Coe v. Bell

• Citation: 89 F.Supp.2d 922
• Decision Date: 29 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 3:00-0239.,3:00-0239.
• Parties: Robert Glen COE, Petitioner, v. Ricky BELL, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

Page 922

89 F.Supp.2d 922

Robert Glen COE, Petitioner, v. Ricky BELL, Warden, Respondent.

No. 3:00-0239.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

March 29, 2000.

Henry Alan Martin, Paul R. Bottei, Federal Public Defender's Office, Nashville, TN, James Holt Walker, Nashville, TN, for Robert Glen Coe, petitioner.

Glenn Richard Pruden, Office of the Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for Ricky Bell, Warden at RMSI, respondent.

MEMORANDUM

TRAUGER, District Judge.

For the reasons set out in the accompanying Memorandum, Robert Glen Coe's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED in all respects. The stay of execution issued by this court on March 22, 2000 is hereby lifted.

Before the court is Robert Glen Coe's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 1), to which Respondent has filed an Answer (Docket No. 9) and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Docket No. 30).

STATEMENT OF FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The present petition is limited to the issue of Coe's competency to be executed. Accordingly, the court confines itself to this issue in recounting the relevant facts and history of the case.¹

After the United States Supreme Court declined to review Coe's last habeas corpus case,² the State of Tennessee filed a motion in the Tennessee Supreme Court requesting that a date be set for his execution. On December 15, 1999, the Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order setting Coe's execution for March 23, 2000 and stating that any claim of incompetency to be executed was now ripe. Coe made such a claim and the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Shelby County Criminal Court, where Coe was originally tried and convicted, ordering that the competency issue be determined under the procedures and standards set out in Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W .3d 257 (Tenn.1999).

Coe filed a petition supported by a psychiatrist's affidavit in the Shelby County Criminal Court, asserting that he is incompetent to be executed. On January 3, 2000, Judge John P. Colton, Jr. found that Coe had satisfied the threshold showing required by Van Tran and that his competency to be executed was genuinely in issue. An evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Colton from January 24 to January 28, 2000. On February 2, 2000, Judge Colton issued a 28-page opinion,³ finding that Coe was "presently mentally competent to be executed" under the Van Tran standard — he has the mental capacity to understand the fact of the impending execution and the reason for it.

Coe then appealed Judge Colton's order to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After a de novo review of all claims, on March 6, 2000, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the decision of the trial court that Coe is presently competent to be executed. See Coe v. State, 2000 WL 246425, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. Mar.6, 2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1460, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2000). The court also reaffirmed that the procedures established in Van Tran provide at least the due process to which the petitioner is entitled under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), and that those procedures were followed in his hearing before Judge Colton.

On March 16, 2000, Coe filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court. On March 17, 2000, Respondent Ricky Bell filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 9). On March 18, 2000, this court transferred this case to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for a determination of whether this court had jurisdiction to review the petition. On March 21, 2000, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this court did have jurisdiction. On March 22, 2000, this court issued a stay of the March 23, 2000 execution pending this court's review of Coe's claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In holding that this court did have jurisdiction to rule on the present petition, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not explicitly state the proper jurisdictional basis for this court's review.

Although Petitioner asserts that this court has jurisdiction over the present petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court finds that jurisdiction over this petition is proper only under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In directing this court to review Petitioner's Ford claim on the merits, the Sixth Circuit held that "[u]nder the unique circumstances of this case, where any prior attempt to raise the Ford issue would almost certainly have been dismissed as premature, it would not have been an abuse of the writ to permit the district court to consider it. See In re Hanserd; Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998); see also Nguyen v. Gibson, 162 F.3d 600, 601 (1998) (Briscoe, J., dissenting)."⁴ Coe v. Bell, Nos. 00-5323/5327/5328/5329 March 21, 2000 Order, at 5-6.

This petition was filed on March 17, 2000, so the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")⁵ apply for purposes of this court's analysis.⁶ See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir.1997). In finding that this court has jurisdiction over this petition, it would appear that the Sixth Circuit determined that this present petition was not a "second or successive" petition under the AEDPA and, as such, it is not barred by the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). This court's standard of review, however, must follow the AEDPA. See, e.g., Brown v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.1999) (finding that although first § 2254 petition was filed prior to AEDPA and second § 2254 petition was filed after AEDPA, the second petition was not barred as "second or successive" petition but denied habeas relief under § 2254(d) provision of the AEDPA).

Under the AEDPA, federal courts must give greater deference to determinations made by state courts than they were required to do before the Act. See Jones v. Jones, 76 F.Supp.2d 850, 854 (E.D.Tenn.1999). A federal court reviewing a state court decision under the AEDPA may only grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus where the state court proceedings:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,⁷ or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). Factual findings reached by the state court carry a presumption of correctness that the petitioner has the burden of rebutting by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Petitioner has asserted that the issue of competency is a mixed question of law and fact. (Docket No. 4 at 14, citing Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1514 (6th Cir.1993)) The Tennessee Supreme Court in Van Tran clearly held that "[a]lthough likely based upon expert medical and mental health testimony, the ultimate question as to whether the prisoner is competent is a question of fact." Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 271. In so holding, the court cited to Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), in which the Supreme Court treated the issue of competency to stand trial as a factual issue.⁸ Since the ruling in Maggio, the Supreme Court, in addressing the issue of whether a question is to be treated as a factual or legal issue for purposes of § 2254(d), confirmed that it has classified as a factual issue the question of competency to stand trial.⁹ See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110-111, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). Despite these Supreme Court rulings, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that competency is a mixed question of law and fact.¹⁰ See e.g., United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 581 (6th Cir.1999); Devine v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 187 F.3d 635, 1999 WL 551400 (6th Cir. July 20, 1999); Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1096, 116 S.Ct. 822, 133 L.Ed.2d 765 (1996). It makes a technical difference in the analysis.

If competency is a question of fact, the state court determination is entitled to the presumption of correctness, and the petitioner must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In addition, an application for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied unless the state court decision was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented" at the hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

If competency is a mixed question of law and fact, the presumption of correctness does not apply, and the analysis must be under § 2254(d)(1). See Nevers, 169 F.3d at 360. See also Harpster, 128 F.3d at 327. The Sixth Circuit has defined an "unreasonable application[] of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" under § 2254(d)(1) to be a state court decision "so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible outcomes." Nevers, 169 F.3d at 362 (citing O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir.1998)).¹¹

As a practical matter, for purposes of this case, this court need not decide whether to analyze the state court determination under the "fact" standard or under the "mixed question of law and fact" standard. This is not a close case, and the result would be the same under either standard. In the interest of brevity, the analysis will be conducted only under the "mixed question of law and fact" standard, as the Sixth Circuit and the petitioner would have it be.

DISCUSSION

I. Petitioner's Claims for Relief

A. Petitioner is not competent to be executed.

The trial court decided on February 2, 2000 that Robert Glen Coe "is presently mentally competent to be executed." (Trial Ct.Op. at 28)¹² On March 6, 2000, the Tennessee Supreme Court...