Cofer v. Lanigan
| Decision Date | 19 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 18-9590 (RBK) (KMW) |
| Parties | BRIAN COFER, Plaintiff, v. GARY M. LANIGAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Plaintiff, Brian Cofer, is a state prisoner. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the South Woods State Prison ("SWSP") at the time of the events giving rise to his complaint. Plaintiff was previously granted in forma pauperis status.
This Court must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to determine whether the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or whether it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the following reasons, the complaint will be permitted to proceed in part.
The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this screening opinion. Plaintiff names the following as defendants in his complaint: (1) Gary M. Lanigan - Commissioner; (2) Willie Bonds - Administrator; (3) Sergeant John Doe; (4) Lieutenant Ware; (5) Officer Vargas; (6) SID Investigator Petit; (7) SID Investigator John Doe; (8) Officers John Doe 1-100; (9) Officers Jane Doe 1-100; (10) Inmate Walter Sosa; (11) Manual Mattias; and (12) the Master Lock Company.
Plaintiff asserts that he was incarcerated at SWSP in March, 2018. Vargas, a correctional officer at SWSP, entered plaintiff's dormitory to conduct a head count. After completing his count, Sammy Cedano, an inmate, began to strike plaintiff on the head, face and body with a combination lock attached to a cloth string, commonly known as a "lock in a sock." Vargas observed the attack and activated his emergency button while Cedano was striking plaintiff. As Cedano continued his attack, Vargas exited the dormitory.
While Vargas was absent, Cedano broke the combination lock after having struck plaintiff approximately twenty times. However, Cedano assembled another "lock in a sock." Thereafter, Cedano began to strike plaintiff again approximately a dozen more times.
In the midst of this second attack by Cedano, Vargas returned with additional officers and ordered Cedano to stop hitting plaintiff. Cedano complied with the officers' orders.
Cedano and plaintiff were then both handcuffed. Plaintiff was then taken to the nurses' office for treatment.
Sergeant John Doe questioned plaintiff about the attack. Plaintiff recounted the events to him. Vargas also gave an account that was similar to plaintiff's version. Ware also questioned plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff was later questioned by Investigators Petit and John Doe.
Plaintiff was not charged with any infraction. Evidence was gathered from the scene which included one broken combination lock and one intact combination lock along with the cloth sling.
According to plaintiff, the two locks used in the attack were from inmates Sosa and Mattias. Sosa and Mattias were given sanctions because their locks were not properly secured and were used in the attack on plaintiff.
Following the investigation, plaintiff returned to the same dormitory. Thereafter, Sergeant John Doe asked plaintiff aloud in his dormitory whether he wished to file charges against his attacker as well as whether he wished to be placed in protective custody. Plaintiff declined both offers.
Plaintiff asserts that a prison gang was behind the attack on him and that they intended to attack plaintiff again. Plaintiff states that Cedano had attacked another inmate previously using a "lock in a sock" at the Southern State Correctional Facility before he attacked plaintiff at SWSP. Plaintiff claims that this attack was known to SWSP personnel.
Plaintiff alleges that he experienced debilitating effects for several days after the attack as well as nightmares and anxiety.
Plaintiff states that Lanigan is liable because he failed to ensure that Bonds carry out a policy to curb violent acts of inmates with a documented history of violence.
Bonds is purportedly liable because he failed to ensure that his subordinates took precautions to prevent the classification of an inmate with a known history of violence to be placed in a minimum security dormitory.
Ware, Sergeant John Doe as well as Investigators Petit and John Doe are liable according to plaintiff because they failed to place plaintiff in protective custody following the assault.
Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that all the defendants are liable under the Eighth Amendment by showing deliberate indifference to plaintiff's need for safety.
Plaintiff states that the Master Lock Company is liable under the Eighth Amendment and for negligence.
Finally, plaintiff states that Sosa and Mattias are liable under the Eighth Amendment for failing to have their combination locks secured.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as relief.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l)); Courteau v. United States, 287 Fed.Appx. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege 'sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff appears to be asserting two different claims against Vargas. First, that Vargas failed to protect him; second, that Vargas failed to intervene when the inmate began beating plaintiff. Both are considered in turn.
To state a claim against a prison official for failure to protect, "the inmate must plead facts that show: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and (3) the official's deliberate indifference caused him harm." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997)). "Deliberate indifference" is a subjective standard where '"the prison official-defendant must actually have known of or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.'" Id. (citing Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)). As noted by the Third Circuit:
It is not sufficient that the official should have known of the risk. [Beers Capitol, 256 F.3d at] 133. A plaintiff can, however, prove an official's actual knowledge of a substantial risk to his safety "in the usual ways, including interference from circumstantial evidence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at...
To continue reading
Request your trial