Coelho v. Posi-Seal Intern., Inc.

Citation544 A.2d 170,208 Conn. 106
Decision Date28 June 1988
Docket NumberPOSI-SEAL,No. 13267,13267
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Parties, 3 IER Cases 821 Robert COELHO v.INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Gilbert Shasha, New London, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, Robert Coelho, alleged in his amended complaint that he had been discharged without just cause by the defendant, Posi-Seal International, Inc. (Posi-Seal), in breach of implied and express employment contracts between them. 1 At the close of its instructions, the trial court provided the jury with a special verdict form on which to answer special interrogatories relating to the allegations of the complaint. The jury returned its verdict on the special verdict form. The jury found the issues for the plaintiff on his implied contract count but found for Posi-Seal on his express contract claim. 2 Posi-Seal claims that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict: (1) when there was insufficient evidence to permit the jury to find (a) that the parties had made an implied agreement that the plaintiff could not be terminated without just cause, (b) that the plaintiff had relied on the implied agreement to his detriment, and (c) that the plaintiff had been terminated without just cause; and (2) when the court had failed to instruct the jury that a termination because of a reduction in force is, as a matter of law, just cause.

After denying motions of both [208 Conn. 108] parties to set aside the verdict, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. 3 Posi-Seal has appealed from the judgment. 4 We find no error.

From the evidence at trial the jury could reasonably have found the following facts: Posi-Seal is a corporation with its principal office in the town of North Stonington. It manufactures high performance valves for the chemical, petroleum and nuclear industries. In January, 1981, the plaintiff, who was then unemployed, had a job interview with the president of Posi-Seal, Donald Miller. On February 9, 1981, the plaintiff commenced employment with Posi-Seal as quality control manager. On January 6, 1984, Posi-Seal terminated his employment.

I

Posi-Seal first claims that there was insufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that the parties had made an implied-in-fact agreement that the plaintiff could not be terminated without just cause.

The plaintiff's evidence of an implied-in-fact agreement consisted of his own testimony concerning statements made by Miller, president of Posi-Seal, both prior to and after his employment commenced on February 9, 1981. The plaintiff testified that he had raised his concerns about job security when Miller interviewed him in January, 1981. The plaintiff testified that Miller had made the following statement about job security. "It's [Posi-Seal is] the General Motors of the future. If you come to work with us, you'll never have to worry. Grow with us into the future. As long as you do your job, you'll ... have a good future with us." The plaintiff further testified that, before he was hired by Posi-Seal, Miller had told him: "Those people that join us now are going to grow with us into the future."

The plaintiff testified that he had, during this interview with Miller, expressed serious reservations about becoming manager of quality control at Posi-Seal because he believed that there was an inherent conflict between the managers of quality control and of manufacturing about whether to emphasize meeting quality standards or reducing costs. The plaintiff was aware that the previous manager of quality control had recently left Posi-Seal. The plaintiff testified that he had told Miller: "If I'm going to take a job like this, I need to know we're going to have support from the upper levels of management. That I'm going to have the support that I need to do my job, if you want me to do it." The plaintiff testified that, in response to his concern that a quality department must have assurances from management in order to function properly, Miller had said: "You'll get it here." During the trial, Posi-Seal's counsel asked the plaintiff: "And you also told him that you wanted to be in a situation where the quality would be backed up with regard to disputes with manufacturing; is that right?" He responded: "I wanted to know that I could properly perform my job." The next question was: "And he told you that he'd see that the quality was backed up?" The plaintiff answered: "He had no problem in backing me to the hilt." The next question was: "Is it fair to say that what he responded to your statement of your expectations was, 'We'll back up quality, and we believe we've got a great future here, and we're going to go far?' " The plaintiff then replied: "I guess that's what he said. He said, 'We've got a great future here.' The problem I [have] is with the word 'believe.' I don't believe that ... at [any] time did Don Miller use the word 'believe.' He said, 'We've got a great thing here, we're growing in the future, and join us, and come with us.' "

The plaintiff also testified that, after he had commenced employment with Posi-Seal, Miller further guaranteed him support and job security when the plaintiff had become involved in a dispute with the manager of manufacturing at Posi-Seal. The plaintiff testified: "Time and time again [Miller] said to me, 'Don't worry about it. Don't worry about it. You're all set. You don't have to worry. Just do your job. If I've got you and [the head of manufacturing] butting heads, then I know you're doing your job. Don't worry about it.' " In addition, the plaintiff testified that at management meetings Miller would frequently make statements concerning the job security of his management "team," with the clear implication that the plaintiff was a member of this team. In this regard, the plaintiff testified: "Miller had a habit ... had a particular set of words that he liked, and at staff meetings he'd slide his back away from the table and say, 'This is the team.' He said that time and time again, 'this is the team.' And he made references to, 'This is the team that will take us into the next century. This is the team of the future. This is the team that will carry this company ahead.' "

" 'A contract implied in fact, like an express contract, depends on actual agreement.' " D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 211 n. 2, 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co., 180 Conn. 91, 94, 429 A.2d 808 (1980); Brighenti v. New Britain Shirt Corporation, 167 Conn. 403, 406, 356 A.2d 181 (1974); Corriveau v. Jenkins Bros., 144 Conn. 383, 387, 132 A.2d 67 (1957). Accordingly, to prevail on the first count of his complaint, which alleged the existence of an implied agreement between the parties, the plaintiff had the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Posi-Seal had " 'agreed, either by words or action or conduct, to undertake [some] form of actual contract commitment' " to him under which he could not be terminated without just cause. D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 212 n. 2, 520 A.2d 217; Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co., supra, 180 Conn. at 94-95, 429 A.2d 808.

Posi-Seal contends that all of the statements that the plaintiff testified had been made to him were, at most, merely expressions of Miller's expectations about the future, and were not manifestations of a "In considering a motion to set aside the verdict, the court must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict. Campbell v. Gould, 194 Conn. 35, 41, 478 A.2d 596 (1984). The trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict is entitled to great weight and every reasonable presumption should be indulged in favor of its correctness. Herb v. Kerr, [190 Conn. 136, 139, 459 A.2d 521 (1983) ]; Katsetos v. Nolan, [170 Conn. 637, 656, 368 A.2d 172 (1976) ]. This is so because '[f]rom the vantage point of the trial bench, a presiding judge can sense the atmosphere of a trial and can apprehend far better than we can, on the printed record, what factors, if any, could have improperly influenced the jury.' Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 26, 301 A.2d 249 (1972).... It is the function of this court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying [a party's] motion." Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 139, 540 A.2d 666 (1988).

present intention on the part of the company to undertake contractual obligations to the plaintiff under which he could not be terminated without just cause.

"Absent a statutory warranty or definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended to encompass in their contractual commitments is a question of the intention of the parties, and an inference of fact. As an inference of fact, it is not reversible [error] unless the [trier of fact] could not reasonably have arrived at the conclusion that it reached." Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Products, Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 274-75, 439 A.2d 314 (1981). "This process of inference is peculiarly a jury function, the raison d'etre of the jury system." Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 256, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15, 78 S.Ct. 36, 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957).

We need not decide whether there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that the parties had an implied agreement that the plaintiff could not be terminated without just cause under all circumstances. We conclude, however, that sufficient evidence was adduced to allow the jury to find that the parties had an implied agreement that the plaintiff would not be terminated as a result of conflicts between the quality...

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