Coffer v. State, No. 29659

• Docket Nº: No. 29659
• Citation: 239 Ind. 22, 154 N.E.2d 371
• Case Date: December 10, 1958
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 371

154 N.E.2d 371 239 Ind. 22 Ernest COFFER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee. No. 29659. Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 10, 1958.

[239 Ind. 23] Adeline C. Lehman, Washington, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Merl M. Wall, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ACHOR, Judge.

Appellant was found guilty of entering a school house with intent to commit a felony therein, under § 10-704, Burns' 1956 Repl. [Acts 1941, ch, 148, § 5, p. 447.]

Appellant asserted as grounds for new trial, and here contends, that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence. In particular appellant contends first, that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that appellant participated in the larceny of the building. Furthermore, he asserts that, assuming he participated in the larceny, there is no evidence to support the allegation that he entered the building with that prerequisite intent.

We consider the issue of intent first. Criminal intent to commit a specific criminal act may be presumed from the voluntary commission of the act. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 34, 92. Bleiweiss v. State, 1918, 188 Ind. 184, 119 N.E. 375, 122 N.E. 577. The testimony of Jaret Keith, an accomplice, was that 'after we got in the car * * * he (appellant) made the statement that we should go over and break into the school house and so we did.' [239 Ind. 24] That he and appellant actually drove to the school house, entered through a window, took off the door of a storage room and stole a large quantify of 'surplus foods,' which they took to the apartment of appellant's girl friend. This evidence was sufficient to prove the prerequisite intent, providing the testimony could be believed.

Page 372

Next we consider appellant's contention that his participation in the offense was not supported by evidence sufficiently convincing or credible to sustain the verdict. Appellant argues that the evidence consists only of the testimony of an accomplice which, in itself, should be accepted with caution, and that his testimony was incapable of belief beyond a reasonable doubt because of the conflicts in his testimony with that of other witnesses. In Indiana the testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to convict without corroboration. Ingram v. State, 1951, 230 Ind. 25, 99 N.E.2d 410.

However, in this case the evidence of the accomplice is not without corroboration. Although she later denied it, appellant's girl friend testified that appellant and his accomplice...