Cockrell v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority, Cause No. 2:95CV016-B-B (N.D. Miss. 1/__/1996)
| Decision Date | 01 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. 2:95CV016-B-B. |
| Parties | WILLIAM J. COCKRELL, BILLY H. COCKRELL, AND CAROLYN V. COCKRELL, PLAINTIFFS, v. MEMPHIS-SHELBY COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, PRESIDENT LARRY COX, BOARD MEMBERS, ET AL., CITY OF SOUTHAVEN, MISSISSIPPI, MAYOR JOE CATES, BOARD OF ALDERMAN, ET AL., DESOTO COUNTY SPECIAL COURT OF EMINENT DOMAIN, MISSISSIPPI, ET AL., JOE WEBSTER, ET AL., D.B. BRIDGEFORTH, ET AL., TAYLOR BUNTIN, ET AL., JUDY KITCHENS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This cause is presently before the court on the motion of the individual defendants Joe Cates, Tony Holmes, Lorene Cady, James Stark, Bob Sewell, Travis Moore, Rickey Jobes and Bill Utroska ("defendants") for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims against them in their individual capacities. The defendants represent the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Southaven, Mississippi ("City") respectively. Upon due consideration of the defendants' motion, the plaintiffs' response thereto, and the memoranda submitted by the parties, the court is prepared to rule.
The plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for an alleged violation of the plaintiffs' civil rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 ("URA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq., seeking damages against the defendants in excess of Two Hundred Million ($200,000,000.00) dollars. The complaint seeks redress from a city condemnation of the plaintiffs' home in Desoto County, Mississippi, which is now dedicated for use as part of a public park.
The defendants seek summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is available to government officials performing discretionary functions and serves to shield them from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." White v. Taylor, 959 F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1992); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violates the right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). If reasonable officials could differ as to the legality or validity of a particular action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. White, 959 F.2d at 544. However, before the court reaches the immunity evaluation, as the defendants correctly point out, it must determine whether the plaintiffs have asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all. Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 886 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 169 (1995); White, 959 F.2d at 545 n.4. Thus, the court examines the foundation for the plaintiffs' alleged constitutional transgressions.1
The plaintiffs' allegations, as they relate to the moving defendants, can be condensed and summarized as follows: (1) that the City is not a properly created municipality because of a defective charter and, therefore, the City did not have the power to institute eminent domain proceedings; (2) that the defendants conspired with officials from the Memphis-Shelby County Airport to violate the URA by providing funds to the City for the eminent domain proceedings against the plaintiffs; (3) that the eminent domain proceedings were instituted in the wrong court; (4) that the defendants violated their First Amendment right when the City condemned their property but left untouched a nearby church.
The plaintiffs' first claim involves the capacity of the City to exercise the power of eminent domain. Essentially, the plaintiffs complain that the City is not properly chartered, or that it acted outside the authority granted under its charter.2 Assuming, arguendo, that there were a technical deficiency of some type in the charter, that would not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has recognized the City of Southaven as a municipality on numerous occasions. See e.g. City of Southaven v. City of Horn Lake, 630 So. 2d 10 (Miss. 1993). Any technical defect in the charter would only implicate a violation of state law.3
The plaintiffs also argue a cause of action arises from the alleged violation of the URA. However, the URA affords no rights such to create a legal cause of action. Indeed, the act expressly does not affect the validity of any proceedings under the power of eminent domain:
(a) The provisions of section 4651 of this title create no rights of liabilities and shall not affect the validity of any property acquisitions by purchase or condemnation.
42 U.S.C. § 4602.
The purpose of the URA was to set policy guidelines to be followed in acquisition of real property, and not to create rights in favor of property owners enforceable in district court. United States v. 131.68 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 872, 876 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 822 n.134 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. Henderson, 881 F.2d 990, 993 (11th Cir. 1989) (); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Faber Enterprises, Inc., 931 F.2d 438, 443 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).
The plaintiffs claim that the City's eminent domain proceeding was filed in the improper state court is also without merit. They allege that since the subject property is owned by an eight-year-old that only the chancery court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Mississippi Constitution § 159(d), providing the chancery court with jurisdiction over "minor's business." The plaintiffs, however, proceed under the mistaken presumption that any and all actions involving a minor must be brought in chancery court. That is simply not the case. See McLean v. Green, 352 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Miss. 1977) (); see also Mississippi State Hwy. Comm'n v. Ratcliffe, 251 Miss. 785, 171 So. 2d 356 (1965) ().4
The plaintiffs' final allegation deals with the City's condemnation of their home while not condemning a nearby church. This, they allege, somehow violates their First Amendment right of freedom of religion. First, the plaintiffs have not shown, beyond mere allegations, that the church property was within the acquisition zone. Second, even if it were, they have not shown why the City was required to condemn that property also. The plaintiffs have not cited, nor is the court aware of, an all-or-nothing type requirement in eminent domain proceedings. Third, the plaintiffs' reply fails to show facts which would substantiate that they were the victims of class-based discrimination because of their religion, that their practice of religion was interfered with by the defendants, or that they were singled out and treated differently because of their religion.
Lastly, the plaintiffs' claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) also fails to state a claim against these defendants. As explained above, the plaintiffs have not alleged a valid independent...
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