Cockrell v. Pruitt
| Decision Date | 30 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1140849. |
| Citation | 214 So.3d 324 |
| Parties | Bobby COCKRELL, Jr., and Cockrell & Cockrell v. Juakeishia Vonshai PRUITT. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
William J. Donald and William J. Donald III of Donald, Randall & Donald, Tuscaloosa, for appellants.
C. Delaine Mountain and Clint Mountain, Jr., of Mountain & Mountain, Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
Two of the defendants below—Bobby Cockrell, Jr., and Cockrell & Cockrell ("the Cockrell law firm") (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Cockrell defendants")—filed for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., from the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court's partial denial of their motion for a summary judgment as to legal-malpractice claims the plaintiff below, Juakeishia Vonshai Pruitt,1 filed against them. We affirm the trial court's order denying the Cockrell defendants' motion for a summary judgment as to malpractice claims alleging that the Cockrell defendants were vicariously liable for fraudulent misrepresentations made to Pruitt by an associate at the Cockrell law firm intended to conceal the existence of underlying legal-malpractice claims.
The legal-malpractice claims in this case arose from Byron House's representation of Pruitt from late 2000 until January 2012. House worked as an associate with the Cockrell law firm from September 1995 until January 2012. This case involves House's handling of Pruitt's claims with regard to four separate causes of action—Pruitt's discrimination and breach-of-contract claims against Stillman College; Pruitt's sexual-discrimination claims against her employer Averitt/i3; Pruitt's claims against Gwendolyn Oyler arising from an automobile accident; and Pruitt's breach-of-contract claims against A+ Photography.
In late 2000, Pruitt, then an employee of Stillman College, consulted House regarding employment issues she was having as a result of her pregnancy. In December 2000, House wrote a letter to Pruitt's supervisor regarding Stillman College's treatment of Pruitt. Pruitt's son was born on March 7, 2001, but Pruitt alleged that she continued to have issues with Stillman College regarding her employment after he was born. Pruitt stated that, in September 2001, she resigned her employment with Stillman College based on House's advice. Pruitt stated that, after she resigned, House told her he was going to file a complaint against Stillman College alleging discrimination and breach of contract. Pruitt testified that it was her understanding that her action against Stillman College remained pending until the summer or early fall of 2006 and that, at that time, House told her that he had settled the case. Pruitt executed a document titled "General Release" that purported to set forth the details of the settlement. The release provided for a structured settlement of $212,500. The settlement indicated that $212,500 would be invested in an annuity; that Pruitt would receive an initial lump-sum payment of $25,000; that Pruitt would receive 59 monthly payments of $3,541.66; that the total disbursement would be $233,957.94; and that the initial payment would be payable on November 1, 2006. She also executed paperwork allegedly regarding an annuity. Pruitt stated that House told her that Stillman College was taking care of his attorney fees. She also stated that she started receiving payments shortly after she executed the settlement agreement and that she received the checks directly from House and the Cockrell law firm. The checks were written on the Cockrell law firm's trust account. Pruitt initially received monthly installments of $3,541.66. However, she stated that, in early 2009, House told her that the company handling the annuity had failed financially and that she could either reduce her monthly payments by roughly one-half or take a very small lump sum; that she told House that she would take the reduced payments; that, in April 2009, she started receiving monthly payments of $1,980; and that she received payments of $1,980 until January 2012. Additionally, House wrote a letter dated August 21, 2007, to a representative of First Federal Bank, apparently at Pruitt's request. In that letter, House stated, in pertinent part, that, as the result of a settlement reached in 2006, Pruitt had received a lump sum of $25,000; that Pruitt was to receive "sixty (60) monthly payments in the amount of $3,541.66"; that, at the time of the letter, she had received "five (5) of the sixty (60) payments"; and that "[t]he payment of these funds is subject to all judicial sanction." House sent a similar letter dated March 3, 2011, to Audria Collins of Wells Fargo Bank, again at Pruitt's request. In that letter, House stated that Pruitt was the beneficiary of a structured settlement that provided for monthly payments of $1,980 for 72 consecutive months starting on April 6, 2009. He also asserted that "[s]aid payments are made by a representative of the settling party via this office."
However, the undisputed evidence established that House never actually filed an action against Stillman College on Pruitt's behalf.
Pruitt's Claims Against Averitt/i3
In April 2006, Pruitt started working for Team One, which provided employees for i3 at the Averitt facility in Tuscaloosa. Pruitt asserted that, while working for Averitt/i3, she was sexually harassed by one of her supervisors; that she reported the problems to the company; that she was forced to change assignments after reporting the harassment; that she was unable to perform the duties that were given to her at that time; and that she was ultimately forced to resign. Pruitt initially consulted a different attorney, Benjamin Woolf, regarding her sexual-discrimination claims against Averitt/i3, and Woolf sent a demand for settlement of Pruitt's claim to "Ai3 Logistics" dated January 5, 2007. Subsequently, Woolf filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC"). On October 4, 2007, the EEOC sent a notice of right to sue to Pruitt and Woolf. The notice provided:
"Your lawsuit under Title VII ... must be filed in federal or state court WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this Notice or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost."
Pruitt stated that, within a couple of weeks after she received that notice, she went to see House about her action against Averitt/i3 and that, ultimately, she, House, and Woolf decided that House would handle her sexual-discrimination case against Averitt/i3. Pruitt testified that House subsequently told her that he had filed an action against Averitt/i3 and that the case was proceeding. She also testified that she made several inquiries about the status of that case and that House reassured her that the case was progressing in anticipation of trial. At one point, House gave her a list of potential jurors to review in anticipation of a trial he said was scheduled for late 2011. Throughout the process, House informed her that, in addition to preparing for trial, he was also discussing settlement with the Averitt/i3 defendants. Pruitt stated that, in October 2011, she and House agreed that they would negotiate to settle the Averitt/i3 case for 1.65 million dollars; that House reiterated the conversation with her in December 2011; and that House told her that the case was going to be settled for that amount but that he was ironing out some details about when the amount would be paid. However, the undisputed evidence established that House never filed an action against Averitt/i3.
In February 2008, Pruitt was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped in the drive-thru line of a restaurant when it was struck from behind by a vehicle being driven by Gwendolyn Oyler. Pruitt alleged that Oyler was intoxicated at the time of the accident. She also alleged that her neck and back were injured as a result of the accident and that she received medical treatment for her injuries. Shortly after the accident, Pruitt hired House to pursue claims resulting from the accident. House wrote a letter to Oyler dated March 12, 2008, regarding the accident.
In February 2010, House told Pruitt that he had settled her case against Oyler; that she would receive $5,000; and that her medical expenses would be paid. Pruitt received a $5,000 check from the Cockrell law firm in February 2010. Her medical expenses, however, were never paid. Pruitt testified that she did not learn until January 2012 that her medical expenses had not been paid and that, until that time, House had assured her that he had taken care of payment of all of her medical expenses associated with the accident. Again, the undisputed evidence established that House never filed an action against Oyler regarding the February 2008 accident.
On November 26, 2007, Pruitt entered into an agreement for A+ Photography to provide photography services for her January 19, 2008, wedding. Pruitt alleged that, pursuant to the contract, A+ Photography agreed to provide her with photographs from her wedding and pre-wedding activities. Pruitt testified that the cost of services was $800; that she paid that amount in full; and that A+ Photography did not provide her with all the photographs as agreed. She also stated that in 2009 House agreed to represent her in a breach-of-contract action against A+ Photography.
In 2011, House told Pruitt that a judgment in the amount of $5,000 had been entered against A+ Photography on her behalf; that they should settle the case for $1,500 to satisfy the judgment; and that on June 9, 2011, she received $1,500 from the Cockrell law firm's trust account. She also stated that House told her that, as part of the settlement, she would receive the photographs she had contracted for; however, she never received any of the photographs she understood to be part of the settlement, and each time she inquired about the photographs on several occasions...
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