Coddington v. State
Decision Date | 16 August 2006 |
Docket Number | No. D-2003-887.,D-2003-887. |
Citation | 2006 OK CR 34,142 P.3d 437 |
Parties | James Allen CODDINGTON, Appellant v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Fern Smith, Christy Reid, Asst. District Attorneys, Oklahoma City, OK, attorneys for the State at trial.
Tamra Spradlin, Tim Wilson, Asst. Public Defenders, Okla. Co. Public Defender's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, attorneys for the defendant at trial.
Andrea Digilio Miller, Emma Victoria Rolls, Asst. Public Defenders, Okla. Co. Public Defender's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, attorneys for appellant on appeal.
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Seth S. Branham, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, attorneys for State on appeal.
¶ 1 Appellant, James Allen Coddington, was convicted by a jury in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF 97-1500, of First Degree Murder, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.1996, § 701.7(A) (Count 1) and of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 21 O.S.1991, § 801 (Count 2). Jury trial was held before the Honorable Jerry D. Bass, District Judge, on April 21st — May 1st, 2003. On Count 1, the jury found the existence of two aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence,1 and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.2 The jury set punishment at death on Count 1 and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on Count 2. Judgment and Sentence was imposed in accordance with the jury's verdicts.
¶ 2 Coddington gave timely notice of his intent to appeal the convictions and sentences. The record on appeal was completed September 3, 2004. Coddington filed his Brief of Appellant on November 8, 2004, and the State filed the Brief of Appellee on March 8, 2005. Coddington filed a Reply Brief on March 28, 2005. This matter was originally set for oral argument on October 18, 2005. At Coddington's request, oral argument was rescheduled and was subsequently held on November 8, 2005. The parties each filed supplemental authorities on November 18, 2005.
¶ 3 In early March of 1997, Appellant, a cocaine addict, suffered a relapse and began using cocaine again. He estimated he spent one thousand dollars ($1000.00) a day to support his habit. Within a short time, he was desperate for money and robbed a convenience store on March 5, 1997 to feed his habit. The robbery did not yield enough money, so Coddington went to his friend Al Hale's home to borrow fifty dollars ($50.00).
¶ 4 Hale, then 73 years old, worked with Coddington at a Honda Salvage yard. Hale had previously loaned Coddington money and had also contributed towards Coddington's previous drug treatment. Hale's friends and family knew he kept a large amount of cash at his home. On March 5, 1997, he had over twenty-four thousand dollars ($24,000.00) stashed in his closet.
¶ 5 Coddington went to Hale's home on the afternoon of March 5, 1997 to borrow money, because he had been on a cocaine binge for several days and needed money for more cocaine. Coddington watched television with Hale for an hour or two and then smoked crack cocaine in Hale's bathroom. Hale knew Coddington was using cocaine again. Hale refused to give him money and told him to leave. As he was leaving, Coddington saw a claw hammer in Hale's kitchen, grabbed it, turned around and hit Hale at least three times with the hammer. Coddington believed Hale was dead, so he took five hundred twenty-five dollars ($525.00) from his pocket and left. Following the attack on Hale, Coddington robbed five more convenience stores to get money for cocaine.
¶ 6 Oklahoma City police detectives arrested Coddington on March 7, 1997, outside of his apartment in south Oklahoma City. Coddington told one officer he had been on a cocaine binge. On the way to the police department, Coddington tried to choke himself by wrapping the seat belt around his neck. He also stated he wanted to die. At the police station, during an interview with a robbery detective and a homicide detective, Coddington confessed to the convenience store robberies and also to the murder of Mr. Hale. He admitted he struck Mr. Hale in the head with a claw hammer and believed Hale was dead when he left. At trial, Coddington admitted he murdered Hale. He testified he did not go to Hale's house with the intent to do anything except borrow money to buy more cocaine. He said he did not have a weapon with him, did not intend to rob Hale, and did not intend to kill him.
¶ 7 Ron Hale, the victim's son, discovered Hale after the attack on the evening of March 5, 1997. There was blood and blood spatter everywhere. Hale was lying in his bed, soaked in blood, still breathing but unable to speak. Hale was transported first to Midwest City Hospital and then to Presbyterian Hospital. He died approximately twenty-four hours later. An autopsy showed Hale died from blunt force head trauma. The medical examiner testified he sustained at least three separate blows to the left side of his head, consistent with being hit in the head with a claw hammer. He also testified Hale had defensive wounds.
¶ 8 Coddington admitted that he did not call the police when he left Hale's house because he did not want to get caught. He also admitted he had prior felony convictions.
¶ 9 Other relevant facts will be discussed under the related propositions of error.
¶ 10 In Proposition Two, Coddington contends he was denied an impartial jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the community when the State exercised five peremptory challenges against minority jurors in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights and in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The State exercised peremptory challenges to exclude four of six African-American jurors from the jury panel of thirty. Coddington claims the State also exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a woman of "Spanish heritage."
¶ 11 A defendant may raise an equal protection challenge to the use of peremptory challenges by showing that the prosecutor used the challenges for the purpose of excluding members of the defendant's own race from the jury panel. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)(extending Batson to include race-based exclusions even when the defendant and the potential juror are not of the same race). Under Batson, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Then, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation related to the case for striking the juror in question. The trial court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful determination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The race-neutral reason given by the prosecutor need not rise to the level of justifying excusal for cause, but it must be a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his or her "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges. Id., 476 U.S. at 98, n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, n. 20; see also Neill v. State, 1994 OK CR 69, ¶ 17, 896 P.2d 537, 546, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1080, 116 S.Ct. 791, 133 L.Ed.2d 740 (1996); Short v. State, 1999 OK CR 15, ¶ 12, 980 P.2d 1081, 1091, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d 683 (2000). The trial court's findings are entitled to great deference, and we review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, n. 21; Neill, id.; Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, ¶ 9, 4 P.3d 702, 710-711, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1099, 121 S.Ct. 832, 148 L.Ed.2d 714 (2001).
¶ 12 Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges against African-American jurors, and in response, the State articulated the following reasons for excusing those jurors: the State excused Juror Christian because he had been prosecuted by the Oklahoma County District Attorney's office for embezzlement and had a brother in prison; the prosecutor excused Juror Mann because the prosecutor believed he could not impose the death penalty and did not believe he truly had a change of heart after taking a walk; the prosecutor excused Juror Graham, because she had previously been prosecuted for embezzlement; the prosecutor excused Juror Mensah, because she had previously been prosecuted for fraud, because her brother was being prosecuted for larceny, and because she acted totally disinterested in what was going on during voir dire. Defense counsel did not object to the State's excusal of Juror Equigua, but now asks this Court to consider her removal in its consideration of the State's "pattern" of excusing minority jurors.3 Defense counsel argued that excusing African-American jurors based upon prior contact with the criminal justice system had a disparate impact on the jury because a higher percentage of that minority population have had contacts with the criminal justice system and there are fewer "non-disenfranchised" African-Americans available for jury service.
¶ 13 The trial court did not specifically rule on the "race-neutral" reasons offered by the State and did not specifically overrule defense counsel's objection to the disparate impact the State's exercise of peremptories had on the jury. However, voir dire continued, the alternate jurors were selected, and the record reflects the trial court accepted the prosecutor's stated reasons for removing these minority jurors and did not believe the reasons were pretexts for purposeful discrimination.
¶ 14 The reasons offered by the State for excusing Jurors Christian, Mann, Graham, and Mensah were facially valid and do not...
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