Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Hawks

• Decision Date: 09 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-35755,17-35755
• Citation: 933 F.3d 1052
• Parties: COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steve W. HAWKS; Deanne A. Hawks, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

933 F.3d 1052

COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Steve W. HAWKS; Deanne A. Hawks, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35755

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 12, 2018 Portland, Oregon

Filed August 9, 2019

Jillian H. Caires (argued) and Peter J. Smith IV, Smith & Malek PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant.

Norman M. Semanko (argued), Parsons Behle & Latimer, Boise, Idaho; Matthew J. McGee, Spink Butler LLP, Boise, Idaho; for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Richard R. Clifton and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges, and Roger T. Benitez,^* District Judge.

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question of whether the grant of federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 encompasses an action to recognize and enforce a tribal court’s award against nonmembers of the tribe. The district court concluded that the action, filed by an Indian tribe seeking to enforce a tribal court judgment against nonmembers, did not present a federal question and dismissed it based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Inherent in the recognition of a tribal court’s judgment against a nonmember is a question regarding the extent of the powers reserved to the tribe under federal law. As in previous decisions involving the application of tribal law to nonmembers, we hold that actions seeking to enforce a tribal judgment against nonmembers raise a substantial question of federal law. We accordingly reverse the district court’s order dismissing the case for lack of subject of matter jurisdiction.

I. Background

Plaintiff-Appellant Coeur d’Alene Tribe (the "Tribe") is a federally recognized Indian Tribe and the beneficial owner of submerged portions of Lake Coeur d’Alene and the St. Joe River. See Idaho v. United States , 533 U.S. 262, 265, 121 S.Ct. 2135, 150 L.Ed.2d 326 (2001). Defendants-Appellees Steve and Deanne Hawks are not members of the Tribe but own an interest in real property abutting the St. Joe River. The Hawks also own and maintain a boat garage set on pilings that extend from their property into the St. Joe River. Beginning in 2003, the Tribe advised the Hawks through letters and compliance orders that the pilings and boat garage encroached on land the Tribe is entitled to control. The Hawks never responded.

In 2016, the Tribe sued the Hawks in the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court (the "Tribal Court") for encroachment without a permit in violation of tribal law. The Hawks were served with notice but did not answer the complaint or otherwise contest the allegations. The Tribal Court accordingly entered default judgment against the Hawks in the form of a $3,900 civil penalty and a declaration that the Tribe was entitled to remove the encroachments.¹

The Tribe subsequently sought federal recognition and enforcement of the Tribal Court’s judgment by filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho.² The Hawks moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tribe responded by arguing that the case fell under the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of federal law because in order to enforce the judgment, the court would be required to determine the extent of the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over nonmembers, a question that federal law governs. Although the district court acknowledged that the Tribal Court’s authority over the Hawks presented a federal question, it held the question was not present on the face of the Tribe’s complaint. Having found "no federal statute or law ... in dispute," the district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tribe timely appealed.

II. Discussion

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation , 373 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 2004).

The cases that a federal court may decide are limited to those authorized by the Constitution and federal statutes and are "not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). We are to "presume[ ] that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Id. (citations omitted); see also Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation , 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

Congress has granted federal courts jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.³ Included within this grant of jurisdiction are cases arising under rules articulated by federal courts in the form of federal common law. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians , 471 U.S. 845, 850, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). An action arises under federal law only if federal law "creates the cause of action" or "a substantial question of federal law is a necessary element" of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization , 858 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1988). "This means that a plaintiff may not establish federal jurisdiction by asserting in its complaint that the defendant will raise a federal-law defense to the plaintiff’s claim, ... or by including in its complaint allegations of federal-law questions that are not essential to its claim. ..." Id. (citations omitted).

Because the district court complaint did not explicitly present any federal cause of action, jurisdiction of the federal courts over this action depends on the necessary presence of a substantial question of federal law. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal. , 463 U.S. 1, 27–28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) ; Morongo Band , 858 F.2d at 1383. In deciding whether a federal ingredient suffices for a case to arise under federal law, the Supreme Court has emphasized:

[I]n exploring the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system. "If the history of the interpretation of judiciary legislation teaches us anything, it teaches the duty to reject treating such statutes as a wooden set of self-sufficient words."

Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 810, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986) (quoting Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co. , 358 U.S. 354, 379, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) ).

"[F]ederal question jurisdiction does not exist merely because an Indian tribe is a party ...." Stock W. , 873 F.2d at 1225. Nor is there any general "federal common law of Indian affairs." Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians , 538 U.S. 701, 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, 155 L.Ed.2d 933 (2003). Rather, we must articulate a specific rule of federal common law under which the Tribe’s case arises. See id.

The Tribe has argued that its enforcement action arises under federal common-law rules limiting its authority over nonmembers. A tribe’s authority does not spring from federal law but rather derives from the "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."

United States v. Wheeler , 435 U.S. 313, 322, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (ed. 1945)), superseded by statute on other grounds . Tribal sovereignty nevertheless "exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance." Id. at 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079. Thus, because "federal law defines the outer boundaries of an Indian tribe’s power over non-Indians," Nat’l Farmers , 471 U.S. at 851, 105 S.Ct. 2447, the question of "whether a tribal court has adjudicative authority over nonmembers is a federal question," Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. , 554 U.S. 316, 324, 128 S.Ct. 2709, 171 L.Ed.2d 457 (2008).

In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians , 471 U.S. 845, 847, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1978), a tribal court entered default judgment against a school district. The school district subsequently sued in federal court to prevent execution of the tribal court’s judgment, claiming that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court held that the school district’s "right to be protected against an unlawful exercise of [a tribe’s] judicial power" presented a federal question, as the right could not be vindicated without reference to the federal law that curtailed the tribe’s authority. Id. at 851–53, 105 S.Ct. 2447 ; see also Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas , 77 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 1995).

Had the Hawks brought a "colorable claim" in federal court, alleging the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, National Farmers would directly control. Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians , 940 F.2d 1269, 1272 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991). It is the Tribe, not the Hawks, however, who brought suit. And it is not protection from the Tribal Court’s judgment the complaint seeks, but enforcement of it. Even if the Hawks had defended on the basis that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over them, that federal issue would have been present only in the form of an anticipated defense. To find jurisdiction on that basis alone would contravene the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Vaden v. Discover Bank , 556 U.S. 49, 60, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009) ; Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp. , 682 F.2d 1311, 1314–15 (9th Cir. 1982) ; see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham , 489 U.S. 838, 841, 109 S.Ct. 1519, 103 L.Ed.2d 924 (1989) (holding a tribe’s sovereign immunity defense insufficient to raise a federal question); Morongo Band , 858 F.2d at 1386.

Relying on our decision in Wilson v. Marchington , 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), the Tribe contended an examination of the scope of a tribal court’s jurisdiction is an implicit predicate...