity was contrary to law. We affirm.

The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. On February 15, 1996, Cockrell purchased thirteen and one-third acres of real estate in Polk Township, Monroe County, Indiana. Cockrell purchased the land from thirty-four individuals who had acquired the real estate through intestate succession. When Cockrell purchased the real estate, he knew that no maintained access road connected the real estate to either Chapel Hill Road or Knob Creek Road, which are the two closest maintained public thoroughfares.

On November 12, 1999, Cockrell filed a complaint against Hawkins and Terry Smith in which Cockrell claimed that he had a right to an easement of necessity across Hawkins's and Smith's lands to enable him to reach Chapel Hill Road. Smith did not contest Cockrell's complaint for an easement, as long as Smith had some control over where the easement would be located. However, Hawkins opposed Cockrell's claim. A bench trial was held.

On June 28, 2001, the trial court denied Cockrell's request for an easement of necessity across Hawkins's land. The trial court's order contained, in pertinent part, the following findings of fact:

The land pertinent to the issues raised consists today of 5 different parcels. Parcels 4 and 5 are owned by [Hawkins], share a common east-west boundary, and are bordered to the north by Chapel Hill Road. Immediately to the south of tract 4 lies tract 8 which is also owned by [Hawkins]. Immediately to the south of tract 8 lies tract 9 which is owned by... Smith. Finally, tract 10 lies immediately to the south of tract 9. Tract 10 is now owned by [Cockrell] and is the proposed dominant estate.

The title of land is a crucial issue in the case at bar. [Cockrell] contends that there was a unity of title between the pertinent parcels at the time of conveyance to him, thus resulting in an implied way of necessity across [Hawkins's] land for ingress and egress to his own.

It is not necessary to recite the entire history of title to each of the parcels. Tracts 4 and 5 have apparently always been joined and have never been severed from one another. Tracts 8, 9, and 10 originally composed one parcel of land, but were subsequently severed, beginning in 1939.

Suffice it to say, [Hawkins] is now, and at all times pertinent was, the owner in fee simple of tracts 4, 5, and 8. Furthermore, title to a 1/120th interest in tract 10 devolved to her through intestate succession. The record of her titled interest in tract 10 is demonstrated only by a "small estate affidavit" which recited the interest to which she succeeded. On the date of the conveyance of tract 10 to [Cockrell], [Hawkins] simultaneously held the referenced interests in those four tracts.

[Hawkins] has never had any ownership interest in tract 9, which at all times pertinent to this case has been owned by [Smith], and the record discloses no unity of title to tracts 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10 at any point in time.

Until at least 1963, County Road 139 provided ingress and egress to and from tract 10 to Chapel Hill Road. The parties agree that there is no evidence that County Road 139 has ever been formally abandoned or vacated by Monroe County.

Appellant's Appendix at 7-8. The trial court concluded that Cockrell's claim to an easement of necessity failed because "there was never any unity of ownership of tracts 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, with tract 10 being subsequently severed, leaving it landlocked and giving rise to the implied intent of the original grantor to grant ingress and egress over the retained remainder" and because Cockrell "has other alternative means of ingress and egress and cannot demonstrate the necessity of imposing an involuntary easement across the lands of [Hawkins]." Appellant's Appendix at 10, 12.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court's denial of Cockrell's request for an easement of necessity was contrary to law. Because Cockrell had the burden of proving his right to an easement of necessity, he is appealing a negative judgment. See McConnell v. Satterfield, 576 N.E.2d 1300, 1301 (Ind.Ct. App.1991). Consequently, on appeal, Cockrell must demonstrate that the trial court's judgment is contrary to law. Id. A judgment is contrary to law "if the evidence is without conflict and leads to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court." Id. at 1302. When determining whether a judgment is contrary to law, we may only consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and we may neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

In addition, because the trial court entered findings and conclusions, we review the findings and conclusions to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Hvidston v. Eastridge, 591 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any facts, or reasonable inferences therefrom, to support them. Id. Because the trial court entered the findings upon a party's request, we may affirm the trial court's judgment only if it is supported by the special findings. Id.

Here, our review of the Record leaves us firmly convinced that the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Each of the facts is supported by testimony or exhibits admitted into evidence at trial. Cockrell does not specifically claim that any of these findings are erroneous. Therefore, we turn to the trial court's conclusions.

An easement of necessity will be implied when "there has been a severance of the unity of ownership of a tract of land in such a way as to leave one part without access to a public road." Whitt v. Ferris, 596 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). An easement of necessity may arise, if ever, only at the time that the parcel is divided and only because of inaccessibility then existing. Ind. v. Innkeepers of New Castle, Inc., 271 Ind. 286, 392 N.E.2d 459, 464 (1979). To demonstrate that an easement of necessity should be implied, a plaintiff must establish both unity of title at the time that tracts of land were severed from one another and the necessity of the easement.

For example, if a landowner conveys a piece of real estate that is completely surrounded by the landowner's remaining property, then we imply that the conveyance includes an easement across the landowner's remaining property. Larabee v. Booth, 463 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Ind.Ct. App.1984). In addition, if a conveyed piece of property has no outlet to a public road except by going across the grantor's remaining land or across the land of a stranger, the law implies a way of necessity over the grantor's remaining land, Whitt, 596 N.E.2d at 233, because an easement of "necessity cannot arise against the lands of a stranger." Moore v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 229 Ind. 309, 315, 95 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1950) (citing State ex rel. McNutt v. Orcutt, 211 Ind. 523, 199 N.E. 595 (1936), reh'g denied, 211 Ind. 523, 7 N.E.2d 779).

To demonstrate that the easement is "of necessity," a plaintiff must demonstrate more than that the easement would be beneficial or convenient. McConnell, 576 N.E.2d at 1302. If the plaintiff has another means of accessing his land, he may not claim a right to pass over the land of another. Id. This rule controls even if the alternate means of access would be more difficult or expensive for the plaintiff. Id.; see also Reed v. Luzny, 627 N.E.2d 1362, 1365 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Cockrell admits that an easement of necessity could not have arisen when tract ten came into existence. Originally, tracts eight, nine, and ten were part of a farm owned by Nolan Deckard. In 1939, when Deckard divided his farm into three tracts, Road 139 connected tract ten to both Chapel Hill Road and Knob Creek Road. Because tract ten had access to a public road when tract ten was created, an easement across someone else's property would not have been necessary. See McConnell, 576 N.E.2d at 1302. Therefore, no way of necessity arose when Deckard divided his farm into tracts eight, nine, and ten. See Innkeepers of New Castle, 392 N.E.2d at 464.

Nevertheless, Cockrell argues that a way of necessity...