Coffey v. Bd. of Election Com'rs of East St. Louis

• Decision Date: 12 February 1941
• Docket Number: No. 25805.,25805.
• Citation: 31 N.E.2d 588,375 Ill. 385
• Parties: COFFEY v. BOARD OF ELECTION COM'RS OF EAST ST. LOUIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

375 Ill. 385

31 N.E.2d 588

COFFEY

v.BOARD OF ELECTION COM'RS OF EAST ST. LOUIS.

No. 25805.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 12, 1940.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1941.

Proceeding by E. J. Coffey against the Board of Election Commissioners of East St. Louis to compel the board to register plaintiff as a qualified voter.From an adverse order, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

FARTHING and MURPHY, JJ., dissenting.Appeal from St. Clair County Court; Joseph E. Fleming, Judge.

H. Grady Vien, of East.St. Louis (James J. Hickey, of East St. Louis, of counsel), for appellant.

R. W. Ropiequet, of East St. Louis (Hugh Parker, of Aurora, Homer W. Hall, of Bloomington, John J. Driscoll, of Cairo, Cassius M. Doty and Robert L. Taylor, both of Chicago, Colfax T. Martin, of Danville, Jerry A. Harn, of Galesburg, Eugene R. Johnson, of Peoria, B. J. Knight, of Rockford, W. Edgar Sampson, of Springfield, and Walter F. Dodd, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

WILSON, Justice.

E. J. Coffey, on March 11, 1940, personally requested the board of election commissioners of East St. Louis to register him as a voter from precinct No. 38 of the city.Upon a hearing, the board refused his application.Subsequently, on April 4, 1940, he filed a petition in the county court of St. Clair county seeking an order directing the commissioners to register him as a qualified voter.From the order adjudging that his name should not be placed upon the registry of precinct No. 38, Coffey prosecutes this appeal.

The appellant, Coffey, is engaged in business in East St. Louis and also manages a coal company in St. Louis, Missouri.From his testimony it appears that he moved into precinct No. 38 in 1906, and, during the twenty-four years prior to 1936, resided with his family, consisting of his wife and their children, in a house at 436 North Eleventh street owned by him since 1918; that in June, 1936, he moved to and has since occupied a home purchased on Robyn Road, Webster Groves, in St. Louis county, Missouri, and that he moved primarily to place a son and a daughter in Washington University and Maryville College, respectively, and two younger sons in the St. Louis University High School.A married son, a widower, and a widowed daughter have occupied appellant's house in East St. Louis for approximately four years.He testified that he carried a key to the house, enjoying the privilege of staying whenever he so desired, and that although he did not actually live in the house he had been in it several times since moving to St. Louis county.Appellant claimed his residence to be 436 North Eleventh street, East St. Louis, and when asked whether he intended to return there, replied, ‘Yes or maintain an address in Illinois.’He testified further that he consulted attorneys in Illinois and Missouri with respect to retaining his residence in Illinios, and that he thought he told them he intended to return to East St. Louis when his children had completed their education.Additional testimony discloses that an annual report of the Coffey-Schreiber Tire and Gasoline Company to the Secretary of State of Illinois, dated January 15, 1940, and verified by appellant, designates his address as secretary, treasurer and director, as ‘Box 330, R.R. 6, Webster Groves, Mo.’

The sole issue for decision is whether appellant in March, 1940, was a resident of East St. Louis entitled to register as a voter.Unless he satisfied the applicable requirements of residence in Illinois one year, in St. Clair county ninety days, and in precinct No. 38 of East St. Louis thirty days next preceding any election therein, appellant was not entitled to be registered.It is established that a permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence within the contemplation of the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions.Pope v. Board of Election Com'rs, 370 Ill. 196, 18 N.E.2d 214.A real and not an imaginary abode occupied as his home or dwelling, we have held, is essential to satisfy the residential qualifications prescribed by law.In particular, a voter must show a place of residence or permanent abode for the requisite statutory period in the precinct in which he seeks to vote, which he has not abandoned but occupies as an abode, or to which he...