Coello-Udiel v. Doll, 3:17-CV-1414
| Decision Date | 14 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:17-CV-1414,3:17-CV-1414 |
| Parties | LUIS A. COELLO-UDIEL, Petitioner, v. CLAIR DOLL, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
Presently before me is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle (Doc. 6), which recommends that I grant Petitioner Luis A. Coello-Udiel's ("Coello-Udiel") Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 directing that a bond hearing be held in his removal proceedings. (Doc. 1.) Because the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018), decided after the Report and Recommendation was issued, has abrogated the Third Circuit cases on which the Report and Recommendation is based, the Report and Recommendation will be rejected.
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts or procedural history. On August 10, 2017, Coello-Udiel, a lawful permanent resident, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which alleged he had been detained for removal proceedings. (Doc. 1.) Coello-Udiel alleges he was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") on February 7, 2017, and has been detained since then. Id. at ¶ 12.
On February 28, 2017, Coello-Udiel appeared with counsel in immigration court for his first master calendar hearing, and the Court granted his counsel's request for a continuance to prepare. (Doc. 14, Ex. 1 at ¶ 2.) On March 1, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") filed a notice that it was ready to proceed and objected to any further continuances. (Doc. 14, Ex. 2.) On March 14, 2017, the immigration C ourt sua sponte rescheduled Coello-Udiel's master calendar hearing. (Doc. 14, Ex. 1 at ¶ 5.) On March 15, 2017, and March 29, 2017, Coello-Udiel was released to Lancaster County on a writ. Id. at ¶ 6.
Coello-Udiel appeared with counsel at a master calendar hearing on April 3, 2017, where he filed a motion to suppress evidence and to terminate the proceedings. Id. at ¶ 7. The Court adjourned the case to June 14, 2017, for a suppression hearing. Id.
On May 3, 2017, DHS received Coello-Udiel's relief application and memorandum in support of his motion to suppress and terminate. Id. at ¶ 8. On June 8, 2017, Coello-Udiel filed a motion to cancel the hearing scheduled for June 14, 2017. Id. at ¶ 9. On June 12, 2017, the Court granted the motion. (Doc. 14, Ex. 3.)
On July 18, 2017, DHS received Coello-Udiel's motion to terminate the removal proceedings. (Doc. 14, Ex. 1 at ¶ 10.) On August 4, 2017, DHS received a motion from Coello-Udiel to strike the DHS pleadings. Id. at ¶ 12. The Court then sua sponte continued the merits hearing scheduled for August 10, 2017. Id. at ¶ 13.
On August 28, 2017, the parties argued Coello-Udiel's suppression motion. Id. at ¶ 14. On September 13, 2017, the immigration Court issued a written decision denying suppression and termination. (Doc. 14, Ex. 4.)
On September 18, 2017, Coello-Udiel appeared at what his counsel thought would be a merits hearing, but the Court had scheduled the case for a master calendar hearing, so the Court adjourned to October 13, 2017, for a merits hearing. (Doc. 14, Ex. 1 at ¶ 16.) On September 20, 2017, DHS filed additional evidence. Id. at ¶ 17. On October 13, 2017, the merits hearing did not take place, presumably continued by the Court sua sponte. Id. at ¶ 18. The merits hearing scheduled for November 14, 2017, was also continued. Id.
On December 14, 2017, the immigration Judge conducted a hearing on the merits of Coello-Udiel's applications for relief, denied relief, and ordered Coello-Udiel removed to Honduras. (Doc. 14, Ex. 5, 6.) Coello-Udiel reserved appeal. Id.
On January 8, 2018, Coello-Udiel filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). (Doc. 14, Ex. 7.) On February 12, 2018, DHS received the BIA briefing schedule and filed its motion for summary affirmance on March 2, 2018. (Doc. 14, Ex. 8.) Coello-Udiel's brief was filed on March 1, 2018. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶ 21.) The appeal remains pending. Id.
Coello-Udiel filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 10, 2017, alleging that his detention would, "in all likelihood," be extended into a "lengthy period of time" as he planned to appeal any adverse decision issued by the immigration court to the BIA and the Third Circuit. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16-17.) Thus, in anticipation of what would be a lengthy detention while he pursued all available means of relief from removal, Coello-Udiel requested that he be provided with immediate release or a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Id. at p. 11.
On February 22, 2018, Magistrate Judge Arbuckle recommended that Coello-Udiel's Petition be granted because Respondents had not opposed his request for a hearing, and because existing Third Circuit case law appeared to require one. (Doc. 6.) On April 19, 2018, Respondents filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, arguing that the February 27, 2018, Supreme Court decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez had implicitly overturned the existing Third Circuit precedent and therefore required that Coello-Udiel's Petition be dismissed. (Docs. 13, 14.) On April 26, 2018, Coello-Udiel filed his Response in support of the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 15.) Therefore, this Petition is now ripe for disposition.
When objections to a magistrate judge's Report are filed, the court must conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of the Report. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). In conducting a de novo review, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Owens v. Beard, 829 F. Supp. 736, 738 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
The outcome of the instant motion depends on whether the Supreme Court's recent decision in Jennings overturned Third Circuit precedent requiring a hearing in the circumstances presented here. Since this question has not been previously decided, I will discuss the relevant case law in detail.
"[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),1 which requires the Attorney General to detain aliens convicted of certain crimes, was enacted to address the issue of such aliens fleeing while released on bond. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2003). "Notably, section 1226(c) does not give the Attorney General any authority to release these aliens on bond." Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2015)(citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 521). The Demore Court recognized that aliens are protected by constitutional due process. 538 U.S. at 523. However, the Court explained that "[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." Id. at 521 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). "The Court, in essence, concluded that Congress lawfully required the Attorney General to make presumptions of flight and dangerousness about the alien solely because he belonged to the group of aliens convicted of the types of crimes defined in section 1226(c)." Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 473. Thus, the Demore Court held that the Government's authority under § 1226(c) to detain aliens without an opportunity for bond complies with the Constitution. 538 U.S. at 531.
However, the Third Circuit has "read Demore as also recognizing that there are limits to this power." Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 473 (citing Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011); Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 678 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2012)). Specifically, the Chavez-Alvarez Court recognized that Demore held that mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens pending removal proceedings does not in itself offend due process, but also noted that the Demore Court based this ruling upon the short, fixed, and finite term of pre-removal detention. Id. at 474. Justice Kennedy highlighted this in his concurring opinion in Demore. 53 8 U.S. at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring)( ). Consequently, the Chavez-Alvarez Court read a reasonable time limit into the statute, relying on the Court's earlier decision in Diop, which employed the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to come to this conclusion. See Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 475; Diop, 656 F.3d at 231 (). The Chavez-Alvarez Court further clarified that, in the case of an alien who is prosecuting a good faith challenge to his removal, the "tipping point" at which an alien's interest in liberty outweighs the interests advanced by § 1226(c) occurs sometime after the six-month time frame considered in Demore and before the alien has been detained for one year. Id. at 478."[W]hen detention becomes unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of proving that continued detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the detention statute." Diop, 656 F.3d at 233.
Applying the standard articulated in Ch...
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