Coffel v. Perry
| Decision Date | 30 August 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-682A172,2-682A172 |
| Citation | 452 N.E.2d 1066 |
| Parties | Hal COFFEL, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Lloyd G. PERRY, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Paul F. Shappell, Portland, for appellant.
Lloyd G. Perry, pro se.
Hal Coffel (Coffel) appeals the trial court's modification of a jury's verdict in a civil conversion action brought by Lloyd Perry (Perry). Perry's complaint was in two counts. Count I alleged tortious conversion of two root rakes. 1 Count II alleged Coffel's conduct also constituted criminal conversion, I.C. 35-43-4-3 (Burns Code Ed., Repl.1979), and therefore warranted treble damages under I.C. 34-4-30-1 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1982). A jury awarded Perry $1200.00 on Count I, but found against Perry on Count II. The trial court granted Perry's motion to correct errors, entered judgment on the evidence on Count I increasing the award to $4,750.00, and entered judgment for Perry on Count II for treble damages ($14,250.00), attorney fees and costs. On appeal, Coffel challenges
the modification of the jury's verdicts under Trial Rule 59(J) as a confusion of the standards for judgment on the evidence and the grant of a new trial. We reverse.
The trial court found the jury's verdicts on both counts were "clearly and without question contrary to the evidence and the law," and entered judgment on the evidence. Judgment on the evidence after a jury verdict is proper only where the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. Huff v. Travelers Indemnity Co., (1977) 266 Ind. 414, 363 N.E.2d 985. However, if there is sufficient relevant evidence to support the verdict as a matter of law, judgment on the evidence is inappropriate. Id.
In considering the relief of entering judgment on the evidence, the trial court must consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the non-moving party. Id. It may not weigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses because of the constitutional right under Article 1, Sec. 20 of the Indiana Constitution to have a jury perform the fact-finding functions. Id.
Judgment on the evidence must be distinguished from the relief of a new trial. The trial court may grant a new trial where the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. Hence, in ruling on a motion to correct errors seeking the relief of a new trial, the trial court sits as a "thirteenth juror." It weighs the conflicting evidence and judges the credibility of witnesses to determine if a contrary conclusion should have been reached in the minds of reasonable persons. Huff, 363 N.E.2d at 994. Thus, a new trial is warranted if the trial judge determines the jury verdict was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Weenig v. Wood, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 413, 349 N.E.2d 235. The trial judge may perform these fact-finding functions in the determination to grant a new trial since the right to a jury trial is preserved.
A new trial may also be appropriate where the verdict is clearly erroneous but the entry of judgment on the evidence would be impractical, unfair or otherwise improper. Where a new trial is ordered for these reasons, the trial court must include findings which indicate why judgment on the evidence was not entered. Borowski v. Rupert, (1972) 152 Ind.App. 9, 281 N.E.2d 502.
To facilitate appellate review, both the entry of judgment on the evidence and the grant of a new trial must be supported by findings. Entry of judgment on the evidence requires a statement of general reasons, whereas, the grant of a new trial requires special findings of fact upon each material issue or element upon which a new trial is granted. Additionally, if a new trial is granted because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the findings must relate the evidence supporting and opposing the verdict. Id.
The appellate court and the trial court employ the same standard of review in determining the propriety of a judgment on the evidence. However, in the appellate court's review of the trial court's grant of a new trial, the ruling is presumed correct. Hence, the appellate court only reviews for an abuse of discretion, a flagrant injustice, or a strong case for relief. Stanley v. Kelley, (1981) Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 663.
The trial court determined the jury's award of $1200.00 was contrary to the evidence and entered judgment for $4750.00. Damages may be modified by a judgment on the evidence only where the jury's award does not reflect clear and unrebutted evidence on damages; the jury's award must be inadequate as a matter of law. Where the evidence on damages is variable or conflicting, and the jury's award is within the range of the evidence, entry of judgment modifying the jury's award is an The trial court erred in increasing the award of damages because the jury's award was within the scope of the evidence. Generally, damages for conversion of property are measured by the market value of the property at the time of conversion since an action for conversion does not seek return of the property but only return of its value. THQ Venture v. SW, Inc., (1983) Ind.App., 444 N.E.2d 335. Here, the range of evidence on market value was $1000 to $5000. However, damages are restricted to actual losses sustained as a proximate result of the conversion. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 516, 329 N.E.2d 620. Consequently, damages are mitigated by return of the property to the owner, Smith v. Downing, (1855) 6 Ind. 374; or by application of the property to its lien. Yeager & Sullivan, Inc. v. Farmers Bank, (1974) 162 Ind.App. 15, 317 N.E.2d 792. In the instant case, the root rakes were pledged as collateral on a note held by the First Bank of Decatur. Coffel delivered the rakes to the bank according to Perry's demand.
invasion of the jury's province and consequently erroneous. 2 Weenig
Where converted property is returned, damages for the deprivation of the use of the property may be measured by the fair rental value for the...
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